

Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics in Kosovo

An empirical survey

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Author:

Theodor Hanf
in cooperation with Petra Bauerle and Rainer Hampel

Responsible: Dr. Rüdiger Blumör

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Is it important to know whether the people of a country have democratic attitudes or not?

There are cases of democratic systems being introduced into societies, in which the majority of the population did not necessarily hold democratic views. Through a favourable combination of circumstances, not least international influences, democratic institutions took root, functioned passably and were not opposed by well-organised and determined anti-democratic forces.

But democracies without democrats remain the exception, and short-lived. Either the success of the system encourages people to take a more favourable view of it, until eventually democrats are in the majority, or democracy collapses.

A more common case is that of states adopting a democratic form of government because an authoritarian regime had nothing more to offer. Whether this transitional democracy manages to consolidate itself depends not only on continued rejection of a undemocratic system, but also on whether democracy gains the approval and support of the majority. And this is possible only if a majority in the population understands what democracy means.

This is the motivation behind all efforts and endeavours to spread and promote democratic ideas and an understanding of democracy.

To do this efficiently and selectively, it is important to have some idea of who in which society is democratic in which way – and especially who is less or not at all democratic.

In short: if there is little chance of stability in a democracy without democrats, yet one would like to try to improve this chance of stability, it is advisable to ascertain attitudes to democracy.

This is done by survey research. Survey research makes it possible to determine more closely who where understands, subscribes to or rejects democracy. Representative surveys allow one to identify democratic deficiencies by social, cultural and regional group. They can reveal what civic education should focus on in each target group.

Commissioned by GTZ, fieldwork for this study (N = 1,511) was carried out by Index Kosova in late 2004. The authors provided the questionnaire and analysed the data. Petra Bauerle MA and Dr Rainer Hampel provided most of the data analysis, factor analysis and construction of indices. Theodor Hanf alone is responsible for errors of interpretation.

ONE

ETHNIC GROUPS, STRATA AND CLEAVAGES: KOSOVO'S SOCIETY AS REFLECTED IN A SAMPLE

Attitudes and opinions are coloured by numerous factors. In any society, behaviour is determined by age and gender, urban and rural environments, and employment or self-employment. Differences in education and income can also trigger differences in opinions. Hence, it is standard practice in social research to study the relative influence of social factors on attitudes and opinions. However, biological and spatial factors, status and income are inadequate to satisfactorily explain the full range of variance in social and political attitudes.

This is particularly the case in societies composed of different language and religious groups. In such cases, it is essential to widen the spectrum of parameters used to elucidate the emergence of attitudes and convictions beyond socio-economic aspects to include cultural factors.

The surveys for this study were conducted by the Index Kosova company at the end of 2004. The sample of 1,512 respondents in total, broken down into Albanian (N = 1,160) and Serbian (N = 352) sub-samples, is large enough to allow us to compare with a sufficient degree of statistical accuracy the attitudes and opinions of respondents from different ethnic groups and religious communities, on the one hand, and from different education and income strata, provinces and occupational groups on the other.

In Kosovo there is a high degree of coincidence between ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation. Eighty-six percent of the respondents are ethnic Albanians, eight percent are Serbs and five percent belong to smaller ethnic communities, including Bosnians (two percent), Askali (one percent), Turks (one percent) and tiny minorities of Roma and Egyptians. Albanians speak Albanian and Serbs Serbian, both in private and public. The smaller minorities generally speak Albanian in public. Ninety-seven percent of Albanians are Muslim, as are most members of the smaller ethnic groups; all in all, a total of nine in ten interviewees in the survey are Muslim. All of the Serbian respondents are Orthodox Christians. Among ethnic Albanians there is also a Christian minority of two percent, most of whom are Roman Catholics. Just three respondents in the entire sample stated that they did not belong to any religion.

By region,¹ the breakdown of the respondents is as follows:

Gjakova	12
Gjilan	9
Mitrovica	13
Peja	9
Priština	34
Prizren	13
Ferizaj	10

Figures in %, rounded

¹ According to the official regional breakdown of the Statistics Office of Kosovo, 2004.

In the Mitrovica region Serbs account for 41 percent of the population. In Prizren, various minorities account for one third of the respondents.

Forty-nine percent of the respondents are men, 51 percent women. The four age groups – from 18 to 24 years,² 25 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 and over – account for approximately a quarter of the sample each. Twelve percent live in Priština, 38 percent in other cities, the rest in a rural environment.

The breakdown by level of education is as follows:

No formal education	5
Primary school uncompleted	13
Primary school completed	23
Secondary school uncompleted	7
Secondary school completed	34
Technical education (13 & 14)	9
Higher education & degree	9
Figures in %, rounded	

Almost half of all Serbs – above-average – have completed secondary school. In this respect, members of the smaller minorities are underrepresented. Women are disproportionately represented in the three lowest education groups. The same holds for respondents in the oldest age group and for rural inhabitants.

The breakdown by occupational group is as follows:

Own business	6
Managers & professionals	2
White-collar & clerical	3
Foremen, technicians, skilled workers	9
Semi- and unskilled workers	8
Civil service & security	2
Teachers	4
Farm owners	3
Other farmers, fishermen	1
Housewives	29
Students	7
Pensioners & disabled	7
Unemployed, looking for work	16
Unemployed, not looking for work	3
Figures in %, rounded	

Serbs are substantially overrepresented in the civil service as well as in white-collar jobs, among pensioners and skilled workers. By contrast, almost all interviewed farmers and agricultural workers are Albanian. The proportion of housewives among Albanians is also higher than among Serbs, and the proportion of unemployed almost twice as high. Overall, too, the number of people not gainfully employed is higher among Albanians than Serbs.

A lower level of education appears to predestine women for life as housewives: the frequency of housewives is particularly high among women with any formal education or who have not completed primary school.

² In this age group Albanians are overrepresented and Serbians – with only 18 percent – overrepresented, while Serbians are slightly overrepresented in the 50+ age group.

The breakdown by household and personal income³ is as follows:

Income	Household	Personal
No income		39
€ 4 – 90		21
€ 100 – 191		19
€ 10 – 191	34	
€ 200 – 300	34	
€ 320 – 7.000	32	
€ 200 – 1.706		22

Figures in %, rounded

Household income of Albanian respondents diverges little from the average. Among Serbs the lowest income group is over and the highest income group underrepresented, so that average income for Serbs as a whole is lower than that of the Albanians.

The data on personal income present another picture. On account of the high proportion of housewives and unemployed, 41 percent of the Albanian respondents had no personal income, compared with just 16 percent of the Serbs. Almost half of the respondents of the smaller minorities are in the same position. Median and higher incomes are overrepresented among Serbs and – hardly surprising – among men.

Income rises, as one might expect, with age. Members of the lowest income group are more common in rural areas, those of the highest in towns.

In Kosovo, as in most societies, income correlates with education:

Income stratum	No income	1sh	2nd	3rd (highest)
No formal education	23	74	*	2
Primary school uncompleted	55	36	2	8
Primary school completed	60	21	9	10
Secondary school uncompleted	34	15	23	27
Secondary school completed	34	15	26	25
Technical school	23	7	35	36
Higher education	15	6	31	47
∅	39	21	19	22

Figures in %, rounded; * below 0.5%

As to be expected, the correlation between occupation and income is equally strong:

Income stratum	No income	1st	2nd	3 rd
Own business	6	11	22	61
Manager & professionals	10	8	15	67
White collar & clerical	6	9	36	49
Foremen, technicians, skilled workers	8	8	37	47
Semi- and unskilled workers	13	18	43	26
Civil service & security	-	9	42	49
Teachers	4	8	56	32
Farm owners	44	46	3	7

³ Twenty percent of the respondents refused to answer questions about personal income and seven percent questions about household income.

Other farmers, fishermen	78	19	3	-
Housewives	69	21	2	8
Students	47	6	35	12
Pensioners & disabled	8	70	13	9
Unemployed, looking for work	75	18	4	3
Unemployed, not looking for work	60	25	3	12
∅	39	21	19	22

Figures in %, rounded

There is a world of workers earning little or nothing: unemployed, housewives, farmers, fishermen and pensioners. It also includes half the students – indeed, is it more surprising that almost half of them have a reasonable income. Only a third of the semi- and unskilled workers are poor. Which occupations provide the best income? On the one hand, the world of technicians and modern skills, of white-collar and clerical workers, managers and professionals and, on the other, all people working for and paid by the state: teachers and above all civil servants.

The analysis of the sample shows clearly that Kosovar society is not only divided along ethno-religious lines, but also strongly stratified, i.e. the cleavages are both vertical and horizontal.

Two

FEAR OF THE FUTURE, TRUST, CAUTION AND POWERLESSNESS: PSYCHO-SOCIAL SENSITIVITIES

Just as gender, age, occupation, income, language and religious affiliation can influence perceptions of society and politics, so this is true of more subjective factors such as trust in one's social environment, fear or confidence, openness to or rejection of change, faith in one's ability to change things or a sense of powerlessness. This section will look at a selection of characteristic personality features that in previous intercultural studies have, as a rule, exhibited relatively high stability.

"I feel uncertain and fearful about my future."

Fifty-two percent of respondents agree with this statement. Differences in age, education, occupation and household income do not significantly influence the level of fear about the future. Agreement falls to 44 percent among respondents in the highest personal income group.

However, there are huge differences by ethnic affiliation. Just under half the Albanian majority, but more than four fifths of the Serbian minority are worried about what the future holds.⁴

"One must be very cautious with people; you cannot trust the people who live and work around you."

Women are more cautious than men, and people who are not yet or have stopped working much more so than the working population.⁵ Once again, the sharpest differences are those between the ethnic minority and majority: 91% of the Serbs agree with the statement, but only 71% of the Albanians; of the entire sample, 75% of respondents agree.

In this society with such pronounced social distrust, whom do people trust?

"People trust and feel close to some people and not to others. For each of the following types, tell us whether or not you feel close to and trust them."

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

⁴ By region, fear of the future is most pronounced in Mitrovica, where two thirds of respondents agreed with the statement. This is the region with the highest proportion of Serbians, and where interethnic relations are particularly tense.

⁵ Only half of farm-owners are fearful about their future.

	Trust or feel close to
Family	97
Friends	82
Neighbours	76
People from my village/town	64
People of my religion	60
People of my ethnic group	57
All citizens of Kosovo	53
People with the same working & living conditions	51
People form my region/municipality	49

Figures in %, rounded

The family is the repository of trust – as it is in numerous other societies. Almost all respondents trust members of their own families. Four in five trust their friends, three in four their neighbours and three in five people from the same town or village, religion or ethnic group. But only half trust "people with the same working and living conditions":⁶ "class consciousness" is much less developed than awareness of family, neighbours and group affiliation.

Once again, the most notable differences are those between Albanians and Serbs. Although Serbs are more likely than Albanians to trust their friends, they are far less likely to trust their neighbours and coreligionists, and even less so other Serbs and people in the same living conditions. Just seven percent of the Serbian respondents trust all Kosovars – compared with 57 percent of the Albanians and even 55 percent of the members of other minorities.

The correlation between the responses on trust⁷ is high enough to construct a statistical scale of "trust",⁸ in which responses break down as follows:

No trust	4
Little trust	26
Average trust	22
High trust	14
Complete trust	34

Figures in %, rounded

Complete trust is more common among men than women, among the young and old than the middle aged and is particularly strong among agricultural workers and business owners.⁹

Differences are strongest between the ethno-religious majority and minorities. Serbs are extremely overrepresented among respondents with little or average trust, Albanians on the other hand among those with complete trust. There are also clear distinctions by religious affiliation: complete trust is most pronounced among Muslims, average and high trust among members of the (Serbian) Orthodox Church, and little trust among (Albanian) Catholics and Protestants – among the latter well above average at 57 percent.

Trust is obviously a reflection primarily of the size and strength of one's ethno-religious group. The larger the group is, the wider the circle of those whom one trusts; the small the group, the small the circle.

⁶ Men are more likely than women to trust people with the same working and living conditions; apart from this, psycho-social attitudes do not differ significantly by gender.

⁷ Ignoring trust between family members, expressed by virtually every respondent.

⁸ $\alpha = .8540$.

⁹ Educational level does not significantly affect the degree of trust.

Agreement with or rejection of the following statement is a measure of social conservatism:

"One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it."

Almost nine in ten respondents agreed, and men a little more often than women. No other social variables, not even ethnic affiliation, influenced the results significantly. Thus, the entire Kosovar society is generally cautious about taking risks.

"If you try to change things you usually make them worse."

This item measures conservative resistance to and aversion to change. Only 36 percent agreed: the majority of respondents are convinced that change can be for the better. There is an almost linear correlation between income and willingness to accept change.¹⁰

Rejection of this statement is strongest among the Serbs at 72 percent.¹¹ Obviously they think their current situation is so bad that change can only improve things.

"There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country."

This statement measures self-perception of social effectiveness. Do people feel powerless or do they believe that they can influence the fate of their fellow human beings? Two thirds of all respondents manifest a feeling of powerlessness. By occupation, this feeling is most common among farmers, agricultural labourers and fishermen. It correlates inversely with education¹² and personal income¹³. The feeling of powerlessness is particularly pronounced in the Mitrovica and Priština regions, and probably reflects the views of the Serbian populace in these regions: in the sample as a whole, four in five Serbs express a sense of powerlessness, compared with two in three Albanians.

"Even ordinary people can make progress if they help each other."

Ninety-six percent of all respondents agree; there are no significant distinctions by social characteristics. It appears that this belief keeps up respondents spirits in an atmosphere best summarised as follows:

The psycho-social sensitivities of Kosovo's population appear to be muted and pessimistic. More than half are afraid of the future, three fourths are extremely cautious and one third resist all change. Two in three respondents do not trust their social environment. Trust is limited to a close circle of family, friends and neighbours. Two of three respondents feel powerless and do not believe that they can influence change.

Fear, caution, distrust and powerlessness are the mood among little people experiencing occupational or job insecurity on the one hand and among minorities on the other. The fact that Serbs are least opposed to change is not a contradiction: change for them could hardly be a change for the worse.

¹⁰ From the lowest to the highest income group: 56% – 66% – 70% – 69%.

¹¹ Rejection among Albanians: 64%; among the smaller minorities: only 50%.

¹² "Disagree" is almost linear from the lowest to the highest level of education: 19% – 32% – 27% – 29% – 34% – 40% – 43%.

¹³ Linear from the lowest to the highest income group: 27% – 33% – 36% – 42%.

THREE

A DESIRE TO BE MIDDLE-CLASS PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

"Which one of the following things in your opinion is the most important for achieving success in life?"

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

Education	35
Working with others and standing together as a group	25
Working hard for myself	22
Good fortune/Luck	7
Religious beliefs	4
What your parents taught me	2
Experience	2
Connections (knowing the right people)	2
Inheritance	2
Tricks	< 1

Figures in %, rounded

More than four in five respondents think performance-oriented factors are decisive for personal success: hard work, education, working with others and experience. Only one in ten believes in fortuitous factors such as luck, connections and tricks. The conviction that education is the key to success is particularly widespread among the youngest respondents and graduates of technical schools and universities, white-collar workers, civil servants and especially among teachers and students.¹⁴ Professionals and managers, as well as farmers, are overrepresented among those that think hard work is the most important factor for success in life. An above-average proportion of the same occupational groups as well as semi- and unskilled workers view teamwork as important. A disproportionate number of respondents in the lowest education groups and among the economically inactive view religious beliefs as the key to success.

Almost half of the respondents in the Mitrovica region think hard work is the most important factor, whereas in the Priština, Prizren and Ferizaj regions 40 percent gave precedence to education, a view shared by 54 percent in the city of Priština.

Preferences also differ by ethnic affiliation Albanians choose both education and teamwork more frequently than Serbs, and members of the smaller minorities attach disproportionate importance to hard work. One notable difference is that twice as many Serbs as average choose good fortune or luck as a factor of success – perhaps a reflex on the part of a community that has not had much good fortune in recent years.

"What kind of job would you prefer:

A job in a factory or in an office with a stable salary you can rely on?

Or:

Your own business where you can win a lot or lose a lot?"

¹⁴ Sixty-two percent of teachers and 60 percent of students.

More than four in five respondents opted for a reliable job as an employee. Who make up the one fifth that would like their own business?

There are slightly more men than women. The willingness to take risks is greatest in the two highest income groups than among those that earn less. Of those that own their own business, 27 percent like what they are doing. Although this figure is above average – it also implies that almost three quarters of current businesspeople would like to give up their risky existence for a permanent job. Equally remarkable is the fact that more than one third of civil servants would like to have their own business. It is less surprising that a good quarter of semi- and unskilled workers would like their own business. Teachers are the group most satisfied with their employment status: 92 percent of them opt for a permanent job.

A disproportionate number of respondents in Prizren and Gjilan favour the business option. This probably reflects the ethnic composition of these regions. An above-average 29 percent of Serbs and 25 percent of members of other minorities would like their own business, but only 16 percent of the Albanians. This indicates that people are more likely to consider an entrepreneurial career if there is little likelihood of a permanent job with the state.

How satisfied are respondents with their jobs and their situation in life?

<i>"Of course, people always like to earn more, but I consider my income to be reasonable."</i>	40
<i>"Whatever my personal efforts are in Kosovo, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to".</i>	59
<i>"I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living as we have."</i>	62
<i>"If I could, I would change to another kind of work."</i>	70
<i>"Young men and women in my community have a reasonable good chance of achieving their goals in life".</i>	71

Figures in %, rounded

A substantial minority of 40 percent are satisfied with their income. Nearly six in ten take the view that they have a worse education and job than they merit. Slightly more than six in ten respondents fear that their children will have a lower standard of living. And an even higher proportion would like to change their job. But an equal proportion believes that the younger generation is likely to have a satisfactory life.

Income satisfaction is above average among respondents in the highest income group. There are no significant differences on the basis of other social variables or by ethnic group. In short: satisfaction or dissatisfaction is determined solely by the level of income and not by anything else. The sense of having missed the education or job one is entitled to is somewhat stronger among men than women. It is lower than average among respondents in the highest education group, particularly among teachers. This feeling is much stronger in rural areas, where it is shared by 80 percent of respondents, than in urban areas. There are no significant differences between the ethnic groups.

The fear that children will have a lower standard of living is stronger in urban areas than in the country. There are also very pronounced differences between the ethnic groups: this fear is shared by 59 percent of the smaller ethnic minorities, by a slightly below-average 61 percent of the Albanians, and by no fewer than 76 percent of the Serbs.

The wish for another type of job correlates inversely with age¹⁵ and directly with income.¹⁶ It is most pronounced among farmers and agricultural workers, semi- and unskilled workers and housewives – and naturally among the unemployed. It is much stronger in rural than in

¹⁵ Linear from the youngest to the oldest: 75% – 73% – 73% – 56%.

¹⁶ Linear from the lowest to the highest income group: 81% – 74% – 57% – 54%.

urban areas. At 59 percent, interest among Serbian respondents in another job is well below average compared with 71 percent of Albanians.

Finally, confidence about the chances of the young generation of achieving their goals in life correlates directly with ethnic affiliation: almost three quarters of the Albanians – 73 percent – and more than two thirds – 69 percent – of the members of the smaller minorities are confident, but only 39 percent of the Serbs.

"When you think about your progress in life, in your work and home, with whom do you compare yourself most often?"

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

People in Western Europe	27
My neighbours	23
People in Albania	11
My school mates	9
People of other ethnic groups in my country	8
People like myself ten years ago	5
Rich businessmen	4
People in former Yugoslavia	2
With nobody	10

Figures in %, rounded

A good quarter compare themselves with Western Europeans, almost a quarter with their neighbours, about a tenth each with Albanians in Albania and former school mates – and with nobody. Of those that compare themselves with western Europeans, a disproportionate percentage is young and respondents in the upper educational and income groups, including a particularly high 38 percent of teachers. An above-average number of women, older people, less educated respondents, housewives and pensioners compare themselves with their neighbours. In contrast to the Albanian majority, none of the Serbian respondents compare themselves with Albanians in Albania; one tenth of the Serbs measure themselves against the former Yugoslavia, and no fewer than 18 percent of them compare themselves with nobody.

Whether people compare themselves with Western Europe or not, for a majority of the respondents Western Europe represents their employment horizon. Asked

"In which country would you or a member of your family like to work?"

fewer than 13 percent gave no answer. Another 13 percent want to work in Kosovo. The rest, almost three quarters of all respondents wish that either they or a family member could work abroad. The choices in order of preference are:

Germany	33
Various other European countries ¹⁷	19
Switzerland	18
(Kosovo)	13
USA	10
Neighbouring states, ex-Yugoslavia	5
Other countries	2

Figures in %, rounded

¹⁷ Mainly the UK, Italy, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Sweden and Norway.

The countries abroad most frequently mentioned are Germany, Switzerland and the USA. Interest in working in Germany is above average among people in the middle age groups, farmers and other rural inhabitants as well as half of the two groups of unemployed. Those interested in working in Switzerland are overrepresented among respondents with little education and low income. Of those who would prefer to remain in Kosovo, an above-average number are members of the oldest age group, people with good incomes, skill workers and technicians, civil servants, managers, professionals and not least town-dwellers.

There are clear differences between the wishes of Albanians and Serbs. Albanians would like to work in Germany, Switzerland, the USA and, not least, at home in Kosovo. Not one Serb plumped for the last. More than one quarter of them would like to work in countries of former Yugoslavia. An above-average number of these respondents belong to the upper income groups – professionals and 11 percent of teachers – and live in the Mitrovica region, and none of them live in a rural area. It is impossible to ignore the outlines of a pattern of potential immigration should the situation of the Serbs in Kosovo deteriorate.

"When I see what the rich have I feel that I should have the same."

Social envy is expressed by slightly less than two thirds of all respondents. It is stronger among women than men and in rural areas than in cities.¹⁸ University and technical school graduates express less social envy than respondents with a lower level of education. Social envy also correlates inversely with household and personal income.¹⁹ It is above average among housewives, unemployed, farmers and agricultural workers and well below average among teachers, managers and professionals. Is social envy thus primarily an expression of social class?

Other findings show that regional and ethnic factors also play a role. By region envy ranges from 50 percent in Gjilan to 76 percent in Mitrovica. There are also considerable differences between ethnic groups: 71 percent of the members of smaller minorities, 64 percent of Albanians and 55 percent of Serbs admit to envying the rich.

Thus, regardless of differentiation, social envy is a very widespread phenomenon in Kosovo. This may also be related to the fact that respondents are very sceptical about the chances of reducing social distinctions.

"It doesn't matter what workers and/or employees do, they can never win against the bosses".

Sixty-nine percent of all respondents agree with this statement. There are no significant differences by gender, age, education or income. As with envy, the sense of powerlessness in social conflicts is strongest in rural areas. Differences between ethnic groups are also significant: 71 percent of Albanians and 63 percent of Serbs, but only 53 percent of the smaller minorities believe that it is impossible to defend their interests against the bosses.

How do respondents view changes in social differences over the past decade?

"In the last ten years, has the difference between rich and poor in this country ...

<i>Increased</i>	67
<i>Decreased</i>	14
<i>Remained the same?"</i>	19

Figures in %, rounded

¹⁸ In the city of Priština only 44 percent expressed envy, a figure well below average.

¹⁹ Linear from the lowest to the highest income group: 75% – 69% – 50% – 48%.

Two thirds believe that economic inequality has increased. This assessment correlates directly with education,²⁰ agreement is above average in the highest income groups, in the Priština and Prizren regions and reaches 75 percent among the inhabitants of Priština city.

Eighty-three percent of the Serbs and 68 percent of the members of other minorities share this view, but only 65 percent of the Albanians do.

*"Here are two descriptions of the social differences in this country.
With which one do you agree?"*

A small minority has most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of poor people;

Or:

A majority of people are in the middle class, with fewer people who are rich or poor."

In the light of the findings for social envy, employees' powerlessness and the widening of social differences, the answers to these alternatives are astonishing: only 38 percent of respondents agree with the first statement, while 62 percent agree with the second. In other words, a clear majority view Kosovo as a middle-class society.

Neither gender nor age, education nor income, occupation nor place of residence explains support for the one and rejection of the other statement. The thesis of the small wealthy minority enjoys above-average support among respondents in the Mitrovica and Gjakova regions with 61 and 55 percent, respectively. One in two Serbs subscribe to it, but little more than one in three Albanians. In other words, it is primarily Albanians who regard their society as a middle-class society.

How do people assess the development in their personal economic situation?

"As regards your living conditions, are you better off, about the same or worse off today than ten years ago?"

And comparing your present situation to your living conditions one year ago, are you ...

²⁰ From the lowest to the highest level of education: 60% – 60% – 63% – 65% – 69% – 69% – 79%.

	Ten years ago	One year ago
<i>Better off</i>	45	24
<i>About the same</i>	23	53
<i>Worse off</i>	32	23

Figures in %, rounded

More than two thirds of the respondents are convinced that they are better off, or at least no worse off, today than ten years ago. The assessment of developments in the past years is also positive: the situation of more than half is unchanged, and that of one quarter has improved.

In particular managers, professionals, students, teachers and businesspeople see progress compared to their situation a year ago, while an above-average proportion of pensioners and the unemployed feel that their situation has deteriorated. Compared to a year ago, one third of independent businesspeople feel they are worse off.

The clearest differences in the assessment of personal living conditions are by ethnicity. In the ten-year comparison, almost one quarter of the Serbs – compared with just below one third of all respondents – say they are worse off today, which is hardly surprising a ten years ago their group was still in power. But even in the one-year comparison 38 percent of the Serbs, compared with 23 percent of all respondents, state that their situation has deteriorated further, again not surprising in the light of developments in the last year.

Economic well-being is one thing, ethnic identification is another. What value to the respondents attach to them?

"What is more important to you – personal wealth or my group"?

A good fifth choose personal wealth, and a little less than four fifths ethnic affiliation. Only among respondents with no personal income does wealth enjoy above-average support at 28 percent. Otherwise, no socio-structural variable favours one or the other option, with the exceptions of residential environment – 85 percent of very rural inhabitants favour of ethnicity – and region: 82 percent of the respondents from Gjakova and a full 93 percent of those from Gjilan also share this view. Almost four in five Albanians give precedence to the ethnic group, but only somewhat fewer than two in three Serbs – obviously one third of the Serbs have rather realistically concluded that wealth can be seen as a portable fatherland.

How do the respondents categorise themselves by stratum in Kosovo's society?

"Some people say that there are different levels in society which others call classes. Here we are thinking of levels and not of groups with different languages/ethnic groups. To what level in society would you be closest to?"

The breakdown of replies is as follows:

Upper level	4
Upper middle level	10
Middle level	60
Lower middle level	17
Lower level	9

Figures in %, rounded; * less than 1%

In many societies interviewees are reluctant to place themselves in higher classes; as a rule, people tend to classify themselves in the middle. Both observations hold for Kosovo, in particular the latter. Level of education plays an important role in self-perceptions of social level: a disproportionately large number of respondents with no or little formal education

classify themselves as lower-class, those with secondary and university education see themselves as middle-class; university graduates are overrepresented among those who classify themselves as upper-middle-class. Technical school graduates are overrepresented among those who place themselves in the highest stratum. By occupation, the self-classification is very plausible: the upper and upper-middle strata contain a disproportionate number of managers and professionals, the middle stratum white-collar and skilled workers, and the lower-middle and the lower strata farmers and agricultural workers. Remarkably, half of the unemployed looking for work and as many as two thirds of the unemployed not looking for work classify themselves as middle-class. This indicates that self-classification is influenced more by the prestige of education and occupation than by income or wealth.

Regional and urban-rural distinctions in self-classification are also significant. An above-average proportion of respondents from the Gjakova and Gjilan regions categorise themselves as lower or lower-middle class, of those from the Priština, Prizren and Ferizaj regions as middle and upper-middle-class, and finally 21 percent of those from the city of Priština as upper-middle-class.

A comparison of self-classification and reported income reveals an interesting pattern:

Income group	No income	1st	2nd	3 rd (highest)	∅
Upper level	4	3	5	3	4
Upper middle level	10	6	10	17	10
Middle level	58	51	67	66	60
Lower middle level	19	21	15	12	17
Lower level	10	19	3	2	9

Figures in %, rounded

There is a disproportionately strong tendency among respondents of all income groups, from the lowest to the highest, to classify themselves as middle class – even more than half the respondents with no or little income do so. Obviously there is a considerable gap between self-perception and reality.

How does self-classification vary by ethnic group?

Ethnic group:	Albanian	Serb	Other
Upper level	5	1	5
Upper middle	11	6	3
Middle level	61	50	61
Lower middle	15	29	16
Lower level	8	14	15

Figures in %, rounded; upper class less than 1%

This table reveals that self-effacement is far more prevalent among the Serb minority than among the majority and other minorities.

What social policy would people like the government to adopt?

"What kind of government would you prefer:

A government which tries to make all people as equal as possible in wages, housing and education, even if incomes are heavily taxed

Or:

A government which allows people who are clever and work hard to become wealthier than others, even if some remain permanently poor."

No less than 69 percent of respondents would like the government to promote equality, even if it means higher taxes. This result is hardly surprising in the light of the findings

analysed above. In general, the respondents have a strong working ethic: they view education, hard work, experience and cooperation as the basis for success.

Four in five respondents prefer a secure job to entrepreneurial risk, and seven in ten would like to change their job if they could. Almost two thirds believe that the gap between rich and poor is growing wider and just as many are envious of the rich.

Yet, despite this, two thirds think they are better off now than ten years ago, and three quarters believe that their situation has improved in the last year. Six in ten regard themselves as middle-class – a majority of all respondents in all income groups take this view. And six in tens respondents also view Kosovo as a middle-class society without many rich and poor. Obviously, the wish is father to the thought. Regardless of growing social differences and social envy, a clear majority regard themselves as middle-class because that is what they want to be. This may be an illusion, but it is an illusion that will undoubtedly encourage economic development.

FOUR

A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY: RELIGION, ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY

<i>"There are many ways of conducting a religious life."</i>	86
<i>"I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion."</i>	85
<i>"Whatever people say, there are supernatural forces of good and evil."</i>	84
<i>"I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished."</i>	84
<i>"I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one."</i>	78
<i>"Muslims in Kosovo should try hard to practise Islam as Arab Muslims."</i>	57
<i>"I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God."</i>	11

Figures in %, rounded

The great majority of respondents accept that there are many ways of leading a religious life – and not only because there are several religious groups in Kosovo, but also because members of a religious group can practise their religion in different ways. Proportionately more Muslims than Orthodox Christians²¹ agree with this statement, and thus also more Albanians than Serbs. Almost as many respondents – without significant differences between Muslims, Orthodox and other Christians – state that they try to live their life according to the teachings of their religion.²² By contrast, more Muslims than Orthodox Christians believe in supernatural forces that influence the lives of people for better or worse – and are also convinced that, as both Islam and Christianity teach, there will be a better life after death, where the good and the bad will receive their just deserts.

Although belief in a life after death declines with increasing education²³ and income,²⁴ even seven in ten university graduates and almost eight in ten respondents in the highest income group accept this doctrine.

There may be many ways of leading a religious life, but almost four in five respondents are convinced that their own religion is the only true one, a view held by 80 percent of Muslims, 79 percent of non-Orthodox Christians and only 58 percent of Orthodox Christians, women more than men, less educated people than highly educated,²⁵ people with no income more than high earners,²⁶ housewives and unemployed more than civil servants and teachers.

Should Kosovar Muslims follow the religious practices of Arab Muslims? There is a parting of ways over this question.²⁷ A majority of 57 percent agree and a strong minority disagree. Who favours a stricter interpretation of Islam? Women rather than men and younger and older people rather than the middle groups. There is a marked inverse correlation with education²⁸ and a less pronounced one with income.²⁹ Support for the Arab approach is

²¹ And even higher proportions of the small Christian communities, Catholics and Protestants.

²² Responses correlate more or less inversely with education: 97% (without formal education) – 88% – 87% – 82% – 85% – 82% – 71% (university graduates).

²³ Almost linear: 98% – 90% – 86% – 83% – 85% – 68% – 74%.

²⁴ Linear: 89% – 87% – 77% – 77%.

²⁵ Sixty-six and 60 percent in the two highest education groups.

²⁶ Linear: 84% (no income) – 81% – 72% – 70% (highest income group)

²⁷ Only Muslims were asked this question.

²⁸ Almost linear: 80% (no formal education) – 73% – 62% – 63% – 55% – 42% – 25% (university graduates).

above average among housewives, semi- and unskilled workers, pensioners and unemployed, and below average among managers, professionals, white-collar workers, civil servants and teachers. It is also much more popular in villages than towns and cities.³⁰

Who believes that they can have a happy life without God? Only one in ten respondents. The remarkable finding is that there are fewer young people in this group than members of the middle age groups. The proportion rises to 14 and 17 percent in the two highest education groups. By occupation and income, there is no significant difference between those who can and cannot live without God.

But there are highly significant differences by religious affiliation differences: only nine percent of Muslims state that they can be happy without God, compared to 24 percent of Orthodox and 23 percent of other Christians. If we treat these responses as an indication of secularisation, it is clear that it has made far fewer inroads into Islam than into Christianity.

In summary: four in five respondents believe in a life after death in which people will receive their just deserts. Almost as many try to live their daily lives according to the teachings of their religion. Not many fewer also believe that their religion is the only true one. But just one of ten can imagine a happy life without believing in God.

Do people practise their religion?

"How often do you pray?"

The breakdown of replies is as follows:

Regularly	33
Often	33
Sometimes	22
Hardly ever	8
Never	4

Figures in %, rounded

Two in three respondents pray regularly or often, and just one of ten hardly ever or never.

Women pray more often than men, older people more often than younger.³¹ Frequency of prayer falls by almost half as education rises.³² High earners pray less.³³ By occupation, farm owners, housewives and the unemployed not seeking work pray far more often³⁴ than white-collar workers, civil servants and teachers.³⁵ People pray more in rural areas than in towns, and least of all in Priština.

Once again, there are marked differences between the religious groups: whereas almost seven in ten Muslims – and almost as many non-Orthodox Christians – pray regularly or often, only a good four in ten Orthodox Christians.

"Do you practise religious rituals (like attending services, fasting)?"

²⁹ Linear decline by household income and almost linear by personal income: 63% (no income) – 66% – 49% – 41% (highest income group).

³⁰ 62% of village inhabitants, compared with 38% of the inhabitants of Priština city.

³¹ 64% (youngest) – 60% – 65% – 78%.

³² Linear: 90% (no formal education) – 82% – 73% – 69% – 59% – 59% – 53% (university graduates).

³³ Among respondents in the highest income group 54 percent pray regularly or often.

³⁴ All a little below 80 percent.

³⁵ Just above or below 50 percent.

Yes, regularly	45
Yes, often	21
Yes, sometimes	21
Hardly ever	6
Never	6

Figures in %, rounded

The social profile of people who visit mosques or churches, fast or practise other religious rituals,³⁶ and the differences between religious groups, resemble the findings for prayer.

The correlation between replies to questions about belief and about religious practice is high enough to construct a statistical scale of "religiousness".³⁷

On this scale, responses break down as follows:

Not religious (0 – 1 items)	4
Religious	57
Very religious	39

Figures in %, rounded

The scale confirms what replies to individual questions indicated: well over half of the respondents are religious and almost four in ten is very religious; just four percent are not religious.³⁸

Who is more and who is less religious? Almost half of the oldest age group are very religious, and disproportionately high percentages of the two youngest age groups are religious. Surprisingly, in the lowest age group the proportion of non-religious is only three quarters of the average.

Religiousness declines sharply as the level of education rises:

	Not religious	Religious	Very religious
No formal education	-	38	62
Primary school uncompleted	1	44	55
Primary school completed	2	59	39
Secondary school uncompleted	3	61	36
Secondary school completed	4	61	35
Technical school	10	61	29
Higher education	12	55	33
∅	4	57	39

Figures in %, rounded

³⁶ Women more than men and the highest age group; religious practice correlates inversely with education (89% – 82% – 73% – 61% – 61% – 52% – 50%); above average among farm owners, housewives and unemployed not seeking work, below average among teachers, civil servants and white-collar workers; below average in the highest income group; practice is strong in villages and much weaker in Priština.

³⁷ It is constructed using the following items: *I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished: yes – I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one: yes – I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion: yes – I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God: no – I believe in some form of existence after death: yes – Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state: yes – How often do you pray?: regularly, often – Do you practice religious rituals (like attending services, fasting): yes.* $\alpha = .6752$

³⁸ If the criteria for non-religiousness are relaxed, i.e. respondents with up to three positive responses are ranked as "non-religious", the percentage in this category doubles, but even then it is still a small minority.

The greatest number of very religious people is found in the two lowest education groups. Although the number of non-religious in the two highest education groups is above average, even at these levels they remain a small minority.

The relationship between income and religiousness is similar: the lower the level of income is, the higher the proportion of very religious. Very religious are overrepresented among housewives and unemployed not looking for work; non-religious are overrepresented among managers, civil servants, white-collar workers, teachers and skilled workers and technicians.

There are also marked differences by ethnic affiliation. Among the Albanians, the very religious are slightly overrepresented, whereas among the Serbs, the proportion of non-religious at 14 percent is well above average and the proportion of very religious a low ten percent. Among the respondents from the smaller minorities, almost half are very religious. Differences by religious affiliation are similar: Muslims are slightly overrepresented among the very religious, whereas among Orthodox Christians the proportion of non-religious is particularly high and that of very religious particularly low.

How much solidarity is there between members of the ethno-linguistic and religious groups?

	agree
<i>"I prefer to be with people who speak my own language."</i>	86
<i>"I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or political views."</i>	83
<i>"I feel very close to people of my own ethnic group, whatever their education, wealth or political views."</i>	82
<i>"I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different language/ethnic group if they loved each other."</i>	28
If the answer is yes: <i>"I would not mind even if it is my daughter."</i>	91

Figures in %, rounded

Eighty-six percent of the respondents prefer to mix with people who speak the same language, and almost as many feel the same way about people of the same religion and the same ethnic group, regardless of social status or political orientation. Mixed marriages across ethnic barriers are accepted by slightly more than one of four of all respondents.

Nine in ten Serbs and a slight lower proportion of Albanians prefer to be around people from the same language group, but only six in ten members of smaller minorities. Only half of the managers and professionals and three quarters of the teachers share this view, but in contrast nine in ten civil servants and agricultural workers.

At 89 percent, orthodox Christians expressed the strongest solidarity with co-religionists. Figures for the two highest education groups are lower, and correlate inversely with income.³⁹

Religious affiliation is not a significant variable for ethnic group identification: whereas Serbs and Orthodox Christianity coincide, other Christians, Catholics and Protestants, identify completely with the Albanians.

Who make up the minority that accepts mixed marriage? The youngest age group, among whom agreement rises to one third, is overrepresented. Higher education goes hand in hand with greater acceptance.⁴⁰ Almost four in ten white-collar workers, civil servants and teachers accept mixed marriage, and 44 percent of students – and almost as many inhabitants of the city of Priština. A good 90 percent of those who accept mixed marriage have no objection even if the family member involved is a daughter.

³⁹ 86% – 83% – 82% – 76%.

⁴⁰ Almost linear: 13% (no formal education) – 22% – 23% – 34% – 28% – 36% – 39% (university graduates).

What roles do religion, ethnicity and other factors play in people's cultural self-determination? The following question has proved effective in exploring people's views of themselves:

“Some in Kosovo think of themselves as being a citizen of Kosovo first, while others think of themselves first as either an ethnic Albanian or a Muslim or a European or a Catholic. Please tell me what you consider yourself.”

The responses in descending order of first choices are as follows:

Albanian	61
Citizen of Kosovo	19
Muslim	11
Christian Orthodox	3
Serbian	3
Citizen of Serbia	1
European	1
Other*	1

Figures in %, rounded; * including "region" and "area"

* Catholic: 0.4%

By ethnic and religious affiliation the options break down as follows:

Ethnic group		Religious group			
Albanian	Albanian	68	Muslim	Albanian	66
	Citizen of Kosovo	20		Citizen of Kosovo	20
	Muslim	11		Muslim	12
	European	1		European	1
Serbian	Orthodox	37	Orthodox	Orthodox	37
	Serbian	36		Serbian	36
	Citizen of Serbia	17		Citizen of Serbia	16
	Citizen of Kosovo	8		Citizen of Kosovo	8
	European	1		European	1
Other	Muslim	37	Other Christian	Albanian	55
	Citizen of Kosovo	29		Citizen of Kosovo	25
	Albanian	26		Catholic	16
	European	2			

Figures in %, rounded; "other" was ignored

More than two thirds of the Albanians define themselves as Albanians, one fifth as citizens of Kosovo and only one tenth as Muslims. An analysis of the responses according to the criterion of religious affiliation, the break down is similar. Hence, for the majority of ethnic Albanians and the majority of Muslims ethnic identification is strongest, followed by citizenship, with religion a distant third.

The priorities of the Serbs are different: a good third of them regard themselves first and foremost as Orthodox Christians, another good third as Serbs, and almost one fifth as citizens of Serbia; only in fourth place follows citizens of Kosovo, chosen by less than one tenth. As all Orthodox Christians are Serbs and all Serbs Orthodox Christians, the break down by religious affiliation is virtually the same. The self-perceptions of members of the smaller ethnic minorities are different again: 37 percent, in other words, far more than among the Albanians, define themselves as Muslims, almost three tenths as citizens of Kosovo and

one quarter as Albanians. The identity profile of members of the smaller Christian minorities most closely resembles that of the Albanians: well over half define themselves as Albanians, no less than one quarter as citizens of Kosovo and 16 percent as Catholics. Thus, the Albanians plump for the ethnic option and the Serbs for the religious, as do the smaller ethnic minorities.

There are interesting distinctions by socio-structural characteristics. Men are more likely than women to identify themselves as "citizens of Kosovo", which also correlates directly with education.⁴¹ The characteristics of those who define themselves as Muslims are almost the reverse: more women than men, and inverse correlation with education⁴² and income.⁴³

To summarise: in Kosovo, the degree of religiousness as measured by religious convictions and religious practice is very high. People prefer the society of people who speak the same language and show strong affinities with those who have the same religious and ethnic affiliation. Ethnic endogamy is regarded as normal by three of four respondents. Available evidence indicates that religiousness and ethno-religious solidarity are mutually supportive, which gives identity structures great stability. Ethnicity is the most important factor in people's cultural identification. Besides ethnicity, significant factors that play a role in defining individual identity include religion and citizenship.

⁴¹ Almost linear: 6% (no formal education) – 12% – 20% – 21% – 19% – 24% – 30% (university graduates).

⁴² Almost linear: 24% (no formal education) – 15% – 16% – 6% – 8% – 7% – 2% (university graduates).

⁴³ Linear: 13% (no income) – 13% – 5% – 5% (highest income group).

FIVE

A PLURAL AND A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY: POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Kosovars see their society as a plural society, cleaved along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. At the same time it is a pluralistic society, divided by political preferences and different views of the world. There are Albanians, Serbs and other ethnic groups, Muslims and Orthodox and other Christians, and none of these is a politically homogeneous group – a positive, but not a sufficient prerequisite for democratic pluralism.

How do respondents keep themselves informed about social and political developments? Almost nine tenths of the respondents rely on television; the other tenth also rely on radio (six percent), newspapers (four percent) and friends and relatives. A little less than one fifth of the respondents read a newspaper regularly and half occasionally;⁴⁴ one third never read a newspaper. Each language group has its own newspapers, and people with satellite dishes – countless roofs and balconies sport them – can watch programmes in the language of their choice, whether broadcast by Kosovar television or stations in neighbouring territories.

"What is in your opinion the most serious problem confronting our country today?"

The replies in descending order of frequency are as follows:

Economic problems (unemployment, poverty, pensions, infrastructure)	47
Political problems (undefined status, independence from Serbia, cooperation of parties)	45
Other (crime, security)	8

Figures in %, rounded

Respondents find economic and political concerns equally worrying. Women, the two lowest age and income groups, farmers, housewives, unemployed seeking work and members of the smaller ethnic minorities are disproportionately concerned with economic problems. Men, older people, respondents in the higher education and income groups, teachers, civil servants, businesspeople, skilled workers and technicians, students and pensioners – in short: those whose economic existence is more secure – are overrepresented among those worried about political problems. Moreover, Albanians are more likely than Serbs to give precedence to political problems.

"In the present situation what should the government focus on most?"

The responses break down as follows:

	All respondents	Albanians	Serbs	Other ethnic groups
Law enforcement	45	47	29	45
Efficient management of economic development	33	32	37	42
Clean government	22	21	34	13

Figures in %, rounded

⁴⁴ The most widely read newspapers are Koha ditore (44 percent), Bota sot (27 percent), Ze`ri i dit`es (11 percent), Epoka e re (five percent) and Vecernje novosti (Serbian – also five percent).

Law enforcement is far and away the priority for the Albanian majority and the smaller ethnic groups,⁴⁵ whereas Serbs favour economic development and clean government.

"Which of the following influential groups of people do you consider as very important or as not very important in Kosovo?"

The responses in descending order of preference are as follows:

	"Very important"
Members of government	88
Members of parliament	88
Military leaders	87
Party leaders	83
Big businessmen	75
Managers of big enterprises	71
Bankers	71
Religious leaders	70

Figures in %, rounded

Ministers and parliamentarians, just ahead of the military,⁴⁶ are viewed as most influential. Party leaders – of which there are many on account of the many small parties – follow at some distance. Business and religious leaders are the choice of far fewer respondents.⁴⁷

The differences in perception by ethnic group are substantial. Nine in ten Albanians regard ministers and parliamentarians as very important, but only one in two Serbs. Military leaders, too, are important for nine-tenths of the Albanians, but for less than half the Serbs. Albanians attach greater importance than Serbs to all groups across the board. Given the Serbs' scant regard for the current power structures in Kosovo, the wish may well be father of the assessment.

"In which of the following situations has one a good chance to receiving fair and just treatment?"

The responses in order of frequency are as follows:

	Fair
In court	73
In a police investigation	73
In elections	70
At the tax office	63
In university entrance exams	45
In getting a government contract	45
In applying for a job	44

Figures in %, rounded

Seven in ten respondents believe that the courts, police and electoral commission are fair, and six in ten the tax office. Less than half are convinced that university admissions and the allocation of government contracts or jobs are above board.

⁴⁵ It is also the choice of an above-average proportion of the inhabitants of the Mitrovica and Peja regions.

⁴⁶ Support for the military is above average among respondents with little education and no income.

⁴⁷ The standing of religious leaders is slightly above average among women and respondents in the lower education and income groups.

The Serbs are far more sceptical. Just one in two thinks the courts and police are fair, two in five think elections are clean and fair, and only one in five think they are treated equally in job applications. Here their opinions are almost certainly based not on their wishes, but on less than positive personal experience.

It is said that the family, the clan and conservative views on the role of women play are determining factors in Kosovar society. Do establish whether this is so, we included the following statements in the survey:

*"It is permissible to break the law if it is in the interest of your family."
"Women should stay at home and look after their children and family."*

Twenty-six percent agreed with the first statement – with above-average agreement among members of smaller ethnic minorities and inhabitants of rural areas and the Prizren, Mitrovica and Gjakova regions. In other words, the hypothesis of familialism holds for one quarter of the respondents.

Twenty-seven percent agree with the second statement – not a particularly high proportion by comparison with other predominantly Muslim societies.⁴⁸ Incidentally, an above-average 42 percent of the – non-Muslim – Serbs agree, compared with 25 percent of the Albanians. Agreement was above average among respondents with little education; men and women did not differ significantly in their replies.

Almost three quarters do not want to keep women out of the public eye. But how do people feel about taking part in politics?

"If you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience."

Three in four respondents agree; there are no significant differences by gender, age or occupation. Support for this statement is lowest among university graduates and people in the top income group – but more than half of even these groups still agree.

The majority may believe that politics is a dubious business and it is better to keep out of it. However, a substantial minority disagrees: almost 15 percent of respondents stated that they were members of a political party.⁴⁹ Whether politically active or not, the vast majority of respondents have clear political preferences. Asked

*"Think of political leaders in our country. Which leader do you admire most?"
Whom else do you admire? (Your second choice)"
"Which political leader in our country do you most dislike?"*

nine-tenths answered the first, four fifths the second and almost three fifths even the third question. The break down of the responses is as follows:

⁴⁸ E.g. 53 percent in the Palestinian territories. Cf. Theodor Hanf & Bernard Sabella, *A Date with Democracy. Palestinians on Society and Politics*, Freiburg: ABI 1996, p. 136.

⁴⁹ Party membership is distributed as follows: LDK 45 percent, PDK 21 percent, AAK 14 percent, various Serbian parties six percent, and other 13 percent. On party support, see below.

Political leader	1st choice	2nd choice	Most disliked
Ibrahim Rugova	42	7	12
Other LDK & PSHDK leaders	6*	15	3
Hashim Thaci	15	7	15
Other PDK leaders	8	17	2
AAK leaders	7**	17	4
ORA leaders	5	6	5
Serbian leaders	7	5	5
Other, none & no reply	10	25	46

Figures in %, rounded; * Nexhat Daci 4%; **Bajram Rexepi 6%

Preferences split along ethnic lines: Albanians opt for Albanian politicians and Serbs for Serbian.⁵⁰ As all Serbs are Orthodox, the distribution by religious affiliation is approximately the same; Albanian Christians, most of them Catholics, prefer Rugova, other LDK and Christian Democrat PSHDK leaders, and have an above-average dislike for Thaci.

Who, according to socio-structural variable, likes and does not like whom?⁵¹

Rugova enjoys above-average support among respondents in the lower education and income groups, farmers, housewives, semi- and unskilled workers and residents of the Peja and Ferizaj regions. Thaci's supporters are overrepresented among the young, people with no income, civil servants, managers and professionals and residents of Mitrovica region. ORA leaders are mentioned particularly often by respondents with high levels of education and income, businesspeople and managers, but also by teachers and agricultural workers. The structure of AAK supporters is similar.

Dislike of Rugova is above average among civil servants and the unemployed and respondents from Priština and Prizren. Thaci is rejected disproportionately by women, students, managers and professionals and respondents in Peja and Gjakova.

People for whom Rugova is the first choice, name as second choice other LDK, but also AAK, leaders. Thaci's adherents usually choose other PDK, or also AAK, politicians as their second preference. Those who choose AAK or ORA politicians as first preference, tend to pick Rugova as second choice.

The patterns of dislike are clearer. Half of Rugova's supporters dislike Thaci, and two thirds of Thaci supports dislike Rugova. People who admire AAK leaders generally reject Thaci, and one third each of the ORA supporters dislike Rugova and Thaci.

The fronts across the pluralistic spectrum are clear, and also pretty inflexible. No fewer than 54 percent answered Yes to the following question:

"Thinking of political leaders whom you support, would you support these leaders in whatever decision they make?"

Fifty-seven percent of Albanians, but only 13 percent of Serbian respondents support their leaders unconditionally. They are overrepresented among women, in the oldest age group, among housewives, semi- and unskilled workers, farmers and respondents from Ferizaj and Gjilan.

Respondents who reply No are overrepresented among people with high levels of education and income, managers and professionals, white-collar workers, skilled workers and technicians, civil servants and residents of the city of Priština.

⁵⁰ Members of other minorities express above-average support for Rugova and for ORA politicians and below-average support for Thaci.

⁵¹ By first preferences.

"If there were elections for our parliament, which party are you most likely to vote for?"

Party preferences⁵² break down as follows:

LDK Democratic League of Kosovo	47
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo	23
AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo	9
ORA	7
PSHDK Albanian Christian Democratic Party	1
SRS Serbian Radical Party	3
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia	1
DSS Democratic Party of Serbia	1
Other, none	8

Figures in %, rounded

The break down of party preferences demonstrates the simultaneously plural and pluralistic nature of Kosovar society even more clearly than politicians' support. It is plural: all Albanians vote Albanian parties and all Serbs Serbian parties. And it is also pluralistic: each of the two sub-societies has a multiparty system.

Asked to mention their second preference among political parties, 36 percent of the respondents name the AAK and 14 percent ORA; in other words, the two smaller parties have real growth potential. Fourteen percent mention as second choice the LDK and 11 percent the PDK. Thus, shifts in voter potential cannot be excluded – another indication of pluralism.

The parties' social profiles resemble those of preferences for politicians. Support for the LDK and the PSHDK correlated directly⁵³ and that of the PDK indirectly with age.⁵⁴ Support for the AAK and ORA is overrepresented among the highest education and income strata. The regional strongholds of the LDK/PSHDK are Peja and Ferizay, those of the PDK Mitrovica and Prizren; support for ORA is twice as high in Priština city as in the country as a whole.

"Relations with a number of foreign governments, peoples and international organisations have had a certain impact on our country. For each country or organisation we mention, please tell us whether you consider its impact as more helpful or as more harmful?"

Responses ranked in descending order of "helpfulness" are as follows:

⁵² Almost nine percent did not reply

⁵³ 43% (youngest) – 46% – 48% – 55% (oldest).

⁵⁴ 16% (oldest) -21% – 26% – 31% (youngest).

	"Helpful"
USA	92
World Bank, IMF	91
KFOR	91
United Kingdom	89
Germany	88
European Union	83
OSCE	80
Turkey	76
Saudi Arabia	71
UNMIK	56
France	39
Russia	10

Figures in %, rounded

There cannot be another territory with a predominantly Muslim population in which the USA is so popular as in Kosovo – thanks to the decisive role that the USA played in the Nato intervention. The roles that the World Bank and KFOR have played in stabilising what has been achieved and the supporting roles of the UK, Germany and the EU are also reflected in high positive assessments. By contrast, France's influence is seen as "harmful", a consequence of its difficult role in protecting the Serbian minority in the north – and perhaps because of its reputation as "serbophile", whether true or not. Finally, Russia is regarded as the protector of the Serbs, and the great majority of Kosovars see its influence as harmful. In the Mitrovica region with its large Serbian minority the proportion that views Russia's influence as positive is well above average. By contrast, in this region the roles of Germany, the EU, Turkey and Saudi Arabia receive lower values than elsewhere. Support for Saudi Arabia is above average among housewives, unemployed looking for work and farmers. The assessment of Saudi Arabia as helpful correlates inversely with education.⁵⁵

Finally, it is interesting that the evaluation of the UNMIK is not very positive. With time, people start to resent even the most benign foreign rule.

The following question was asked to determine the normative world view of respondents:

"Which country in the world, in your opinion, should serve as an example for our country?"

The responses break down as follows:

	All respondents	Albanians	Serbs	Other ethnic minorities
USA	54	58	8	49
Switzerland	18	17	31	14
Germany	14	14	16	16
Other European countries	10	9	28	11
Neighbouring countries, former Yugoslavia	3	2	11	6
Other	1	1	7	3

Figures in %, rounded

More than half of the respondents and an even greater proportion of Albanians – in particular the youngest age group, less educated people, housewives, farmers and

⁵⁵ 85% (no formal education) -77% – 74% – 70% – 68% – 66% – 65%.

agricultural workers – see the USA as an exemplary country. By education, the choice of the USA drops from an above-average 62 percent among the least educated to a below-average 40 percent among the most educated. Those furthest from realising their dreams dream the American dream: the USA is less a concrete example than a hope – a very strong hope. Attitudes towards the USA also reflect the ethnic divisions in the country: the Serbs do not share the enthusiasm of the Albanians, although the smaller minorities do.

Those who see Switzerland as an example have a different social profile: men are overrepresented, as are respondents in the middle age and upper income groups, businesspeople, skilled workers and technicians and civil servants. Much the same is true of those who opt for Germany.⁵⁶ Both countries are chosen by Albanians, Serbs and members of the smaller minorities. Many Kosovar refugees first-hand experience of Switzerland and Germany and others as workers: they are concrete examples.

To summarise: although a small plurality of respondents view the economy as Kosovo's main problem, almost as many regard its political status as the chief hindrance. They want the government to establish the rule of law and efficient policies of economic development. They think political leaders are more influential than business elites. Three quarters of the respondents think it is better to keep out of politics, but a larger proportion has clear political preferences, whether for political leaders or parties. Both preferences testify to the plural character of Kosovar society: Albanian and Serbian preferences exist side by side, but in the form of pluralistic multiparty systems. The influence of the USA and KFOR and states associated with them are regarded as "helpful", and a large – Albanian – majority sees the influence of Russia as "harmful". Nine in ten respondents choose prosperous, democratic Western countries as examples for Kosovo.⁵⁷ Thus, having determined Kosovars political orientations, the next step is to enquire about their attitudes towards democracy.

⁵⁶ Support for Germany was above average among the two lowest income groups.

⁵⁷ No one mentioned Islamic countries. It is unclear whether no one mentioned them spontaneously or whether interviewers limited the choices. Although the questionnaire *code box*, of which the authors were unaware, contained 33 countries, but none of them were Asian or Arab countries with a Muslim majority.

SIX

DEMOCRATS AND OTHERS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POLITICAL ORDER

"It is harmful for society that individuals or groups have different opinions and pursue different interests."

"It is normal that people have different opinions and pursue different interests as long as they respect the rules."

Fifty-five percent agree with the first statement, and 87 percent with the second. The recognition of a diversity of opinions and interests is a precondition for democracy. Those who say No to the first statement – a good two fifths of the respondents – recognise this diversity. Given a positive restriction (respect the rules) and an affirming formulation, another two fifths will accept this view. A good one tenth are hard-core rejectionists. All in all, less than half regard pluralism as natural, but with a little help a similarly sized group can be convinced of the need for it. Only a small hard core is set against it.

This core grows when the respondents are asked to choose between two other statements:

"A state authority which controls particular interests and preserves social harmony

Or:

Freedom for people to pursue different interests provided they respect the rules."

Just under one fifth favour social harmony under state coercion to people's freedom to pursue their own interests.

The proportion of non-democratic convictions grows further in response to the next statement:

"It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win."

Almost one quarter of the respondents agree; the proportion of Serbs is almost half that of the Albanians, but rises to almost three in ten among members of smaller minorities. The proportion of woman, and particularly housewives, who have nothing against electoral fraud is well above average, that of civil servants, white-collar workers, unemployed and teachers below. Approval correlates inversely with income.⁵⁸ In the city of Priština far fewer respondents than in the rest of Kosovo approve of electoral fraud.

A series of pairs of questions measures attitudes to the essentials of democratic governance – independent courts, the separation of powers or checks and balances, freedom of speech and a multiparty system.

"Here is a list of statements which describe different ways in which a society can be governed. For each pair of statements, which one would you agree with?"

⁵⁸ "Agree": 27% (lowest) – 26% – 23% – 18% (highest income group).

Choices in descending order of support for pro-democratic options are as follows:

	Democratic option
<i>"Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity Or: Newspapers free to criticise government and exercise freedom of expression."</i>	72
<i>"Judges, who follow instructions given by the government. Or: Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says."</i>	60
<i>"One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future Or: More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future."</i>	60
<i>"A prime minister whose power is balanced by parliament. Or: A prime minister who can act without the interference of parliament."</i>	58

Figures in %, rounded

Seven in ten respondents agree with freedom of the press, six in ten want an independent judiciary and multiparty system, and almost as many favour a division of power between the executive and the legislative. Compared to the attitudes on the fundamental components of democracy, it appears that the proportion of non-democrats is even higher than thought.

*"A government can use different methods to protect its ability to govern a country in a crisis situation.
Which of the following methods do you approve of and which do you disapprove of?"*

The responses in descending order of approval are as follows:

	Approve
Prosecution of violent political action	90
Prosecution of people working against national interest	87
Prosecution of criminals only	84
Seeking political solutions by negotiation	84
Introducing martial law	34
Prohibiting political activities of the opposition	30
Censorship or banning of newspapers	21

Figures in %, rounded

Nine tenths of the respondents approve of prosecuting violent political action, and more than four fifths approve only of prosecuting criminals. An identical number believe that negotiation is the best way to solve political crises. A good third accept the use of martial law. Undemocratic methods of retaining power find the approval of substantial minorities: almost one third would not object to banning the opposition, and one fifth has nothing against censorship or banning newspapers.

*"Think of a situation in which many people are dissatisfied with the government and want to change it.
Which of the following do you consider appropriate or inappropriate?"*

In descending order of popularity, the replies are as follows:

	"Appropriate"
Peaceful meetings and protests	80
Waiting for the next elections	63
Violent action	3

Figures in %, rounded

These responses reflect a clear rejection of violence: four fifths regard peaceful protest as a legitimate expression of dissatisfaction and almost two thirds think it right to wait for the next elections. Just three percent approve of using violence to force a change of government.

The following question seeks to measure opinions on – democratic and undemocratic – forms of governance in multi-ethnic states:

"There are many countries like ours – that is, a country with different religious, language and ethnic groups. There are different forms of government in these countries and different opinions about what is the best way of ruling such a country. We will give you some of these opinions. Thinking of Kosovo, please tell us whether you find each one acceptable or not."

"Which one of these opinions is, according to your feeling, the best solution for Kosovo?"

In descending frequency of acceptability, the answers are as follows:

	Acce p- table	The best solution
<i>"All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party (parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition."</i>	92	62
<i>"A joint government with a quota for all major ethnic groups."</i>	75	11
<i>"The largest ethnic group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided."</i>	64	16
<i>"One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave."</i>	38	3
<i>"A single party open to everyone rules without opposition."</i>	33	4
<i>"The country is divided up and communities form their own states."</i>	21	4

Figures in %, rounded

More than nine tenths find an open majority democracy acceptable and three fifths think it is the best solution. A democracy based on ethnic proportionality is acceptable to three quarters, but only one tenth think it the best solution.⁵⁹ Almost two thirds find an ethnic majority government acceptable, but only 16 percent regard it as the ideal solution. Remarkably, more than four fifths of the Albanians, i.e. the ethnic majority, do not view it as the best solution.

⁵⁹ Two fifths of the Serbian respondents – above average – regard proportionality as the best solution.

The replies to the undemocratic solutions are equally interesting: domination by one group over all others is acceptable to almost two fifths of the respondents, a one-party state to one third and partition to one fifth – but only about four percent view each of these solutions as the best. These results reveal a degree of ambivalence in this group of respondents: between 21 and 38 percent do not object to systems that are hardly democratic, yet when it comes to the crunch the great majority of them prefer democratic models.

Who are democratic, partly democratic and undemocratic? To determine this we constructed a democracy index.⁶⁰

The index ranks the answers as follows:

0 to 1 democratic options	Not democratic	12
3 to 5 democratic options	Partly democratic	63
6 democratic options	Democratic	25

All figures in percent, rounded

At the first glance, gender seems to matter. At 16 per cent, female respondents are overrepresented in the non-democratic category, while males reach 29 per cent among the democrats. However, the gender factor is strongly pre-determined by education. Four times more women than men have received no formal education, and nearly three times more did not finish primary school. Among primary school graduates men outnumber women two to one and among secondary graduates by four to two and a half. In technical education, the gender distance is smaller. However, at university level, it rises again to 12 men for every five women.

And education definitely matters for attitudes towards democracy, as the following table demonstrates:

	Not democratic	Partly democratic	Democratic
No formal education	36	49	15
Primary uncompleted	15	66	19
Primary completed	15	68	17
Secondary uncompleted	8	73	19
Secondary completed	10	62	28
Technical school	2	62	36
University	5	53	42
Average	12	63	25

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

The relationship between education and democratic attitudes, though not fully linear, is nevertheless quite clear: more education correlates with a positive stance on democracy.

This finding is in tune with those from other countries. Given that the contents of education may differ considerably from place to place, this raises a difficult question: is the impact of education direct, determined by the content and the quality of teaching, or is it indirect, attributable to the fact that, generally, better educated people see better chances for their life – and that these chances are enhanced by democratic systems? In Kosovo, as in most countries, income rises with education – and positive attitudes towards democracy rise with income:

⁶⁰ Using the following items: “*One political group (majority or not) rules without opposition, and people who refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave*”. – Unacceptable; “*A single party open to everyone rules without opposition*” – Unacceptable; “*More than one party, each with its own plan for the country’s future*” – Agree; “*A prime minister whose power is balanced by the parliament*”. – Agree; “*Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says*”. – Agree; “*Newspapers free to criticise government and exercise freedom of expression*”. – Agree.

Income	Not democratic	Partly democratic	democratic
No income	14	69	17
€ 4-90	19	55	26
€ 100-192	5	65	30
€ 200-1,706	5	61	34
Average	12	63	25

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Lack of positive attitudes is clearly a phenomenon linked to poverty, while support for democracy increases linearly with income.

Attitudes differ by occupation:

Occupation	Not democratic	Partly democratic	democratic
Housewives	22	61	17
Pensioners, disabled	12	62	26
Semi-, unskilled workers	11	72	17
Unemployed, looking for work	10	65	25
Farm owners	6	77	17
Teachers	5	57	38
Students	5	65	30
Foremen, skilled workers, technicians	4	68	28
White collar, clerical workers, employees	3	64	33
Unemployed, not looking for work	2	60	38
Farmers, fishermen	-	87	13
Civil servant, security officers	-	64	36
Managers, professionals	-	57	43
Average	12	63	25

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Lack of enthusiasm for democracy is particularly apparent among semi- and unskilled workers, farmers, farm workers and fishermen and, most noticeably, among housewives⁶¹ – all groups with low education and low income. By contrast, support for democracy is quite strong among respondents working for the state: civil servants, members of the security forces and teachers, and is also noticeable among employees and skilled workers. In short: democratic deficits exist mainly in less modern occupations; moreover, traditional marriage is obviously not a school for democracy.

Hence it is not surprising that far above average 40 percent of respondents living in the capital city rank among the full democrats, while those hailing from smaller towns or from villages figure below the average.

What is the breakdown of non-, partial and convinced democrats by major political party?

⁶¹ Fifty-six percent of all women interviewed are housewives. They represent 62 percent of all respondents without schooling. Seven out of ten housewives have no personal income.

Party	Not democratic	Partly democratic	democratic
LDK & PSHDK	13	65	22
PDK	11	70	18
AAK	11	54	34
ORA	8	60	33
Average	11	64	24

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

There is little surprise in the breakdown: the larger a party's support, the less likely that its views on democracy will deviate far from the mainstream. An above-average proportion of LDK and PDK supporters are recruited from social groups in which convinced democrats are underrepresented: thus in both parties convinced democrats are slightly underrepresented and non- and partial democrats overrepresented. The small parties attract a greater proportion of educated, high income, urban voters than the large parties and have a correspondingly high proportion of convinced democrats.

To summarise: overall, the respondents' attitudes reflect the state of a young democracy that is still finding its feet. In the light of the territory's recent history, this is what one might expect.

Another finding, however, is surprising. The data from Kosovo differ considerably from most surveys in other countries with incipient democracies in that they are remarkably inconsistent. The same persons who choose the democratic option on one fundamental component go for non-democratic options on others. Whereas elsewhere each set of answers, democratic as well as non-democratic, tends to highly correlate, which allows for the construction of highly coherent scales of democracy, this was not the case in Kosovo.

Taking the attitudes towards the various fundamental elements of democracy one by one, an overall picture, if not of overwhelming, certainly of clear majorities for each important element of democracy emerges. As we have seen, almost three in four approve of newspapers having the freedom to criticise government, and about two in three reject rule by a single group without any opposition. Support for a multiparty system is slightly weaker, though still higher than in West Germany in 1950, when only one in two opted for it.⁶² Backing for checks and balances is relatively weak, though still expressed by a majority.

It could be argued that pro-democracy options are strongest in fields people know – they have experienced a government-controlled press and the birth of a free one, and they have suffered from a ban on opposition movements and rule by a single group – whereas a freely elected parliament is a comparatively new venture and may be viewed as support for a government claiming independence rather than as a mechanism designed to hold it accountable.

Be this as it may, all options for or against the fundamentals of democracy make rather strange bedfellows, as a few examples show. It is hardly astonishing that among those who prefer a multiparty system, 80 percent are in favour of a free press. It is less obvious, however, that 61 percent of single-party supporters should share that preference. Likewise, a free press is favoured by 61 percent of those respondents who want government be controlled by parliament, but by no less than 78 percent of those who prefer to give government a free hand. Not surprisingly, there is a close correlation between the options for a free press and an independent judiciary. Yet 57 percent of those opting for a government-guided judiciary want a free press, too. In summary, freedom of the press or absence of censorship ranks highest among the democratic options and is shared even by many people who otherwise hold undemocratic views.

More confusing, however, is the contradictory overlap in support for a one-party and a multiparty system. The latter is preferred, logically, by two thirds of those rejecting the former – however, less logically, not by the last third – but also by more than half of respondents

⁶² Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Wandlungen der deutschen Demokratie 1953–1991, in: Peter Haungs et al. (eds), Paderborn: Civitas, pp. 435ff.

who otherwise opt for a single party ruling without opposition. These findings reveal some conceptual confusion or, more probably, ambivalence about a multiparty democracy.

Other ambiguities deserve to be noted: more than two in three one-party supporters want the executive to be controlled by the legislative, yet only one in two respondents who prefer a multiparty system share this wish. Likewise, half of those in favour of a one-party system want independent judges, while one third of the adherents of a multiparty system do not.

It is not too difficult to draw some conclusions: opting for one essential component of democracy implies not opting for others; options for both the one-party and the multiparty system partly overlap; the concepts of checks and balances, of government accountability to parliament and of an independent judiciary have the support of majorities, but of changing majorities.

While all fundamental components on their own find majority approval, the overall perception of democracy, except for a minority of respondents, remains inconsistent, and makes for a very diffuse picture of support for democracy.

SEVEN

CAN POLITICISED RELIGION ENDANGER DEMOCRACY? OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS

<i>"Religion is a matter between God and an individual – the country is for everybody."</i>	93
<i>"Obviously there are differences between religious groups in this country, but they should be kept out of politics."</i>	84
<i>"Religious leaders should stay out of politics."</i>	79
<i>"Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state."</i>	56

Figures in %, rounded

The first statement is a variation on the slogan of the liberal Wafd Party in Egypt, which sought to separate religion and politics and create unity around the concept of love for the fatherland. It was adopted by many modernising political forces in the Arab and wider Muslim world. An overwhelming majority of the respondents agree with this statement.⁶³

More than eight in ten respondents are also of the opinion that undeniable group differences should be kept out of politics. Support for this view is above-average among Serbs and members of other minorities. It is also higher in Prizren, an area with many minorities – which is not surprising, as this statement obviously reflects the interest of minorities.

Responses to the statement that clerics should keep out of politics put the support for and opposition to the separation of religion and politics in sharper perspective. More than four of five respondents support this demand. They are strongly overrepresented among Serbs / Orthodox Christians, civil servants, teachers and pensioners and among the inhabitants of Priština.

It is a standard demand of fundamentalists of all religions that belief and religious values should determine all aspects of society and state. Are more than half of the respondents fundamentalists? An analysis of the results suggests caution. Support for this view is above average among farmers, farm workers and unemployed not looking for work, and far below average among employees, civil servants and teachers. It declines with education.⁶⁴ Not only 59 percent of the Muslims agree, but also 30 of the Orthodox Christians and an above-average 62 percent of other Christians. There are almost certainly a number of convinced fundamentalists among those who approve. But the social composition of approval points rather to large numbers of people disadvantaged in terms of education and occupation who expect that giving greater consideration to faith and religious values will improve their lot.

The following question deals directly with the fundamentalist concept of the state:

"Which kind of government would you prefer?

A government which makes laws to ensure that people live according to the rules of religion

Or:

A government which believes that there should be no enforcement in matters of religion and which leaves religion to the believers' conscience."

⁶³ Ninety- three percent of Muslims agree, 85 percent of Orthodox Christians and 97 percent of other Christians.

⁶⁴ Almost linear: 69% (no formal education) – 62% – 58% – 58% – 59% – 47% – 43% (university graduates).

One quarter of respondents approve of legislation to ensure observance of religious rules; a strong majority of three quarters are against. Approval varies strongly depending on the degree of religiousness: among the very religious it is almost one third, falling to almost one quarter among the religious and one twentieth among the non-religious. Support is above average among women, semi-skilled workers, farm workers and housewives, and well below average among civil servants, teachers and students. It declines with rising levels of education.⁶⁵

Despite this, the fact that a good quarter of the respondents approve of a statement that is a central demand of political fundamentalists is a surprising finding that gives food for thought.

According to most local as well as international Kosovo observers, the principal political cleavages are of an ethnic, but not of a religious nature. Parties and other movements articulate opposing nationalisms, but there is no apparent manifestation of politicised religion.

The analysts' surprise was all the greater, when – after many failed attempts to detect a coherent pattern in attitudes to democracy – they conducted separate factor analyses for the Albanian and the Serb respondents – and uncovered a distinct, relatively strong and coherent factor in each sub-sample. While the “Serbian factor” is hardly a real surprise – we will deal with it below – the one Albanian definitely is.

It consists of high correlations between a large number of answers⁶⁶ that can be grouped together under four separate headings:

First, religiousness, measured in terms of beliefs and religious practice: belief in a life after death and compensatory justice; the conviction that one's own religion is the only true one; regular or frequent prayer; regular or frequent practice of religious rituals; affirmation of trying to live according to the teachings of religion.⁶⁷

Second, social conservatism, linked with a perception of powerlessness: the conviction that change makes things worse; that women should stay at home; that shops and factories should be run by the state; refusal of mixed marriage; social envy; feeling unable to improve peoples' life.

Third, a link between religion to politics: considering religious leaders as very important; Saudi Arabia's influence as helpful; no comparison with Western countries; Kosovo Muslims should try hard to practise Islam as Arab Muslims do; conviction that faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society; preference for a government that makes laws to ensure that people live according to the rules of religion.

Fourth, non-democratic opinions and attitudes: favouring a one-party state; censorship of the press; prohibition of the opposition; local authorities appointed, not elected; unconditional support for preferred leaders; agreement with rigging elections in order to allow the better candidates for the country to win.

Factors of religiousness, of social conservatism and of non-democratic convictions, taken individually, are of no great surprise. However, their linkage with expressions of powerful convictions of the role religion should play in public life is an outstanding finding. In terms of content, most significant is the correlation of all factors with the approval of using state laws to enforce religious prescriptions on how people should live their life. This item is designed to distinguish pure religion from fundamentalism, Islam from Islamism. Of all Albanian respondents, 26 percent agreed – 28 percent of women and 23 percent of men.

⁶⁵ Almost linear: 38% (no formal education) – 27% – 32% – 26% – 25% – 13% – 16% (university graduates).

⁶⁶ See the full list in annex.

⁶⁷ In most of our surveys, conducted in predominantly Muslim as well as Christian countries, these items correlate very closely, allowing for the construction of a religiousness scale.

Using the answers to the 24 items that correlate significantly, we constructed an index of “politicised religion”. The distribution is as follows:

“Politicised religion”	
None, barely (1-8 items)	17
Partly (9-16 items)	61
Highly (17-24 items)	22

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Hence, one in five Albanian respondents holds opinions and attitudes that combine support for politicised religion with non-democratic convictions.

What is the social profile of this fifth of respondents? Women are slightly over- and men under-represented. Age is not significant, but the level of **education** reached is highly significant:

Level of education	Highly “politicised religion”
No formal education	21
Primary uncompleted	28
Primary completed	26
Secondary uncompleted	26
Secondary completed	21
Technical	15
University	5
Average	22

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

The lower levels of formal education are conducive to above average degrees of politicised religion, while tertiary education, and particularly university, reduced it considerably.

Politicised religion decreases consistently with rising income:

Income	Highly “politicised religion”
No income	25
4-90 E.	20
100-192 E.	17
200-1.706 E.	16
Average	21*

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Lower due to missing values

The variations by respondent's occupation are extremely very interesting and significant:

Occupation	Highly “politicised religion”
Farm owner	28
Semi- & unskilled worker	27
Unemployed, not looking for work	27
Pensioner, disabled	26
Housewife	26
Unemployed, looks for work	24
Foreman, skilled worker	20
Teacher	16
Farm worker, fisherman	14
White-collar worker, employee	12
Manager, professional	11

Own business	10
Student	10
Civil servant, security agent	4
Average	22

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Obviously, the principal sites of politicised religion are the economically less attractive occupations. In the civil service, it is almost non-existent. While 16 percent of teachers belong to this category, they are far outnumbered by the above-average 42 percent who subscribe to none or very few of the convictions indicative of politicised religion.

Geographic distribution is very uneven. The level of urbanisation matters: in Priština the level of highly politicised religion is as low as 14 percent.

By region⁶⁸, the following picture emerges:

Region	Highly “politicised religion”
Mitrovica	42
Prizren	24
Ferizay	23
Priština	22
Gjilan	19
Peja	14
Gjakova	6
Average	22

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

It appears that politicised religion is more prevalent in regions of ethnic or religious diversity and lower in overwhelmingly Muslim areas.

In summary, politicised religion, similar to non-democratic attitudes, seems to be linked to lower levels of education and unfavourable economic conditions. It is more a rural than an urban phenomenon and decreases with rising income – a kind of poor man’s, better: poor woman’s fundamentalism.

Should economic stagnation in Kosovo persist, this blend of fundamentalism could offer a fertile ground for populist political entrepreneurs and seriously threaten the consolidation of democracy. And vice versa: it can be assumed that economic uplift and greater and better education are the factors that will fend off the phenomenon of politicised religion.

⁶⁸ As defined by the Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2004.

EIGHT

POWERLESSNESS VERSUS TOLERANCE PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES AND COEXISTENCE

The most remarkable peculiarity in the data for this sample is the complete absence of a factor that provides a recognisable connection between the attitudes and opinions of all respondents, a clamp for the overall survey, as it were. Notwithstanding the physical proximity, the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority live in different emotional and political worlds.

As shown above, a separate analysis of the ethnic Albanian revealed the factor of politicised religion: both the minority, who identify with this form of religion, and the majority, who reject it, have clearly structured socio-cultural characteristics, attitudes and opinions. A separate analysis of the Serbs also reveals an equally pronounced, complex factor that can be labelled "powerlessness" – both economic and political.

It is based on high correlations between the following attitudes and opinions⁶⁹:

Dissatisfaction and feeling helpless: Conservatism; closeness to fellow ethnics and coreligionists; perception of an increasing gap between rich and poor, and of belonging to a disadvantaged community; dissatisfaction with life as it is, without expecting a change for the better; fear for the future of their children and general fear; perception of an inability to change their lot.

Longing for secular democracy: preference for a competitive democracy, elected local authorities and an independent judiciary; wish to see religious leaders out of politics and separation of religion and politics; no enforcement in matters of religion.

Perception of a hostile world and political abstinence: perception of Albanians versus Serbs as the main cleavage; UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE viewed as harmful; determination to stay clear of politics.

This factor sheds light on a set of attitudes and convictions of a minority, formerly in power and now beleaguered. Bitterness and fear are linked with the desire for a secular democracy that would best serve the interests of such a minority. Since the environment, local as well as international, is perceived as hostile, retreat into political abstinence is predictable. This set of feelings pervades the minority:

Only four percent have a low sense of "powerlessness", 28 percent feel partly powerless and 68 percent very much so. Neither gender, age, education, income nor occupation make a difference. Region of residence, however, does:

"Powerlessness"	low	partly	High
Ferizaj	23	59	18
Gjilan	-	37	63
Mitrovica	-	22	78
Priština	-	21	79
Average	3	29	68

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Obviously, these differences reflect recent experiences of conflict.

The "Powerlessness" index is corroborated by a correlation between ethnic group affiliation and the democracy index:

⁶⁹ See the list of items in annex

Ethnic group	Not democratic	Partly democratic	Democratic
Albanian	12	65	23
Serb	4	51	45
Other	9	67	24
Average	12	63	25

All figures in percent, rounded; bold figures: above average

Obviously, attitudes towards democracy are not shaped only by social factors such as gender, age, education, income and occupation, but also by the relation to power. Those whose group has lost power, whether democratic or not, usually turn to democracy, because democracy alone can provide a guarantee for minority survival. In this respect, Kosovo's Serbs are reacting like South Africa's whites, who, now that their long period of minority rule has ended, exhibit pro-democracy attitudes more frequently than the majority population. Minority status can be a harsh, but efficient school of democracy.

A minority's future depends only in part on their own attitudes and opinions; ultimately it depends on the perceptions of the majority and their willingness to coexist.

This chapter will examine how the respondents assess the social cleavages, the ability to deal with differences and the chances of regulating conflict, and what the prerequisites for conviviality are.

"Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest difference in Kosovo?"

The replies in descending order of frequency are as follows:

Differences between rich and poor	45
Differences between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians	41
Differences between urban and rural Kosovars	6
Differences between very strict Muslims and other Muslims	5
Differences between Muslims and Christians	3

Figures in %, rounded

Not surprisingly, the difference population groups weight differences differently, depending on the degree to which they are affected. Almost half the Albanians give preference to difference between rich and poor, whereas the beleaguered Serbian minority focus on the ethnic conflict. Serbs also mention cleavages between Muslims and Christians twice as often as the average – and indication that for them this means only their conflict with the Albanians.

Understandably, the lower income groups give precedence to social tensions; those who earn more tend to focus on the ethnic cleavages. Cleavages between very strict and other Muslims are mentioned disproportionately often by inhabitants of the Gjilan, Priština and Prizren regions.

Ethnic tensions are often the result of competition for jobs in the private sector and the civil service. What criteria do respondents think should be used to choose candidates?

"If you were to chose people for jobs in Your Own Business, whom would you prefer?"

The replies break down as follows:

"People of your group"	2
"People you know and trust"	22
"Members of your family"	32
"Anyone who is qualified"	44

All figures in percent, rounded

Ethnic affiliation plays virtually no role as a criterion of selection. Even in ethnically homogeneous societies it is not unusual to employ familiar people and family members in one's business. On the other hand, in a multi-ethnic society it is anything but natural for 44 percent of the respondents to choose qualifications as the most important criterion.⁷⁰

Answers to the question

“When choosing people for jobs in Government Service, who should be chosen?”

break down as follows:

<i>“People of all ethnic groups”</i>	20
<i>“People from the majority ethnic group”</i>	21
<i>“Anyone qualified”</i>	59

All figures in percent, rounded

An above-average 23 percent of ethnic Albanian respondents choose the second option, which favours them. Yet, a majority of them, only slightly below average, opt to recruit civil servants on the principle of merit.

What do respondents think about the current state of coexistence and relations in general between the main different ethnic and religious groups in their territory?

“Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which of the following descriptions do you agree with most?”

a)

I fear that peace and co-operation between Albanians and Serbs may have become impossible 20

Or:

In spite of everything, peace and co-operation can still be achieved. 80

b)

I fear that peace and co-operation between Muslims and Christians may have become impossible 15

Or:

In spite of everything, peace and co-operation can still be achieved. 85

Figures in %, rounded

Only one fifth of all respondents, but almost twice as many Serbs think peace between the ethnic groups is now impossible. This pessimistic view is overrepresented among inhabitants of the Mitrovica region, where the ethnic conflict is still not settled.

Eighty-five percent of all respondents, but only 59 percent of the Serbs, think there is a good possibility of peace and cooperation between Christians and Muslims. Once again, Mitrovica is the centre of pessimism. These findings indicate that for numerous respondents "Muslim" and "Christian" were synonyms for "Albanians" and "Serbs" – and indeed, Albanian Muslims and Christians do not have any problems with each other.

Overall, a good four in five Albanians do not have any problems with peace and cooperation – regardless of whether defined as ethnic or religious groups. This doubtlessly reflects the fact that the current situation allows them to largely determine the conditions for them. The Serbs, by contrast, are at a disadvantage. This makes it all the more remarkable

⁷⁰ An above-average proportion of women and respondents with people with low education and incomes opt for family members. By contrast, members of the highest education and income strata, teachers, civil servants and the inhabitants of Priština have an above-average preference for qualifications.

that there is also a majority – albeit noticeably smaller – among them who voted for the more optimistic option.

The insight into the possibility of peace and cooperation is fuelled by the insight into its necessity:

"Open conflict between groups in our society would cause everyone to lose in the long run."

"Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter the circumstances of the cause."

No less than 81 percent of the respondents agree with both statements.⁷¹ An even larger majority of 95 percent of the respondents agree with what sounds like a normative statement of something we examined above:

"In the present conflicts of our country all sides concerned should seek compromises and try to find agreement."

This is supported by 95 percent of the Albanians and a full 99 percent of both the Serbs and the members of other minorities. Finally, it is encouraging that by age, agreement with highest in the youngest group at 98 percent.

Apart from views about the serious of potential conflict and the balance of power, and the insights into coexistence that they motivate, there is the question of how people view cultural plurality, of perceptions of relations between different groups and of opinions on the sense of coexistence.

<i>"Whether one likes it or not, when groups with different languages, religions or otherwise live in one country, a group will either control others or be controlled."</i>	62
<i>"Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting."</i>	83
<i>"Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights."</i>	88
<i>"A good friend is a good friend whether he is called Mohammad or George"</i>	89

Figures in %, rounded

In view of recent developments, it is not surprising that more than three in five respondents hold the opinion that it is inevitable that one group rules over other groups in a multi-ethnic or multireligious, for that is their experience. It is more surprising that such a substantial minority does not agree with this view and thus accept that forms of coexistence without ethnic domination are possible.⁷²

More than four in five respondents regard the existence of different groups as enriching their society. Albanians and smaller minorities are slight overrepresented in this view; only two thirds of the Serbs agree – a much smaller, but still considerable majority.

Almost nine in ten respondents are convinced that coexistence between very different groups is possible on the basis of mutual acceptance and recognition of rights.

⁷¹ For the first statement there are no significant socio-structural variables – not even ethnic affiliation. For the second, agreement is above average among Serbs and the inhabitants of the Gjilan, Mitrovica and Peja regions.

⁷² Neither agreement nor rejection of the statement is significantly linked with socio-structural variables or ethnic affiliation.

A similar proportion believe that Mohammad and George can be good friends. Among Orthodox Christians just under three quarters take this view, which is below average, whereas Muslims are slightly overrepresented at 90 percent and Albanian Christians record an extremely high 98 percent. These differences may be coloured by the fact that for a number of years a Serbian – unlike an Albanian – George has had hardly any chance of contact with a Mohammad. Given the current ghetto situation of the Serbs in Kosovo, one wonders whether the 74 percent agreement expresses a memory of the past or hope of better times to come.

To summarise: social differences are the most important cleavages for a plurality of respondents; those between Albanians and Serbs rank second. Eight of ten believe that in spite of present conflicts, peace and co-operation are still possible. Most respondents are convinced that in the event of violent conflict everybody would lose. Accordingly, they consider compromises as highly desirable.

Slightly less than two thirds believe that it is inevitable that one group will dominate and the others be dominated. Yet four of five think that the coexistence of groups with different traditions is a social enrichment for the country, and even more believe that mutual respect and recognition of one another's rights is possible and a good three quarters. Tolerance is obviously based not only on the insight into the inevitable but also on convictions.

It is sufficiently well known that attitudes and opinions are not necessarily reliable predictors of actual behaviour. Hence, tolerance and positive attitudes to conviviality are not a guarantee, or a sufficient condition, for peaceful coexistence in a plural society, but they are a prerequisite – a necessary condition. The data confirm that the population of Kosovo, and ultimately the majority of the ethnic Albanians, fulfil this necessary condition.

To put it more simply: to the extent that it depends on the ordinary citizen, peaceful coexistence in Kosovo is possible.

NINE

VIEWS OF LIFE AND FUTURE

"Thinking about your life in Kosovo. How do you feel?

Are you

<i>Very satisfied with life as it is,</i>	15
<i>Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied, in the middle,</i>	58
<i>Dissatisfied with life as it is?</i>	27

And how do you think you will feel in ten years' time?

Will you be

<i>Very satisfied with life as it is,</i>	62
<i>Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied, in the middle,</i>	26
<i>Dissatisfied with life as it is?"</i>	27

Figures in %, rounded

Today three in five respondents are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, but somewhat more hope that they will be very satisfied in ten years' time – a clear sign of hope.⁷³ A good quarter are currently dissatisfied, and just as many take a similar view of the future. Those who are very satisfied today are more likely than others to assume that they will not feel differently in ten years' time.

There are no significant differences between men and women, nor between gainfully employed and others. Older people tend to be more satisfied than young people, who are more likely to see themselves in the middle. However, an above-average proportion of the young hope to be among the very satisfied in ten years' time. Currently, over one third of the respondents without formal education are very satisfied; however, differences between the different levels education disappear in the future perspective.

At more than one fifth, teachers are overrepresented among the satisfied. Among those who believe that their standard of living will improve, managers and professionals are overrepresented, as are farmers and farm workers. Present and future dissatisfaction is well above average among respondents from Mitrovica.

However, the largest differences are in the assessments of the ethnic groups. Both today and in the future, Albanians regard themselves as having less-than-average dissatisfaction, members of smaller minorities do not think they will be quite as dissatisfied, and Serbs feel that the likelihood that they will be unhappy is much greater: three quarters of the Serbs are currently dissatisfied, and one half believe they will also be unhappy in ten years' time. Compared to other groups, they have a far lower level of future optimism.

What is the degree of satisfaction among the non-, partial, and convinced democrats?

⁷³ This must be qualified: a good quarter of the respondents refused to answer the question. The figures discussed are based on the responses given.

	<i>Life</i>	<i>in Kosovo</i>	<i>today</i>	<i>Life in</i>	<i>Kosovo in</i>	<i>10 years' time</i>
	Very satisfied	In the middle	Dissatisfied	Very satisfied	In the middle	Dissatisfied
Not democratic	25	50	24	71	21	8
Partly democratic	14	60	26	64	24	12
Democratic	13	57	30	52	32	16
average	15	58	27	61	26	13

Figures in %, rounded

The level of satisfaction drops from the non-democrats through the partial democrats to the convinced democrats, both satisfaction with current conditions and those in ten years' time. Are convinced democrats simply more sceptical than others, or do they expect more from life? Both may be correct. But perhaps a democratically functioning polity plays a greater role in their life than in that of others. If this were true, their dissatisfaction could become an incentive for more democracy.

TEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELEVANT FOR CIVIC EDUCATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the most important findings with relevance for civic education:

- Positive attitudes to democracy correlate directly with formal education: education engenders democracy.
- Kosovars have an incoherent understanding of democracy.
- The most important social groups whose attitudes towards democracy reveal serious deficits are:
 - housewives;
 - unemployed looking for work;
 - semi- and unskilled workers,and in all three groups across the board, apart from the city of Priština.
- Albanians are for the most part tolerant and have a positive attitude towards peaceful coexistence between the ethnic groups. The opinions and attitudes of the Serbs indicate that they are not aware of this.
- Teachers are one of the groups in which the proportion of respondents with democratic attitudes is above-average. This implies that democracy derives not only quantitative, but also qualitative advantages from formal schooling.
- Nine in ten respondents get their information from television, which makes it the most important medium by far.

The following conclusions can be drawn from these findings:

- Any educational support for Kosovo simultaneously serves to promote democracy.
- Every essential element of democracy has the support of a majority of Kosovars, but not necessarily the same ones. This incoherence attests that people want democracy, but do not know enough about it. Hence, the transfer of cognitive knowledge about the essential elements of democracy and the stringent necessity of their interdependence appears to be desirable.
- The main target groups for civic education cannot be reached through the school system, but only through adult education and television.

Accordingly, on the basis of the above we make the following recommendations:

- To provide further training and education in civic education for teachers, combined with instruction in adult education to qualify them to provide tuition for the most important target groups.
- To provide support for a television series on the essential elements of democracy: the rule of law, the separation of powers, multiparty democracy, free elections and freedom of speech, of assembly and of the press. It should be the goal of this series to make it clear in an easily understandable manner that all of these essential elements together are necessary to guarantee democracy.
- To make the results of this study, in particular Chapter Eight, available to the leaders of opinion in the Serbian minority in Kosovo, e.g. through a Serbian translation.

ANNEX I – POLITICISED RELIGION

- I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one – *agree*
- Muslims in Kosovo should try hard to practise Islam as Arab Muslims – *agree*
- Do you practice religious rituals (like, attending services, fasting)? – *yes, regularly and often*
- I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished – *agree*
- I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion – *agree*
- Praying – *regularly and often*
- I believe in some form of existence after death – *agree*
- Influential group - Religious Leader very important – *agree*
- Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state – *agree*
- *A government which makes laws to make sure that people live according to the rules of religion*
- *I fear that peace and co-operation between Muslims and Christians may have become impossible*
- If we try to change things we usually make them worse – *agree*
- There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country – *agree*
- When I see what rich people have I feel that I should have the same – *agree*
- Women should stay at home and look after their children and family – *agree*
- I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they loved each other – *disagree*
- When you think about your progress in life with whom do you compare yourself most often – with all (or nobody) *except for people from Western Europe*
- Impact of Saudi Arabia – *more helpful*
- A government can use different methods to protect its ability to govern a country in a crisis situation = *Prohibiting political activities of the opposition* – *approve*
- *One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future*
- Thinking of political leaders whom you support, would you support these leaders in whatever decision they make – *yes*
- *Local authorities which are appointed by the central government*
- *Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity*
- *Shops and factories owned by a government elected by the people*
- A single party open to everyone rules without opposition – *acceptable*
- It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win – *agree*

ANNEX II – POWERLESSNESS

- One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it – *agree*
- *Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says*
- All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party (parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition – *acceptable*
- Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest difference in Kosovo? *Differences between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians*
- In the last 10 years, has the difference between rich and poor in this country ...
Increased
- *A government which believes that there should be no enforcement in matters of religion and which leaves religion to the believers' conscience*
- I feel very close to people of my own ethnic group, whatever their education, wealth or political views – *agree*
- There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country – *agree*
- *Local authorities which are elected by the people of the respective region, town or village*
- Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter the circumstances or the cause – *agree*
- Impact of UNMIK – *more harmful*
- Impact of KFOR – *more harmful*
- Impact of OSCE – *more harmful*
- The country is divided up and ethnic groups form their own states – *unacceptable*
- People of my ethnic group live in less favourable conditions than others – *agree*
- Thinking about your life in Kosovo. How do you feel? = *dissatisfied with life as it is*
- Thinking about your life in Kosovo. And how do you think you will feel in ten years time? = *dissatisfied with life as it is*
- I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or political views – *agree*
- Religion is a matter between God and an individual. The country is for everybody – *agree*
- I feel uncertain and fearful about my future – *agree*
- Our children might not have our standard of living – *agree*
- If you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience – *agree*
- Religious leaders should stay out of politics – *agree*
- Obviously there are differences between religious groups in this country, but they should be kept out of politics – *agree*