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Follow-up to the twentieth special session of the General Assembly

**Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation  
Final Synthesis Report \*\***

1. In March of 2002, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs issued resolution 45/14 urging member states, in league with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to prepare a comprehensive thematic evaluation of Alternative Development. Synthesized below are that evaluation's findings, which rest on recent studies of AD in Southeast Asia and the South American Andes.<sup>1</sup> Those studies drew on data from evaluation and other reports, seminars, workshops, and interviews of key AD actors over more than a decade; and on a recent in-depth field assessment of AD in each region—in the Aguaytía-Neshuya area of Peru's Huallaga Valley, and in a multiethnic highland area of northern Thailand.

*Executive Summary*

2. A quarter-century on, Alternative Development donors and practitioners still underestimate the socio-cultural, economic, political, and environmental milieu in which AD operates. This underestimation invites unrealistic expectations and projects set to fail.

3. In Latin America, class and ethnicity order society. The richest one-tenth earn 50 percent of income, the poorest tenth 1.6 percent. AD's Andean clients are among the poor. Theirs is a peasant world: relations are face to face, outlook is local. Illiteracy feeds an oral tradition: a spoken promise equates to a written contract. Their social bonds are tenuous, their social texture disturbance-prone and vulnerable to violence. Past history and milieu breed mistrust: things are thought other than what they seem. In SE Asia, the clients are ethnic peasants who migrated from China into the highlands of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1800s. They only recently began to link to dominant lowland society. The task is first to bring them "in" rather than move them "up," as in the Andes.

4. In both the Andes and SE Asia, poverty and illicit crops overlap. In Bolivia's Chapare, 85 percent of a migrant population endures poverty, 30 percent extreme poverty. In Peru, 70 percent of farmers in coca-growing zones endure poverty, 42 percent extreme poverty. In Myanmar, poppy-growing families, among the poorest, earn \$214 per year. In Thailand's Nam Lang Area, annual household income was US \$236, with 42 percent of households in debt, when AD began. In Vietnam, 50 to 78 percent of hill-tribe families are poor. And in Lao PDR, two-thirds of the 47 poorest districts grow poppy to augment family income.

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\* E/CN.7/2005/1.

\*\* This document has not been edited.

5. AD varies by milieu. Andean peasants cite a lack of markets for alternatives; Asian peasants a lack of access to state services—in Thailand, to land and citizenship. Donor and national-government policies often condition aid and form part of AD's variation. Policies can range from an emphasis on security, with law enforcement and prompt eradication, to an emphasis on poverty alleviation and development. AD has clearly helped much to reduce and contain the spread of drug-crops, but, as one of several forces at play, its precise contribution is rarely known. It is known that illicit-crop farmers receiving AD have been few: 23 percent in the Andes, five percent in Asia. But these few represent numerous successes. This suggests an unrealized potential.

6. In Peru, AD coffee supports 5,000 families, and oil palm 1,815 Huallaga families. In Colombia, 1,500 Cauca families sell organic coffee to Europe, and coffee and palm cabbage to Carrefour. In Thailand, household income in the Doi Tung project rose sevenfold, the percent of those lacking citizenship fell by half. The Thai-German Highland Development Program brought schooling, health services, and clean water, with fewer water-borne infections. In Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, a plethora of languages, structures disallowing local participation, armed conflict, forced eradication, and mistrust have slowed AD. Nonetheless, AD among Myanmar's Wa reduced infant mortality with vaccination and also eliminated leprosy. And Laos's Palavek project was key in eliminating opium through introducing village-level treatment of addicts.

7. AD has stabilized shifting agriculture, checking erosion and enabling sustainable farming. It has promoted forestry and agro-forestry, with marketable tree crops. Still, commercial farming is a threat. AD has addressed gender with mixed results, dealing poorly with household gender roles and how they react to external pressure. AD's relation to conflict resolution is little studied. Conflict occurs all along a chain from drug-crop farmer upward. AD's work at the base—offering alternatives, fortifying civil society—shifts upward. Peru-study households cite better security as AD's main and most sustainable impact. Impacts can also be negative: forcing hill farmers unprepared into mainstream society, or promoting technology that causes land and water squabbles.

8. AD supports the sustainable reduction of drug crops by improving livelihoods. Thus policy must treat drug control as a development issue. **Among other major conclusions:**

- *AD policy formulation is at its best when all stakeholders—donors, governments, NGOs, and beneficiaries participate and share a consensus.*
- *Policy formulation requires flexibility to adapt to particular regions and situations. It must accommodate local knowledge, skills, and culture.*
- *Community participation throughout the project cycle—feasibility assessment, planning, project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation—is vital.*
- *Decentralized, participatory decision-making and the empowerment of local communities, which in turn contributes to creating a sense of ownership of AD activities among AD clients, increases the quality of development assistance as well as the chances of sustainability.*
- *Impact must be monitored at the household level. This requires use of quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure human development as well as drug control. Baseline surveys are mandatory requirements without which AD activities cannot be properly monitored nor evaluated. Only by understanding the processes by which households move from illicit to licit livelihoods can policy development become evidence-based and accountable.*
- *Political commitment cannot be ad hoc. It implies long-term commitment of financial resources to human development, reasonable drug-control laws, respect for human rights, and a coordinated inclusion of illicit-crop reduction (law enforcement and AD) in national and regional planning.*
- *AD projects led by security and other non-development concerns are typically not sustainable—and may result in the spread or return of illicit crops, or in the materialization of other adverse conditions, including less security.*
- *As growers of illicit crops accept participating in AD projects, they need to be allowed a transition period until AD activities (on- or off-farm) will prove to be suitable to their agro-ecological environment, local knowledge, and start generating income that will contribute to improve the quality of their lives.*
- *AD requires an appropriate policy-legal framework, one that allows illicit-crop growers to be treated first as candidates for development rather than as criminals.*

- *AD is more effective, more sustainable, as part of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihoods of marginal rural populations.*
- *Drug-crop eradication on farms lacking viable alternatives undermines development.*
- *Law enforcement is vital to successful AD. But to be effective, it must use strategies to reduce demand at the farm gate rather than directly target peasant farmers. These strategies include strengthened capacities of law enforcement to interdict illicit drugs and chemical precursors used for the illicit manufacture of drugs. Such strategies diminish traffickers' ability to operate thus reducing the demand for illicit crop and lowering farm gate prices.*

#### ***Some basic recommendations***

- *Make a firm political commitment to conduct AD in coordination with all stakeholders so that it is sustainable and has human development as the ultimate aim.*
- *Establish a global partnership with development entities and national groups to make illicit-crop reduction a crosscutting issue, thus maximizing the impact of efforts.*
- *Make elimination of illicit crops conditional on improvements in the lives and livelihoods of households. Do not make it a prerequisite for development assistance.*

## **Final Synthesis Report**

### ***Introduction***

#### ***Illicit Crop Cultivation: Challenge and Threat***

9. A quarter-century on, AD donors and practitioners still underestimate the socio-cultural, economic, political, and environmental setting in which AD operates. And this underestimation invites unrealistic expectations and projects that are primed to fail.

10. In the Andes, as in the rest of Latin America, class and ethnicity organize society. Rigid class lines allow the richest one-tenth to earn 50 percent of total income, and the poorest tenth but 1.6 percent. As the co-author of a recent World Bank report notes,

"Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the regions of the world with the greatest inequality....Latin America is highly unequal with respect to incomes, and also exhibits unequal access to education, health, water and electricity, as well as huge disparities in voice, assets and opportunities. This inequality slows the pace of poverty reduction, and undermines the development process itself."<sup>2</sup>

11. The 2004 UNDP World Development Report ranks Colombia as the world's ninth most unequal country.<sup>3</sup> Its Controller General reports two-thirds of Colombians, and above 85 percent of rural Colombians, below a three-dollars-per-day poverty line.<sup>4</sup>

12. These poor are AD's clients. Mainly highlanders, most of them entered tropical lowlands after 1950, driven by land scarcity, drought, violence, and illusory colonization schemes, often state-sponsored as substitutes for politically volatile land reform. Theirs is a peasant world, relations are face to face. Their outlook is local, most know little of the wider world. Illiteracy feeds an oral tradition: a spoken promise equates to a written contract.

13. Historical forces have twisted their world. Social bonds in migrant communities tend to be tenuous as do those of organizations—if those exist; indeed, "community" may be only geographical. The social texture is vulnerable to internal and external disturbance. And on top of this has been at times an ugly violence, often drug-related, as rival bands and irregular armed groups spar for territory and enforce grower "contracts."

14. This dynamic, steeped in violence, has spawned an individual psychology of fear and mistrust, aimed not only at the "outsider," including a State whose presence in many rural areas can be rather marginal, but also at

others in the community. Things are thought to be other than what they seem, no one is trusted; devils, real and imagined, endlessly stalk the psyche.

15. AD's Southeast Asia clients are also peasants, but they grow opium poppy rather than coca.<sup>5</sup> Most belong to ethnic groups that migrated into the highlands of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam from China in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. These highlands long remained isolated, and only recently began to link to functioning national societies. Even in 1990, fewer than half of 600,000 Thai hill people were citizens.<sup>6</sup> While relating to others in the peasant way, the migrants are not, as in the Andes, victims of centuries-long repression—with cumulative grievance—who cling to the bottom of a feudal class regime. The first challenge is thus to bring them “in” rather than move them “up.” But programs to that end, often driven by security concerns, have led to discrimination, and pressure for them to adopt lowland ways.<sup>7</sup> Integration stress has sometimes caused social breakdown, especially in Thailand, where “modernization” was rapid in the 1980s.

***Contrary to popular belief, communities with opium are among the poorest in Lao PDR. The annual national opium poppy survey of 2003 estimates that the average opium farmer gets US\$ 88 from opium poppy cultivation out of an annual income of about US\$ 205. This is roughly equivalent to income that could be generated from the sale of a calf, one ton of rice, a couple of pigs, five goats, fifty chickens or two pieces of woven silk. This is easily achievable—Boonwaat, UNODC 2004***

16. In both the Andes and SE Asia, poverty and illicit crops overlap. In Bolivia's coca-growing Chapare, 85 percent of a migrant population lives in poverty, 30 percent in extreme poverty.<sup>8</sup> In their upland zones of origin, poverty levels exceed 90 percent.<sup>9</sup> In Peru, 70 percent of those in seven major coca-growing areas live in poverty, 42 percent in extreme poverty.<sup>10</sup> In Myanmar, poppy-growing families, among the country's poorest, earn \$214 per year.<sup>11</sup> Of 38 villages in Thailand's Nam Lang Area when an AD program began in 1983, nine had road access, none had electricity, six had potable water, and only eight percent of children went to school. Annual household income averaged US \$236, with 42 percent of households in debt.<sup>12</sup> In Vietnam, rural dwellers are 90 percent of the poor, with highland poverty the worst. There, 50 to 78 percent of hill-tribe households are poor: a four-district survey found mean annual income at \$131.<sup>13</sup> In Lao PDR, two-thirds of the 47 poorest districts grow poppy to augment family income. Households with poppy earn an annual income of US \$205, US \$88 of it from opium.<sup>14</sup>

17. Poverty and illicit-crops threaten political and economic stability, national security, and the environment. Drugs fan armed conflicts in Myanmar and Colombia. Criminal mafias everywhere mar the peace. And shifting poppy farmers cause erosion and alter climates.

### ***Implementation of Alternative Development***

18. The way AD works varies by region and country, in response to illicit-crop settings, donor drug-control strategies, national strategies and institutions—even notions of AD.<sup>15</sup>

19. In the Andes, illicit-crop growers first highlight an incomes obstacle—as expected in a class-based society. Poor roads, lack of credit, absence of agro-industry, and other factors bear on this. But growers rank one factor above all others: a lack of viable, stable markets for alternatives. SE Asian growers, by contrast, while facing many of the same obstacles, focus first on gaining entry to national society—the ethnic issue is at the fore—and access to its services. In Thailand, for instance, citizenship and land access rank high.<sup>16</sup>

***“Those of us who defend our coca... have grown it for 3,000 years. It's never harmed us, nobody gets hooked on drugs. We totally reject drug trafficking. But drug trafficking exists because of the demand for drugs. We agree to help fight drug trafficking, but help us to find markets for alternative products.” –Farmer Leader, Yungas, Bolivia***

20. The drug-control milieu in the two regions differs in yet other ways. Illicit-crops in the Andes, more than in SE Asia (at least today), tend to be treated first as a security threat, to be addressed by strict law enforcement through direct eradication, with readily-visible results, rather than as a poverty issue to be addressed through

development. But even in the Andes, donors and national governments vary with regard to the emphasis—and the conditions they attach to AD assistance—they place on these two strategies. This lack of consensus, which is reflected also in UN instruments, can cause local tensions when the strategies operate side by side in a single or contiguous geographic areas.<sup>17</sup>

21. The national management of AD also varies by region. In the Andes, each country has a single entity that coordinates, or implements, donor and national AD projects—PDAR in Bolivia, DEVIDA in Peru, and PLANTE (until recently) in Colombia. While this has advantages, it has also led to the slighting of line public agencies—for agriculture, transportation, health, education—vital to sustainable development.<sup>18</sup> AD management in SE Asia is more diverse, and more complex. Yet those countries tend more to involve line development agencies, though often working with, or under, an agency charged with addressing ethnic, highland, or border issues, as in Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Evaluation Focus***

22. The sections of this report below discuss the operation of AD in the two study regions, the South American Andes and SE Asia. The next section addresses the impact of AD, and identifies factors explaining success or failure. The third section details some lessons learned over the years, and the final section provides recommendations.

### ***Impact: Changes in Lives and Livelihoods***

#### ***Declines in Illicit-Crop Cultivation***

23. Both the Andean and SE Asian regions have seen illicit-crop declines over the past 15 years. The decline is relatively less in the Andes, where coca fell from 210,000 hectares in 1990 to 150,000 hectares at the end of 2003—a 28-percent reduction. SE Asian poppy fell from 200,000 hectares in 1990 to 50,000 hectares in mid-2004—a 75-percent reduction (see Annex A). AD has clearly contributed to these declines, more so in some countries than in others. Because AD is only one of several factors operating together to reduce illicit crops, the weight of its contribution is not always precisely known.

24. Coca in Peru's Aguaytía basin, site of the Andean regional study, declined from 16,000 hectares in 1995 to about 500 hectares today. Forty percent of farmers in the study's 191-household survey reported coca as their economic mainstay prior to participating in AD, whereas only five percent reported it as so today. Most of those who quit coca pointed to a US-funded voluntary eradication program. US anti-drugs strategy in Peru shifted in 2002, after relying since 1995 on interdiction (of an airbridge) to keep farm-gate coca prices low so development might work. The new strategy held that neither the US nor Peru would ever have enough resources to develop the far-flung coca valleys.<sup>20</sup>

25. In some areas in the Andean countries, where law enforcement has been directed at illicit crop growers without provision of AD assistance, there has been displacement of illicit crops to remote areas including to fragile eco-systems and indigenous peoples' lands.

26. Opium production in Thailand, today virtually opium-free, fell from about 145 tons in the 1960s to fewer than 10 tons by 2000. Ninety-five percent of poppy-growing families in a 120-family survey (part of the SE Asian regional study) in Thailand increased the amount of land worked following AD assistance, as compared to only 13.3 percent of non-poppy-growers. Thailand, unlike other illicit-

***About five percent of poppy-growing families in Lao PDR have received AD support. At issue is how the recent sharp decline in poppy cultivation, achieved through opium-elimination contracts with local communities, can be sustained. –UNODC***

crop countries in either region, and thus a special case, folded AD into large-scale *development* in the highlands, beginning in the 1960s.<sup>21</sup> The 1980s, when the poppy area fell from 6,000 hectares in 1980 to less than 1,000 in 1990, saw the greatest opium decline. Eradication by the Royal Thai Army and Border Patrol Police helped. But more than a dozen major donor-assisted development projects also began during the period.<sup>22</sup>

27. Statistics on areas sown to illicit crops can mislead. The graphs in Annex A, for instance, show a 30-percent fall in Andean coca between 2000 and late 2003. The fall's sustainability, however, is uncertain. Data from UNODC's Illicit Crop Monitoring Program reveal that the number of Colombian provinces with coca rose from 12 in 1999 to 23 in 2003.<sup>23</sup> And the trend continues. Coca has also increased in Bolivia and Peru over the past two years—notably in the Yungas of La Paz, and Peru's Apurímac and Huallaga (Monzón) valleys.<sup>24</sup> In Asia, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Research Fellow of France's Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and student of opium, observes:

“The forced reduction of opium production during 2003-04 in Myanmar (down 54 per cent) and in Laos (down 64 per cent) could well have perverse effects such as shifting production to other areas.<sup>25</sup> This was the case in 2002-03 when a 50 per cent drop in production in the Kokang area of Myanmar's northern Shan state caused opium farming and production to shift to the northern end of the Myanmar's Wa Special Region Number 2. But eradication and interdiction also have another major perverse effect: they drive prices up.”<sup>26</sup>

28. Farmers receiving AD attention in either region have been relatively few. According to UNODC, AD has worked with 23 percent of families in illicit-crop areas in the Andes, and with only five percent of families in poppy-growing areas of the Golden Triangle.<sup>27</sup>

### ***Poverty Reduction and Improved Quality of Life***

29. AD has enjoyed numerous development successes, if betimes they seem small vis-à-vis the size of the challenge. These have allowed and consolidated the reduction of illicit crops and contained their spread. They suggest what greater commitment could do.

30. In Peru, coffee has been the main alternative, supporting 5,000 families on 12,000 hectares. In 1988, UNODC began restoring COCLA, a cooperative founded in Cuzco province in the 1960s (see Annex B). Using improved organization, financing, marketing, and production technology, COCLA exports rose from 3,000 MT in 1997 to 8,000 MT in 2003. Since 1997, it has exported directly rather than through middlemen, and since 2001 has operated without project assistance.

31. UNODC's oil-palm projects in Peru's Huallaga Valley have provided income to 1,815 families. Farmers in and beyond the Aguaytía Basin cited the work with oil palm as a success. They could save, think future, and educate their children. A producer's association and a processing plant had increased employment.<sup>28</sup> A multiplier effect had brought new businesses and a livelier economy. The association and the plant had gained region-wide acclaim, giving local people more voice in regional affairs. Half of Neshuya palm farmers in the study's household survey said that palm had improved their living standard “significantly,” the other half said “moderately.” And farmers often noted the lack of any requirement to eradicate coca before receiving assistance; indeed, coca income had allowed some to transition into palm.<sup>29</sup> The survey also revealed more education for children over age 17 in Neshuya's palm-producing households than in others. Of much interest is that surveyed households everywhere cited greater peace and security as AD's major positive impact, followed by increase in area planted.<sup>30</sup>

32. In Colombia's southern Cauca province, which grows coca and poppy, UNODC founded COSURCA in 1993 to organize 19 small-farmer producer groups. Developed along COCLA lines, COSURCA today allows 1,500 families, many of them Amerindian, to sell organic coffee (at twice the farm-gate price of regular coffee) to Europe, and coffee and palm cabbage (*palmito*) to the French supermarket chain Carrefour.<sup>31</sup>

33. SE Asia has also had AD successes. Since the 1970s, the Thai government has expanded services in agriculture, health, and education in the context of highland development. Farmers in the household study cited an increase in area planted to cash crops as well as a reliance on modern production technology as major AD impacts. A downside has been increased debt and migration to urban areas in search of employment (see Note 21).

34. Thailand's highland areas have enjoyed several major AD (or development) initiatives since 1969, among them the Doi Tung Development Project, begun in 1988 in Chiang Rai province, near the Myanmar border, at the

behest of Princess Srinagarindra.<sup>32</sup> As charts in Annex C reveal, average household income of project participants rose sevenfold between 1988 and 2003, and the percentage of those lacking Thai citizenship dropped from 62 in 1992 to 30 in 2003.<sup>33</sup> The increasing fraction of household income from labor (shown in the charts) refers to wages earned in local project-developed factories, processing plants (especially for cacao and macadamia), training centers, and tourism.<sup>34</sup> A chart also shows that the population fraction with no education dropped slightly between 1992 and 2003, but that with secondary education rose sharply.

35. Another major initiative, the Thai-German Highland Development Program (1981-1998), operated in the Wawi, Nam Lang, and Huai Poo Ling areas.<sup>35</sup> Its major household impacts include greater access to education, health services, and clean drinking water, with a resulting decline in water-borne infections and diseases like malaria and smallpox. Family planning also reduced birthrates. Meanwhile, new cash crops and a growing agricultural economy in the north doubled or tripled many household incomes.<sup>36</sup>

36. AD impacts in Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam have been fewer. Initiatives there have, unlike in Thailand, where large well-funded efforts have lasted 15 to 30 years, been brief, and funds scarce. A babel of ethno-linguistic groups, vertical social structures disfavoring grassroots participation, armed conflict, forced eradication (to meet opium-reduction goals) without economic alternatives, and peasant mistrust have slowed AD.

37. Myanmar's major poppy-growing area is Eastern Shan state, where the Wa Alternative Development Project began in 1998 in Wa Special Region 2, working with 7,800 households spread over 1,300 km.<sup>2</sup><sup>37</sup> Despite slow progress due to mistrust borne of years of armed conflict, the project made laudable gains on the health front. All children under age three have been vaccinated, thus reducing infant mortality. Leprosy has been eliminated in an area with rates four times those elsewhere in Myanmar. The project electrified one township, built 10 primary and two middle schools (Wa illiteracy rates are high), brought potable water to two townships and 16 hamlets, and built 15 kms of roads.

38. The so-called Palavek project (1989-1996), operating in Xaisonboun, Hom District, Lao PDR, provided Hmong farmers with simple post-harvest technology, road infrastructure (though maintenance has been a problem), and support to sell small livestock. But the initiative is best known for (1) initiating the first village-based treatment and rehabilitation program in a country where above half of the opium produced is consumed in the impoverished highlands; and (2) showing that strong clan leadership and community involvement can reduce poppy without forced eradication or punishment.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Environmental Sustainability***

39. Andean AD projects, but for a few in highland poppy-growing areas, tend to be in tropical lowlands, whereas Asia projects are mostly in the uplands. Stabilizing shifting agriculture is a challenge in both regions, but especially in Asia, where upland population growth has reduced the fallow cycle, causing land degradation and falling yields.<sup>39</sup> Soil erosion is a baneful result in both regions, but, again, more so in Asia, where it gives the ruling classes of the lowland river plains, as in Laos, more reason to resent highlanders.<sup>40</sup>

40. Numerous Andean projects have promoted tropical tree crops. The more common include coffee, oil palm, cacao, rubber, and peach palm. These not only "fit" humid climes with thin soils, but also allow farmers little time or space to cultivate coca. Oil palm in Peru is a classic example. In Bolivia, UNODC has promoted forestry and agro-forestry for nearly a decade in the Chapare in order to stabilize shifting agriculture by teaching farmers to cut selectively, sell the wood, and replant fast-growing harvestable wood species. They meanwhile plant crops for food and sale. This forest-management project, unlike most AD initiatives, has substantially influenced government forestry policy and legislation.

41. In Thailand, the Thai-German Highland Development Program improved watershed management and the ecological balance in general. Key to this was community-based natural-resource management, which evolved in tandem with a growing valuation of local participation.<sup>41</sup> Yet, one caveat transcends the Program: "Commercial agriculture can override ecological concerns and affect income distribution."<sup>42</sup> Also in Thailand, the Doi Tung project reforested a denuded landscape and initiated dramatic land-use changes. The project reduced the cultivated area, yet increased peasant income

***"Initial attempts at conservation involved enforcing the existing laws to resettle people from protected areas. This was strongly resisted by communities with the help of NGOs, who by this time were part of an emerging environmental movement....Private sector involvement in commercial reforestation also proved unpopular with local communities. The [Thai Forest Sector Masterplan] contended that there was no longer any other way to proceed but by involving local people in forest management."—TG-HDP 1998, Vol. 1, p. 26***

from agriculture while opening up new income sources for former opium farmers<sup>43</sup> (see Annex C). The reforestation also had salutary environmental effects on relative humidity, temperature, rainfall, and fire incidence—and not only in the project area, but in the wider province (see Annex D).

### **Gender Roles**

42. Since about 1990, projects have with varying resolve addressed gender, as that notion has evolved and been understood. The author of a key gender report says gender is a “perspective,” not a project “component.” She shows how adopting the perspective—how understanding sex-based roles—can help projects meet their objectives.<sup>44</sup>

43. In the Andes, illicit-crop growers, with some exceptions, share kin structures and norms with the ruling classes. There, peasant women not only confront a society-wide *machismo* subordinating them to men, but also high illiteracy rates and spousal abuse, ills deriving from exclusion and a tense, hard life at the social margins. In Asia, poppy growers belong to a myriad of ethnic groups, each with gender norms that differ from those of the prevailing national culture. The Hmong, for example, are organized into patrilineal clans, the Karen are matrilineal and matrilocal. Development often ill-prepares these groups for national society, where they succumb to self-destructive lures and pressures. In many hill tribes, women tend the poppies and earn the family income.<sup>45</sup> With poppy eradication, this role vanishes, with often dire results—many hill-tribe women enter the sex trade.<sup>46</sup>

44. Annex E shows the gender structure of the 191-household Peru survey. Except in UN-Neshuya, men outnumber women. Migration history may explain this: recent migrant households have fewer women. Women head 10 households, due in all cases to male death or absence. Annex E also shows that men in the sample have more education than women, especially after age 25. The spread is less in ages under 25, a reflection of the expansion of primary education in the rural areas in recent years. And last, Annex E compares women’s participation in AD projects when they began and now. One interpretation of the results is that projects began by looking mostly at men’s production activities. Several respondents said that women’s low participation in UNODC-project decisions on palm cultivation brewed until it was a problem that had to be addressed.<sup>47</sup>

45. In Asia, the Thai-German Highland Development Program involved women in the development process. They benefited from improvements in health, education, and subsistence agriculture.<sup>48</sup> The Doi Tung project focused strongly on women—training them and securing jobs for them (see Annex F).

**“Most women believe that their families would not survive without the money they get from opium production.”—Lao PDR, Prathoumvanh 2004, p. 36.**

The Thai field study reports that AD increased women’s participation in family and village decisions as well as income generation. Their access to education increased only slightly over that of men. It reports that male addiction rates in some Karen villages, where men sold livestock to fund their habit, caused work to fall heavily on women. This may explain why women often play an effective role in drug-abuse prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.<sup>49</sup> But the study also reports that development reduced women’s control of resources, expanding male household economic roles at their expense.

46. The gender issue in Asia is unusually complex. AD’s overall impact on women there has been mixed. In both regions, AD must do more to understand household gender roles, and how those shift vis-à-vis each other in response to technological change.

### **Conflict Resolution**

47. The relation between AD and conflict resolution is little studied.<sup>50</sup> Yet one clearly exists. Drug-related conflicts occur the length of a chain from illicit-crop producer to the interstate level. Whatever AD does to reduce illicit crops at the chain’s base, therefore, reverberates upward. At the top, drugs fuel civil conflicts and international terrorism.

48. AD’s more immediate impact on conflict resolution occurs at the levels of household and community. Not only is conflict deriving from social decomposition endemic to communities with illicit crops, but overt violent

conflict stemming from the drug trade and criminality, or from insurgent movements, is not uncommon. Effective household and community participation, themselves key to instituting sustainable alternatives, often require prior restoration of the social fabric in order to reduce internal conflict and allow minimal consensus. Helping households and communities cope with the causes and consequences of conflict, and creating a strong civil society, are thus inherent to AD.

49. As noted, Peru-study households cited peace and security as AD's major impact—and its most sustainable (see Annex G). In this regard, UNODC has worked to create and strengthen producer groups among Peru's migrants. The oil-palm work is but one case. In Myanmar, work with the Wa promotes trust between them and the government, after years of war. Thai-study households noted that improved farmer involvement in politics and community, more contact with public and private entities, and greater self-reliance in articulating their rights had paralleled development. Yet, also a downside: project technology enabled dry-season cash-cropping with irrigation and chemicals. This led to water conflicts, water pollution, and harm to fisheries. And while many highlanders now have citizenship, recognition of their land rights has been slow, and this too leads to conflict, as does the out-migration of uplanders unprepared for the larger society.

50. Drug control itself has caused conflict, especially in the Andes. In Bolivia, for example, rapid forced coca eradication vis-à-vis a lagging provision of viable alternatives produced unrest and violence.<sup>51</sup> In Peru, the field study revealed that oil-palm farmers in parts of Aguaytia had high expectations, having seen oil palm's success in nearby Neshuya. But they said their life quality had declined following a new voluntary eradication strategy. They had to eradicate to receive technical help, yet their trees—2,000 hectares—were not yet mature and produced no income. Many saw a veiled threat in the strategy: if they did not sign eradication pacts, their coca would be removed by force and they would get no help. The eradication pace had been swift, now they had no coca and no income. They felt the government had deceived them, and they threatened marches and street protests.

### ***Sustainability of Impact***

51. Impact sustainability is vital and has at least four important, and sometimes shifting, dimensions—environmental, economic, socio-cultural, and political-legal—but its determinants in some measure always transcend the control of AD projects and programs.

52. In Latin America, Peru-study households were asked whether and how AD had improved their living standard—an indicator of sustainability. UNODC projects rank higher (see Annex G). Perception of impact closely parallels perception of sustainability. The study devised indices for both perceptions (Annex G). The work with oil-palm in Neshuya shows the greatest impact, and is seen as the most sustainable. Coca was the main activity in 40 percent of households before AD, but in only five percent today. Most of them quit coca for other forms of agriculture, or other occupations, including wage labor.

53. Thailand is today virtually opium-free, and as the Thai household study shows, AD played a part in opium reduction. It introduced alternative crops, new sources of income, and new opportunities. Government services expanded in education, health, and agriculture. But there was a downside: in some areas, more debt, uncertain income, and migration to urban areas in search of work. In Lao PDR, farmers of the Palaveck project were opium-free five years after that project ended.<sup>52</sup>

***“I once made a trip with some journalists to Nam Lang. We asked a farmer there to tell us the most important impact of the project. In the midst of the coffee plants and the cattle, he said: ‘We feel more secure here now because we are in a position to negotiate with the government. Officials don’t come threaten us anymore. We’re more confident in explaining our position.’ ”—AD official, Thailand***

## **Conclusions and Lessons Learned**

***AD extends the writ of the state by drawing socio-economically marginal human groups and areas into the wider socio-economy. It improves security, allows investment. AD is more than agriculture. It includes non-farm options to diversify income. It supports the sustainable reduction of illicit crops by improving livelihoods. Above all, it rests on a firm belief that drug control is a development matter. The belief must inform policy at all levels. It must be part of planning...***

### ***Policy Formulation and Impact Monitoring***

- *AD policy formulation is at its best when all stakeholders—donors, governments, NGOs, and beneficiaries—participate and share a consensus.*

54. A lack of international consensus is adverse for national policy formulation. The US, for example, provides 95 percent of Peru's AD funds, but disallows their use for AD "unlinked" to eradication. European donors place no such restrictions. National consensus has several dimensions. First, illicit-crop farmers must be deemed development candidates and not criminals. This means consensus among legislative, law-enforcement, and development agencies. Next, all stakeholders, from donors to communities, must agree on development goals and processes. Advisable also are mechanisms among them for joint oversight, communications, and information exchange.

- *Policy formulation requires flexibility to adapt to particular regions and situations. It must accommodate local knowledge, skills, and culture.*

55. The situation of illicit-crop growers can vary among a country's regions. AD must thus respond flexibly. In Thailand, some early AD sought national development at the cost of local culture. Ill-prepared highlanders fell to crime, heroin use, prostitution, and HIV/AIDS.

- *Community participation throughout the project cycle—feasibility assessment, planning, project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation—is vital.*

56. Participation is doubly important in milieus with a history of exclusion. A long-

***"A 'participatory approach' means more than just consulting communities about their wishes. It requires serious dialogue in which these communities are allowed to have substantial leeway for negotiation."—GTZ and UNODC 2004. p. 25***

term process, participation is democracy's crux: it boosts transparency, creates a local sense of ownership, builds institutions, and strengthens civil society. Still, it is often poorly practiced.<sup>53</sup>

- *Decentralized decision-making and the empowerment of local communities increases the quality of development assistance as well as the chances of sustainability.*

57. To support participation, AD must often create, and invariably strengthen, local organizations. This is local empowerment. The Asia study reveals that governments and development entities have often failed to empower highland communities, whether from fear of losing control or from entrenched patron-client attitudes.

- *Impact must be monitored at the household level. This requires use of quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure human development as well as drug control.*

58. AD progress measures have typically not considered household life-quality changes, objectively or subjectively (baselines rarely exist), and so have not clarified household decision-making. Monitoring impacts on households allows "local" understanding—what works, what does not, and why. Indicators must be qualitative as well as quantitative: AD is successful in the measure that direct beneficiaries believe so. Once subjective and

objective baselines have been set up, the indicators must be closely monitored. Failure of subjective (the household view) and objective indicators to square indicates a problem.

59. AD often does not know enough about its target population: how its households are structured and take decisions. The household is not a black box. Role division occurs within it, along age and gender lines. The creation of baselines will help to clarify this, and thus remedy a major constraint: a failure to understand and respond to gender roles.

### ***Political Commitment***

- *Political commitment cannot be ad hoc. It implies long-term human development, reasonable drug-control laws, respect for human rights, and a coordinated inclusion of illicit-crop reduction (law enforcement and AD) in national and regional planning.*

60. Ideal long-term national commitment, still distant, means altering laws as well as public institutions, policies, and programs in a way that marginal peoples, living in marginal areas, become citizens, de jure and de facto. The result would be good governance and respect for human rights, which would reduce illicit-crops permanently. But meanwhile, governments could “mainstream” AD by directing line development agencies—ministries of agriculture, transportation, health, education—to address marginal peoples’ needs. As a caveat, it should be noted that donor aid, provided in the name of co-responsibility, can also reduce commitment, which national-resource investment encourages and evidences.

### ***Development as Drug Control***

- *AD projects led by security and other non-development concerns are typically not sustainable—and may result in the spread or return of illicit crops, or in the materialization of other adverse conditions, including less security.*

61. In the Andes, as noted, two AD strategies play out among donors and host governments: one of them security-led that treats illicit crops first as a law-enforcement issue and calls for direct eradication, with prompt results; the other development-led that treats them as a poverty issue and calls first for poverty reduction, with results over time. Early AD in Asia (1960s), when insurgency loomed, was security-driven. Today, security concerns again press on AD—in both regions.<sup>54</sup> Afghanistan and Colombia are two examples.

62. Experience in Asia shows that a blind nation-building zeal can translate into forcing hill tribes into a lowland mold, with consequent disregard for their cultures and their human

***“In the opium poppy growing regions of Laos, the same issues relate to opium and poverty. To eliminate both is a long-term process that cannot stop even after most farmers have stopped cultivation”—Boonwaat 2004: “Gender Mainstreaming...” p. 24.***

rights. The resulting social disorder and anomie favor neither sustainable drug control nor nation-building.

63. Successful AD requires that households trust implementers. Confidence is a primary AD asset, for households are asked to submit to actions whose impact on them is in the hands of others. Respondents in the Peru study cited failure to keep promises as the major cause of poor results (see Annex H). Keeping promises is key to maintaining confidence.

64. A lack of sustainable markets for alternatives is a serious constraint. The promotion of non-marketable alternatives is a common failure and a key reason for farmer mistrust. In order to be successful, AD projects need to identify reliable markets at local, national and/or international levels and link the products or services to be promoted by AD activities to those markets.

65. In sum, favoring counter-narcotics or other goals over development ones makes for haste and undermines sound development; the chances of AD failure rise. It may also prompt unrealistic projects in illicit-crop areas (of

low environmental potential for sustainable alternatives) rather than in zones of migrant origin, or in other more-suitable sites.

- *AD requires an appropriate policy-legal framework, one that allows illicit-crop growers to be treated first as candidates for development rather than as criminals.*<sup>55</sup>
- *AD is more effective, more sustainable, as part of a wider development scheme whose goal is to improve the livelihoods of marginal rural populations.*

66. In the Andes, countries have often created an “extraneous” entity to coordinate, even implement, AD—PLANTE in Colombia, DEVIDA in Peru, PDAR in Bolivia. The entities are often seen as needed to respond to the special situation of illicit crops. While they may be attractive to donors, and may let countries capture and manage resources better, the arrangement can slight line development agencies—ministries of transportation, agriculture, and sustainable development. Since the extraneous entities are by nature “short-term,” such slighting can compromise commitment and sustainability. Extraneous entities occur less in Asia.

***Common Causes of Mistrust and Negative Outcomes  
(From Peru Assessment—See also Annex H)***

- *Lack of consensus with participants in selection of alternatives and strategies.*
- *Haste to achieve or show results at expense of good development practices.*
- *Eradication of coca prior to the establishment of viable alternatives.*
- *Prioritization of coca reduction over welfare of farmer producers.*
- *Unkept promises to local producers.*
- *Poor technical support for alternatives.*
- *Lack of donor and government transparency in resource management.*
- *Promotion of alternatives that are not sustainable (for varying reasons).*
- *Unreliable markets for alternative products.*
- *Inadequate participation by local farmers, local leaders, and local organizations.*

***Eradication and Conditionality***

- *Illicit-crop eradication on peasant farms lacking viable alternatives undermines development.*

67. Forced eradication is at best a dubious practice.<sup>56</sup> Creating unrest and violence, it compromises

***“At the production level, a key lesson is that eradication of illicit narcotics in the fields alone will not work and is likely to be counterproductive, resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs (e.g., in Colombia), displacement of production to more remote areas, and fueling of violence and insecurity (e.g., Peru, Bolivia, Colombia), which in several cases forced the eradication policy to be reversed and led to adverse political outcomes. Neither does the approach of making eradication a condition for development assistance work—without alternative livelihoods already in place, premature eradication can alienate the affected population and damage the environment for rural development.”—Byrd and Ward 2004, CPR, The World Bank, p. 13.***

development—and long-term nation-building, itself a key to lasting drug and crime control.<sup>57</sup> Yet law enforcement—as negative incentive—has a role: Thai-study households cited fear of arrest as a main reason they quit poppy—but after they had viable alternatives. Speaking for Asia, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy says (see Note 40):

“...the sharp fall in production in Myanmar and Laos, where opium production was halved during 2002-03 and again during 2003-04, was achieved by forced reductions through opium bans and eradication, and these measures are already having a detrimental impact on farmers, because no viable alternative livelihoods have been promoted.... Human costs are also to be considered, as these reductions of the main cash crop in such a short time in areas where rice shortages are severe have had dire consequences

for the local populations, who have no other way of coping with such shortages than the opium economy” (Chouvy 2005).

68. Voluntary eradication, also problematic, involves some form of “conditionality,” typically stated in a written agreement with communities or households. The sequencing of AD and eradication enters here—whether eradication should precede AD, parallel it, or occur only when sustainable alternatives allow a viable income.

69. Households in the Peru study cite loss of income, associated with coca eradication through conditionality, as the greatest negative

impact of AD (see Annex G). Respondents in the Thai study also reject conditionality.

**“King Bhumibol Adulyadej contributed to highland development work in other ways. Among the most influential was his guideline that opium poppies not be destroyed until viable alternatives existed. The King realized that the radical removal of the hill people’s source of income would imperil them.”—Thailand, Renard, 2001, p. 7.**

70. In farmers’ minds, conditionality tends toward associating AD with law-enforcement. This association can be fatal for AD; the two functions must always remain separate. It has been argued that eradication can succeed, if coordinated with AD. But the record on coordination is poor. In both Bolivia and Colombia, eradication far outpaced AD, with consequent unrest, human displacement, and hardship.

**“I will never forget the remarks of the Australian ambassador during a helicopter trip to Doi Sam Mun, Chiang Mai province, when he asked: ‘Why has opium poppy been planted in that coffee field?’ I answered: ‘Opium poppy was not planted in that coffee field; coffee was planted in that poppy field.’”—Richard Mann, quoted in Renard, 2001, p. 83.**

#### ***Law Enforcement as Interdiction***

- *Law enforcement is vital to successful AD. But to be effective, it must use strategies to reduce demand at the farm gate rather than directly target peasant farmers.*

71. Rather than target peasant illicit-crop growers, as in forced eradication, law enforcement should interdict supply lines—of chemicals or processed or semi-processed drugs—arrest and prosecute traffickers, and disrupt labs and financial markets. Where opium is consumed on farm, AD must promote village-level drug treatment (see Note 52).

## Recommendations

### ***Political Commitment, Institutionalization, and Coordination***

- *Make a firm political commitment to conduct AD in coordination with all stakeholders so that it is sustainable and has human development as the ultimate aim.*
  - Institute drug control at a political level high enough to allow it to include human development.
  - Establish a drug-control legal framework that allows small-farm illicit-crop cultivation to be addressed in development terms.
- *Establish a global partnership with development entities and national groups to make illicit-crop reduction a crosscutting issue, thus maximizing the impact of efforts.*
  - Realize that addressing the multiple causes of illicit-crop cultivation—an unsustainable livelihood strategy—is required for sustainable development.
  - As part of the partnership, create an AD information clearinghouse to record experiences and allow all parties to learn what works, what does not, and why.
- *Establish an effective inter-ministerial body to:*
  - Coordinate and monitor drug-control and development, with participation of line development agencies in illicit-crop reduction.
  - Make illicit-crop reduction a part of national and regional development plans.
  - Ensure a comprehensive and balanced drug-control strategy, with prevention and education, law enforcement, demand reduction, and AD.
- *Make elimination of illicit crops conditional on improvements in the lives and livelihoods of households. Do not make it a prerequisite for development assistance.*
  - Eradicate illicit crops only when viable alternatives exist for households participating in AD. Successful AD requires proper sequencing.
- *Let interdiction play a key support role in illicit-crop reduction through:*
  - Extending the rule of law.
  - Creating an environment for economic and political development.
  - Lowering illicit-crop farm-gate prices to make alternatives more attractive.

### ***Alternative Development as Value Added***

- *Mandate AD to play a pioneering and catalytic role by charging it with:*
  - Establishing a state presence, with state services, in marginal areas, thereby promoting law enforcement, good governance, and drug-demand reduction.
  - Incorporating the community as *principal* actor in the development process—from feasibility through design, execution, monitoring, and evaluation.
  - Promoting trust by improving *inter alia* health, education, and food security.
  - Promoting immediate income opportunities, then medium and long term ones.
  - Promoting *market-driven* production alternatives.
  - Looking beyond agriculture to promote non-farm opportunities.


- Facilitating public and private-sector investment.
- Avoiding environmental harm.
- Helping communities address new threats from ATS, heroin, and HIV/AIDS.
- *Explore and constantly monitor the links between drugs and conflict, and reflect those in project planning and execution. AD's often conflictive milieu requires this.*
- *To sustain successful AD and prevent illicit-crop resurgence, assure that projects have from the outset an exit strategy that continues the development process.*

#### ***Knowledge Management and Capacity Building***

- *Oblige all stakeholders—donors and international agencies, rural communities, appropriate government entities—to use comprehensive knowledge management to:*
  - Strengthen information- and experience-sharing.
  - Coordinate efforts to reach consensus on an AD approach.
  - Use farmer knowledge and advice to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate AD.
- *Require the collection and use of appropriate baseline data to monitor implementation and allow policy to be evidence-based and accountable through better understanding of how households move from illicit to licit livelihoods.*
- *Strengthen institutions, build capacity, and develop human resources to create an all-important mutual understanding between drug-control and development agencies.*
  - Build human capacities in particular in the areas of AD product marketing and rural primary health care, income generation, education, and vocational training.


**Annex A**  
(Source: UNODC)

**Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region**




Note: The red arrow denotes a decline of 30% between 2000 and the end of 2003

**Opium Cultivation in the Golden Triangle**



**Annex B**  
(Source: UNODC)



**Central de Cooperativas de la Convención y Lares (COCLA)  
Export Performance, 1987-2003 (in MT)**



**Annex C**

(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation, Chaing Mai Presentation, Nov. 2004)



**Doi Tung Development Project**



**Annex C**

(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation, Chaing Mai Presentation, Nov. 2004)



**Doi Tung Development Project**



**Annex D**

(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation, Chaing Mai Presentation, Nov. 2004)



**Doi Tung Development Project**



**Annex D**

(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation, Chaing Mai Presentation, Nov. 2004)



**Doi Tung Development Project**






**Annex D**

(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation, Chaing Mai Presentation, Nov. 2004)

**Doi Tung Development Project**



**Annex E**  
(Source: GRADE, 2004 Peru Field Assessment)



Note: The graphs above depict four geographical areas—Neshuya, Shambillo, Divisoria, Huipoca—and five Alternative Development projects—two belonging to UNODC, three to USAID (as implemented by Chemonics, CARE-CODESU, and Winrock).

**Annex F**  
(Source: Mae Fah Luang Foundation)

**Doi Tung Development Project**


**Number of People Being Educated by Gender**

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
1989	-	-	3,404
1990	-	-	3,638
1991	-	-	3,592
1992	2,401	2,135	4,536
1993	2,539	2,214	4,753
1994	2,644	2,346	4,990
1995	2,757	2,479	5,236
1996	2,825	2,575	5,400
1997	3,001	2,718	5,719
1998	3,121	2,859	5,980
1999	3,008	2,796	5,804
2000	3,070	2,845	5,915
2001	3,242	3,008	6,250
2002	3,292	3,067	6,359
2003	3,367	3,131	6,498

**Number Employed by the Project (by Gender)**

EMPLOYED				UNEMPLOYED									
YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	YEAR	CHILDREN			OLD AGED			UNEMPLOYED		
					MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
1989			5,992	1989			3,404			806			-
1990			5,247	1990			3,638			984			652
1991			5,613	1991			3,698			453			573
1992	2,760	3,022	5,782	1992	1,941	1,896	3,837	191	274	465	153	99	252
1993	2,746	2,966	5,712	1993	1,885	1,878	3,763	196	278	474	129	110	239
1994	2,770	3,021	5,791	1994	1,906	1,905	3,811	226	320	546	95	54	149
1995	2,755	3,008	5,763	1995	1,850	1,891	3,741	250	350	600	85	46	131
1996	2,732	3,041	5,773	1996	1,826	1,859	3,685	253	344	597	89	51	140
1997	2,793	3,157	5,950	1997	1,933	1,973	3,906	279	388	667	114	46	160
1998	2,849	3,198	6,047	1998	1,870	1,963	3,833	283	420	703	156	62	218
1999	2,768	3,131	5,899	1999	1,778	1,851	3,629	256	383	639	140	70	210
2000	2,763	3,152	5,915	2000	1,739	1,777	3,516	244	394	638	189	101	290
2001	2,961	3,337	6,298	2001	1,689	1,742	3,431	285	448	733	170	77	247
2002	3,006	3,411	6,417	2002	1,691	1,767	3,458	243	403	646	170	85	255
2003	3,073	3,426	6,499	2003	1,601	1,694	3,295	247	427	674	146	102	248

**Annex G**  
(Source: GRADE, 2004 Peru Field Assessment)



**Opinions about improvements or detriments from AD**


	UN-N	UN-SH	UN-D	CH-N	CH-S	CH-D	W-H	CC-H	TOTAL
<b>Improvements:</b>									
Credit access	97%	35%	53%	3%	17%	15%	18%	14%	36%
Market and prices	93%	29%	59%	3%	13%	10%	18%	14%	35%
Increase in agricultural areas	97%	55%	88%	23%	40%	30%	18%	29%	54%
Equipment acquisition	60%	35%	50%	20%	20%	20%	18%	29%	34%
Goods acquisition	63%	23%	16%	7%	3%	0%	0%	0%	18%
Access to educational services	77%	26%	59%	10%	20%	20%	9%	0%	34%
Access to health services	77%	26%	56%	7%	20%	15%	18%	14%	33%
Security and social peace	100%	84%	100%	83%	90%	75%	82%	71%	88%
Home improvements	87%	29%	78%	10%	23%	10%	9%	0%	38%
<b>Detriments:</b>									
Loss of source of income	13%	77%	31%	37%	97%	70%	100%	71%	57%
Selling of durable household goods	7%	58%	31%	50%	90%	55%	73%	43%	49%
Need to return to coca	3%	48%	13%	20%	77%	55%	100%	71%	40%
Problems to send children to school	30%	55%	53%	47%	60%	50%	73%	71%	51%

Note: Total or partial agreement was assigned a value of "1," other responses a value of "0."


**Are improvements sustainable after AD Projects?**

	UN-N	UN-SH	UN-D	CH-N	CH-S	CH-D	W-H	CC-H	Total
Access to Credit	83%	42%	41%	3%	13%	10%	9%	14%	31%
Market and prices	80%	29%	47%	0%	10%	5%	9%	14%	28%
Increase in agricultural area	90%	45%	72%	13%	27%	15%	9%	14%	42%
Equipment acquisition	63%	39%	28%	7%	13%	5%	9%	14%	26%
Goods acquisition	50%	26%	3%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	14%
Access to educational services	80%	32%	50%	7%	10%	5%	9%	0%	30%
Access to health services	80%	32%	44%	3%	7%	15%	18%	14%	30%
Security and social peace	93%	71%	91%	47%	47%	40%	55%	71%	66%
Home improvement	83%	35%	69%	10%	10%	10%	9%	0%	35%

**Annex G**  
(Source: GRADE, 2004 Peru Field Assessment)



The impact index assigns points to opinions on specific positive impacts: “3” corresponds to “total agreement,” “2” to “partial agreement,” “1” if “partial disagreement,” and “0” for “total disagreement.” The sustainability index assigns a “2” if the impact is deemed sustainable, a “1” if doubts are raised, and a “0” if deemed unsustainable, or if there was no positive impact. The graphs show the mean value and standard deviation for each group.



### Changes in main economic activities after AD Projects

Currently	Before ADPs					Total
	Coca	Agricult	Extract	Services	Others(*)	
Coca	8%	2%	0%	0%	4%	5%
Agriculture	43%	93%	80%	33%	40%	65%
Extractives	5%	0%	20%	0%	8%	4%
Services	7%	2%	0%	67%	0%	5%
Other (*)	37%	2%	0%	0%	48%	22%
<b>Total</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>191</b>

(\*) Includes wage labor in diverse activities

This table is a “transition matrix” that records responses of changes in main economic activities as a result of AD. The bottom row shows main activities (by number of households) before the presence of AD projects, the last column (by percentage) main activities afterward. Shaded cells show the percentage of households whose main economic activity remained the same, whereas remaining cells show the distribution of activities of households that changed (percentages in the columns sum to 100).

**Annex H**  
(Source: GRADE, 2004 Field Assessment)

**What is the most important factor for achieving positive results in an AD project?**

	UN-N	UN-SH	UN-D	CH-N	CH-S	CH-D	W-H	CC-H	Total
Permanent technical assistance	60%	48%	59%	10%	10%	10%	9%	0%	32%
Beneficiary confidence in AD project	17%	13%	13%	7%	3%	15%	0%	0%	10%
Permanent beneficiary-ADP contact	10%	19%	9%	13%	0%	5%	0%	0%	9%
Fulfillment of promises	13%	6%	9%	0%	0%	15%	0%	0%	6%
No positive experiences	0%	13%	9%	70%	80%	55%	82%	100%	41%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	9%	0%	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>191</b>

**What is the most important factor for not achieving positive results in an AD project?**

	UN-N	UN-SH	UN-D	CH-N	CH-S	CH-D	W-H	CC-H	Total
Failure to fulfill promises	10%	19%	13%	73%	90%	60%	64%	86%	46%
Lack of transparency in resource use	17%	29%	13%	10%	3%	20%	9%	0%	14%
Little presence of AD technical personnel	0%	0%	19%	3%	3%	0%	9%	0%	5%
Failure to inform beneficiaries adequately	13%	10%	13%	7%	3%	15%	0%	0%	9%
Lack of confidence in AD project implementers	7%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Lack of feasibility studies	0%	3%	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Other	53%	26%	31%	7%	0%	5%	18%	14%	21%
No response	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>191</b>

**Level of Confidence in AD Implementing Entity**

	None	Low	Average	High	Very High	Total
UN-N	0%	0%	10%	67%	23%	30
UN-SH	0%	0%	16%	55%	29%	31
UN-D	0%	6%	25%	38%	31%	32
CH-N	23%	37%	30%	7%	3%	30
CH-S	17%	57%	20%	7%	0%	30
CH-D	0%	35%	40%	10%	15%	20
W-H	45%	45%	9%	0%	0%	11
CC-H	71%	29%	0%	0%	0%	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>191</b>

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Study countries in the Andes include Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; those in Southeast Asia form part of the “Golden Triangle,” embracing areas of Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR.

<sup>2</sup> David de Ferranti, World Bank Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean. <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocByUnid/4112F1114F594B4B85256DB3005DB262?OpenDocument> See Ferranti et al., 2003.

<sup>3</sup> And the trend may be growing: the percentage of national income going to the poorest 20 percent of the population fell from 3.0 percent in 1996 to 2.7 percent in 1999. Colombia’s Gini coefficient is 57.6.

<sup>4</sup> The 2004 report also notes that the wealthiest 10 % of the population earned 80.27 times more than the poorest 10 % in 2003 (cited in Calligaro and Isacson, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Opium poppy, unlike coca, typically grows above 2,000 meters. But it is not restricted to Asia. For more than a decade, Colombia has been growing it and producing heroin. An estimated 80 percent of the heroin in eastern US cities is from Colombia. More recently, small amounts of poppy have appeared in Peru.

<sup>6</sup> The Thai Nationality Act of 1911 gave citizenship to all persons born in Thailand. But those who actually became citizens (with identity cards) lived in or near cities. The remote hill people lay well beyond the reach of Thai institutions (Renard, 2001, pp. 53, 55).

<sup>7</sup> Insurgent groups plagued Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s, a time when the US saw Thailand as the prize “domino” in the so-called domino theory that guided US policy and military intervention in Indochina until 1975.

<sup>8</sup> From 2001 Census, Cochabamba Tropics (in Mancomunidad del Trópico, 2004).

<sup>9</sup> República de Bolivia, 2002. p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> These regions include seven departments: Ayacucho, Cusco, Huanuco, Junín, Pasco, San Martín, and Ucayali (USAID, 2003. pp. 6-7).

<sup>11</sup> UNODC, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> TG-HDP, 1998, Vol. 1. p. 12; TG-HDP, 1994. pp. 6, 29.

<sup>13</sup> UNODC, n.d. pp. 8,9,12, 51.

<sup>14</sup> Boonwaat, 2004. pp. 8-9. Ethnic minorities comprise up to 70 percent of the population of Lao PDR (Boonwaat, 2004, “Gender Mainstreaming...” p. 21).

<sup>15</sup> The United Nations General Assembly’s Twentieth Special Session (UNGASS) in 1998 defined AD “as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognising the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”

<sup>16</sup> The land problem in SE Asia is unlike that in the Andes, where the volatile issue is land reform. In Asia, growers practice shifting cultivation in highland forests that may, as in Thailand, carry a protected status vis-à-vis national governments, with settlements there illegal. And hill tribes confront not only environmental interests opposed to shifting agriculture, but also aggressive illegal timber interests, as in Thailand and Lao PDR, where the interests operate through corruption and political influence.

<sup>17</sup> Many donors have funded AD in the Andes over the years. The major ones, in order, have been the US (USAID), the UN (UNODC), and Germany (GTZ), with the EU now beginning to play a larger role. But in size of investment, the US surpasses all others. In Peru, the US funded about 95 percent of AD in 2003.

<sup>18</sup> This is not to deny the important role played by private-sector entities—e.g., COCLA and OLAMSA in Peru, COSURCA in Colombia, all farmer controlled—so much as to stress a greater need for appropriate public-sector involvement. Such involvement also evidences a government’s commitment to aiding its marginal sectors.

<sup>19</sup> In Vietnam, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development cooperates with the Committee for Ethnic Minorities and Mountain Affairs. In Myanmar, development agencies work in the eastern Shan State under the Ministry for Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs. In Thailand, the government has singled out the highlands and their ethnic groups for development since 1969, when the Royal Project began. [The Thai-German Highland Development Program (1981-1998), however, did designate Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board as executor, though development entities, national and local (when they existed), still played an important role (see BMZ, 1993. p. 4)] In both Lao PDR and Myanmar, donor-funded projects and external personnel play an enlarged in-country role, owing to weaker institutions and fewer trained nationals. AD projects

there, as early on in Thailand, seek to strengthen the national human-resource base as well as to address the needs of illicit-crop growers.

<sup>20</sup> A US contractor, Chemonics International, worked in 2003 with 27,000 Aguaytía families, who eliminated a reported 3,000 hectares of coca under voluntary eradication pacts. A company official told the study team that Chemonics operated under a coca-reduction mandate from USAID, not a poverty-reduction one.

<sup>21</sup> This “folding” makes it hard to distinguish, especially for beneficiaries, AD from development generally. [US policy in the 1980s required US-funded projects working in the hills to have opium-control as a main objective, even though it was not stated in project documents (Renard, 2001. p. 104).] As several reports suggest, this development, especially in the early years, typically sought to remake highlanders into lowland Thais rather than to bring them into Thai society with due regard for their cultures, or for their control over the change process (e.g., TG-HDP, 1994. pp. 9, 91-94). High stress levels and social anomie, with and without out-migration, often attended this process. It is of interest, as the reports also note, that falling opium production paralleled a rise in use of heroin and ATS, even alcohol—perhaps to cope with the stress and to replace traditional medicinal and ritual opium use.

<sup>22</sup> UNODC, 2001. “Thai-German...” p. 91.

<sup>23</sup> UNODC, 2004. pp 7, 11. See also Youngers and Rosen, 2004. p. 114; and Walsh, 2004.

<sup>24</sup> The average annual farm-gate price of Bolivian coca rose from \$US 1.6/kg in 1997, at the inception of the Government’s aggressive forced-eradication campaign in the Chapare, to \$US 5.4/kg in 2003. The average annual farm-gate price of Peruvian coca fell from \$US 2.5/kg in 1994, on the eve of US-supported airbridge interdiction, to \$US 0.8/kg in 1997, but then rose again to \$US 2.1/kg in 2003 (UNODC, 2004, *World Drug Report*. pp. 243, 249).

<sup>25</sup> Forced eradication has also been rapid in the Ky Son area of Vietnam (the Hmong alone cultivate 75 percent of the poppy in Vietnam), and this has made it difficult for the UNODC-led Ky Son Alternative Development Project to respond in an effective manner. As one UNODC project expert notes, “Too rapid eradication could be counterproductive and result in more re-cultivation, loss of trust in alternative development where an AD project can not deal with the rapid increase in demand of its services caused by rapid and efficient enforcement of eradication policies.” (UNODC, 2001. “Ky Son...”p. 126).

<sup>26</sup> Chouvy 2005.

<sup>27</sup> UNODC, 2004. “Presentation...”

<sup>28</sup> The association, COCEPU (Comité Central de Palmicultores de Ucayali), was founded in 1992, and the processing firm, OLAMSA (Oleaginosa Amazónica S.A.), in 1998. COCEPU is majority shareholder (56%) in OLAMSA, with association farmers holding the remaining shares (44%). OLAMSA is an unusual hybrid of cooperative and firm, an arrangement unique to UNODC and now drawing much attention.

<sup>29</sup> Palm farmers reported a mean net income of \$US 650/hectare, with a result that farmers throughout the area are now wanting oil palm. In a narrow sense, this success represents a long-term, high-risk endeavor with a high cost-benefit ratio. In a broader sense, the benefits transcend those accruing to participants and extend over a broad area. Indeed, palm may yet prove to be a “development pole” for a large region, with many future benefits. It should be noted too that many of the initial oil-palm farmers had fled drug-related violence in Upper Huallaga, and so may have been more willing to risk oil palm. Also noteworthy is that UNODC’s strategy was constant over the project’s eight years (1991-1999), and its technical team stable.

<sup>30</sup> The violence that illicit crops often incite may explain why many farmers accept AD despite an expected income decline.

<sup>31</sup> Information on COSURCA (*Empresa Cooperativa del Sur del Cauca*) from several UNODC sources.

<sup>32</sup> The princess was mother of King Bhumibhol Adulyadej, who initiated the pioneering Royal Project in 1969. For reasons of stability and continuity, the Mae Fah Luang Foundation, under royal patronage, was chosen to coordinate an effort that involved numerous government agencies (which invested \$US 20 million between 1991 and 1993 alone, more than half of it on road construction) and plans spanning an expected 30-year project life (see UNODC, 2001. “The Role of...” pp. 73-81). The royal family is a potent symbol in Thailand, which explains its galvanizing role in highland development and its ability to coordinate the efforts of numerous public and private agencies (Renard, 2001. p. 125).

<sup>33</sup> A desire for citizenship has been a strong lure for some farmers to quit poppy during AD’s early phase. According to an AD study in the Nam Lang area,

“Most express a strong desire to legalise their status and to improve their access to social services, as well as markets for alternative cash enterprises. Therefore, the majority of villagers show great enthusiasm when development measures are offered to them. This partly explains why many villagers are willing to abandon their involvement in opium poppy cultivation—as long as the expectations are still high and promised support is forthcoming. For this reason the cultivation of opium tends to drop most drastically during the early life of a project” (TG-HDP, 1994. p. 95)

<sup>34</sup> UNODC, 2001. “The Role of...” P. 75.

<sup>35</sup> TG-HDP, a lengthy initiative, was planned as a “program” rather than a “project” so as to give it flexibility to respond to conditions that were still in process of discovery (Renard, 2001. p. 96).

<sup>36</sup> GTZ, 2004; BMZ, 1993. p. 70; and UNODC, 2001. “Thai-German...”. pp. 92-93.

<sup>37</sup> Seventeen armed groups signed ceasefire accords with the government in 1989, after decades of war. But the central government still has little control over some areas, and mistrust runs high. The UNODC-supported project emerged (Phase II began in 2002) to support the commitment of Wa authorities and the central government to make the Wa region opium-free by June 2005 (see Government of the Union of Myanmar, 2001; UNODC, 2002; UNODC, 2001, “Wa Alternative Development... pp. 49-53. ).

<sup>38</sup> Boonwaat 2004; UNODC 2001, “An Overview ...”, p. 144.

<sup>39</sup> Also, with reduction in the fallow period, weeds and insect pests soon rise to uncontrollable levels.

<sup>40</sup> The recent forced poppy reductions in both Myanmar and Laos have threatened the livelihood of some of the hill tribes, who sell opium to secure food. As Chouvy notes,

“While the World Food Programme provided the Kokang area [northern Shan state, Myanmar] with emergency assistance last year, in Laos, the government chose over the last few years to relocate some 25,000 hill-tribe people (Hmong, Akha, and others) from their rain-fed mountains to the valleys where irrigation offers higher rice production potential. However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has acknowledged that crop-substitution projects have been implemented only in a few areas and that they are too few to make up for these drastic changes. Moreover, having been moved from malaria-free hilltops to malaria-infested valleys, often without adequate developmental and health measures, many displaced communities have been ravaged by malaria and, also, by dysentery. Resettled villages now experience a four per cent annual mortality rate on average (as high as 20 per cent in one specific village) when the national rate is only 1.2 per cent” (Chouvy 2005).

<sup>41</sup> TG-HDP, 1998, Volumes 1 and 2; UNODC, 2001, “Thai-German Highland...”

<sup>42</sup> GTZ, 2004. But overall sustainability, as Program management notes, may depend on how the Royal Thai Government manages the institutional, policy, and legal frameworks:

“According to Royal Forest Department (RFD) regulations, many villages are situated illegally in national forest reserves, and in some cases even in wildlife sanctuaries. In the absence of formal land use rights and a legal framework (Community Forest Act) that gives community groups the opportunity to manage local forest areas, highland communities remain exposed to changing interpretations and applications of government policies. The overall sustainability of highland development is only as strong as the national institutional framework within which all stakeholders are operating” (UNODC, 2001. “Thai-German Highland...” p. 95).

<sup>43</sup> UNODC, 2001. “The Role of Non-agricultural...” p. 75.

<sup>44</sup> Dietz, 2000. While gender certainly includes equity, it is about more than improving the quality of life of women. It is about household roles, and the relationship between those roles, and how those roles and that relationship shift in the face of technological innovations and development-induced change. It is about men as much as about women. In a word, it is about the welfare of family and household.

<sup>45</sup> According to one observer in Lao PDR, “...women contribute about 62 percent of labor for opium production, while men are involved in clearing and burning the fields and the construction of fences around the opium fields. Women are responsible for poppy land preparation, sowing seed, weeding the crop, and harvesting the gum (Prathoumvanh 2004, p. 36). Boomwaat, a CTA for UNODC in Lao PDR, says:

“Women are the mainstay of their households and do the majority of household work as well as generate up to 80 percent of the household cash income working in the fields, especially in the labor intensive aspects of opium production, but most highland ethnic groups award women with little status or opportunity. Educating girls is given a low priority and their decision-making role outside the household is severely limited (Boonwaat, 2004. “Gender Mainstreaming...” p. 20).

<sup>46</sup> At the outset of the Doi Tung project, cash came not only from opium, but also from young women sent or sold to work as prostitutes in the cities (UNODC, 2001. “The Role of Non-Agricultural...” pp. 74-75).

<sup>47</sup> A gender study of a UNODC project in Huallaga concluded that “activities developed along the way to mainstreaming gender equity... are part of a process that needs to be strengthened.” And the study noted that farmer organizations should “promote the equitable development of their membership” (Pulgar, 2003. p. 43). A 2000 UNODC gender study of Bolivia projects held that “there are not sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure gender mainstreaming in...alternative development projects in Bolivia. Lessons learned show...that better integration of gender perspectives is needed...” (Bentvelsen, 2000. p. 31).

<sup>48</sup> UNODC, 2001. “Thai-German...” p. 94.

<sup>49</sup> UNODC, 2001. “Thai-German...” p. 94.

<sup>50</sup> For a good discussion of the issues, see GTZ: “Drugs and Conflict – A Discussion Paper”, 2003.

<sup>51</sup> See Ledebur, 2005. A 2002 US General Accounting Office (GAO) report addresses aggressive forced eradication:

“More recently, the rapid pace of the Bolivian government’s eradication campaign has created gaps between eradication and alternative development assistance that can leave peasant farmers without livelihoods. The Bolivian plan has been to remove itself from the coca-cocaine business by 2002. According to a US embassy official in Bolivia, the schedule for the eradication process was compressed because the current government wanted to complete the effort before the 2002 presidential election. As a result, coordination between eradication and alternative development became very difficult” (USGAO, 2002. p. 27).

<sup>52</sup> UNODC, 2001. “An Overview of Alternative Development...” p. 144. Given that more than half of the opium produced in Lao PDR is consumed locally, in the impoverished highlands, the project’s village-based treatment program, the first in the country, may have played an important part.

<sup>53</sup> The 2000 *UN World Drug Report* notes that “[I]ntegrated rural development projects, as they were designed, still failed to meet expectations.... One key flaw was that local communities participated little, if at all, in the actual design of the programs themselves.” (quoted in Jelsma and Metaal, 2004. p. 12).

<sup>54</sup> In Peru (and Colombia), the US argues that public resources will never be enough to reduce illicit-crop cultivation through development. The private sector is needed. But it will not respond without security. Therefore, coca reduction—eradication—must precede development. This reversal of logic—drug control as development—is ironic: whereas development had before been part of a broader strategy to reduce coca, now coca reduction was part of a strategy to induce development (Interviews from UNODC Peru study).

<sup>55</sup> AD’s policy-legal “space” is greater in Peru and Bolivia than in Colombia, where Law 30 criminalizes the planting of coca (except small amounts allowed native groups for traditional use), marijuana, or poppy and allows prosecution of violators. Law 30 underlies a massive aerial spraying program, which dwarfs AD. Peru’s Decree Law 22095 makes all coca illegal but that grown by farmers registered with a state-controlled purchasing agency. Cultivation per se, however, say some Peruvian legal experts, is a crime only in national parks. Bolivia’s Law 1008 makes all coca illegal but that in statutorily-defined traditional areas.

<sup>56</sup> The “Action Plan on International Cooperation for the eradication of illicit crops and alternative development,” prepared by the 1988 UNGASS, notes that “In cases of low-income production structures among peasants, alternative development is more sustainable and socially and economically more appropriate than forced eradication.”

<sup>57</sup> A Huallaga peasant, now a militant protestor of Peru’s anti-drugs policies, tearfully described to a researcher in Aguaytía the scene of helicopters landing in her community, wind from the rotors destroying food crops and lifting straw roofs from houses, soldiers jumping out firing their guns to intimidate residents while an army of workers entered the fields to uproot coca. The event, she said, traumatized her young child, who today suffers neuroses. In Colombia, the State often first appears to forgotten rural citizens in the form of armored helicopters

and crop dusters. Anger and despair lie in the wake of the spraying, which drives people into one of the armed groups, or into the growing ranks of the displaced. As a local peasant leader told an UNODC researcher, “The spraying kills everything. People leave for other parts of the county, or settle on the fringes of local towns. And some go deeper into the forest to plant coca again.”

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