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Effective Crisis Prevention

Challenges for
German Foreign and
Development Policy

Policy Paper 12

Crisis prevention is a dictate of rational politics. Foreign and development policy currently find themselves facing a host of conflicts with a high potential for escalation. Not only governmental and multilateral institutions, but also actors from civil society are increasingly being confronted with the realities of disintegrating social structures and with a social climate of violence that ranges all the way up to armed hostility. These realities affect their work for peace, human rights, and development as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The wars and catastrophes of the 1990s—most recently the war in Kosovo/ Yugoslavia—show that traditional measures are extremely limited in their effectiveness and that no proper use has so far been made of more up-to-date instruments of crisis prevention.

Against this background, the fact that the German government has accorded an important place to the task of crisis prevention in its coalition agreement of October 1998 is to be welcomed. This task covers a wide spectrum, including: gearing development co-operation more strongly to the requirements of stabilization in crisis regions; reforming and expanding international organizations in line with co-operative security; and pursuing disarmament in the area of small-arms and via regional demilitarization agreements. Another task that needs tackling is that of creating an infrastructure for peaceful conflict management—in a way that is geared to practical politics and is theoretically well thought through. This Policy Paper focuses on the steps needed to achieve this (see table 'Summary of Contents'). We suggest practical ways in which 'classical' diplomacy might be developed into preventive diplomacy. We also ask how actors in development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, and peace and human-rights work can help strengthen peace-promoting structures in societies undergoing development or transformation.

The infrastructure for peaceful conflict management needs to have flesh put on its bones over the next few years. Jörg Calließ—who has played a crucial part in shaping this idea in Germany—has pointed out that this fleshing-out is also a 'learning process'. It serves to structure communication and co-operation between different actors and ensures that the various contributions to the overall task of containing violence, settling disputes, and transforming conflicts are closely intermeshed with one another. In our view, new forms of co-operation based on 'public-private partnerships' should become a basic component in the creation of an infrastructure for peaceful conflict management, as a way of underpinning the si-

multaneous strengthening of state and non-state actors. Our proposals primarily refer to the German situation. Here we recognize a particular need for decisive measures and are familiar with the diversity of actors and existing institutional structures. We are aware, however, that new initiatives and measures should be embedded in a broader European and international framework. Our recommendations are based on a three-phase model which includes a gradual internationalization of all endeavours. The new infrastructure should be capable of making a significant contribution to effective crisis prevention by 2005 at the latest.

We address three areas of activity. The first covers the creation of early-warning and prevention units within existing institutions and the improvement of consultation mechanisms within the framework of dialogue forums. This process should be backed by an 'Early Warning and Dialogue Unit', which would act as a point of contact for the various milieus, build up an 'institutional memory' for evaluating and passing on experiences, and fulfil 'sensory' and alarm functions.

Secondly, we believe that promoting peace-oriented forces on the ground and providing them with external support—via, amongst other things, a Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst)—is a crucial task. As a way of developing this area, we propose that a process be instituted in which relevant information is gathered about organizations and individuals and in which task-sharing is fostered. This would ensure that the work done is geared to professional standards and that reliable financial provision is made for relevant projects. We believe a 'Peace-building and Networking Unit' needs to be created to advance this process.

The third area of activity relates to the training of individuals employed in peace missions organized by international organizations, in humanitarian assistance, and in the work for peace and human rights done within the framework of civil society. All these types of work call for very similar basic competences (regional expertise, linguistic, social, and practical skills). At the same time, there are specific skills that differ according to the particular area of operation (election observation, for example, or verification missions, or reconciliation work and work with refugees). A crucially important factor is how the various providers co-ordinate their activities and link up with one another. In this connection, we propose the institution of a process backed up and monitored by a 'Training and Expert Pools Unit.'

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I. Crisis Prevention as a Political Challenge

1. From 'Classical' to Preventive Diplomacy: New Concepts for Foreign and Development Policy

At the time of the East-West conflict, preventive measures were essentially aimed at averting a third world war. High-tech military early-warning systems, nuclear deterrence, and post-Cuba-shock crisis-management were meant to preclude a direct confrontation between the blocs. To these measures were added elements of arms control and détente. The many—mostly internal—regional and local disputes at the periphery of the bipolar system were either ignored or were treated as proxy wars and exploited or escalated as a way of securing some advantage in the arena of power politics.

Since then, this type of locally confined military conflict has come to occupy centre-stage in international crisis-diplomacy. As a result of numerous ethnic power-struggles, civil wars, and processes of state disintegration, and also complex humanitarian catastrophes associated with flight and expulsion, 'ethnic cleansing', famine, and genocide, a glaring gap has become visible in foreign and development policy. Despite early warning, the horrific events in question were not prevented. Once the crises had broken out, the measures used by the international community mostly turned out to be unsuitable for containing or halting the acts of violence and barbarities. At the same time, huge sums were paid out for expensive military operations, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction.

Traditional diplomatic instruments are clearly no longer up to their task (see table 'Crisis Prevention as a Political Challenge'). A new concept of preventive conflict management, based on the old adage 'prevention is better than cure', would seem to be more humane, politically more effective, and, above all, cheaper than the extremely costly reactive type of conflict management and aftercare. Since the United Nations, in its 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, highlighted the special significance of preventive measures—for example, confidence-building and the preventive deployment of UN troops—there have been greater efforts by other international organizations, and also by national governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academic institutions, to develop the idea of crisis prevention further, and to find ways of putting it into practical operation. There is also an increased realization that a new kind of 'multi-track diplomacy', involving a major contribution by NGOs, is needed. In its final report of 1997, the 'Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict' urged the institution of a 'culture of prevention' and called for the adoption of a diversified, task-sharing approach based on public-private partnerships.

2. Strengthening Peace-building Structures: New Perspectives for Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance

Development co-operation and humanitarian assistance have also found themselves in crisis as a result of intra-state conflicts. The experiences in Somalia and Rwanda in particular fuelled a (self-)critical debate about the limits and possibilities of what organizations in this area could achieve. Two pioneering publications in this connection were the Dutch study *Between Development and Destruction* (1996) and the international *Joint Evaluation of Development Assistance to Rwanda* (1996). Development co-operation found itself increasingly acting as a 'repair workshop' dealing with a never-ending stream of war-damage. In addition, because of the various processes of state disintegration, it began to lose many of its state 'counterparts'.

Humanitarian assistance measures began increasingly to be accompanied by unintentional negative side-effects, notably exploitation and abuse by parties to the conflicts. As a result, in civil wars such aid not infrequently became part of a 'war economy' fraught with violence, and it sometimes involuntarily helped prolong and intensify hostilities and human suffering. It also saw itself more and more frequently having to act as a stop-gap, making good the failure and inertia of politics.

New concepts at the UN, OECD, and EU level took these experiences into account. This was the case with the *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* published by the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 1997. 'Post-conflict peace-building', the theoretical groundwork for which had been laid in the UN *Agenda for Peace*, emerged as an important new area of activity. The idea was permanently to preclude any re-eruption of violence by instituting measures of reconstruction, renewal, and reconciliation.

These schemes recognize that, in order permanently to overcome the deeper causes of violence and war, the burden of social and economic problems that weighs on many societies has to be reduced, and the capacity of these societies to effect peaceful change has to be enhanced. The main starting-points for this are seen as being the provision of support for socio-political mechanisms of non-violent conflict management and the strengthening of democratic and civil-society structures. As far as practical operations on the ground are concerned, the idea is that local forces and capacities should be mobilized to a greater extent in the effort to secure peace—as proposed, for example, in the 1996 study *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid*, published by the American NGO 'Collaborative for Development Action'. In Germany, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ—German Agency for Technical Co-operation), is attempting, via its 'Development-Oriented Emergency Aid' (Entwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe/EON), to meet the challenges involved in constructively

Crisis Prevention as a Political Challenge

Foreign and Security Policy

Problems

The reactive-curative approach to crises and conflicts is inhumane, politically ineffective, and costly.

'Classical' international crises and inter-state disputes are no longer predominant.

The 'classical' image of war (state-organized, state-directed warfare between large military conglomerates) has changed.

High-tech military early-warning systems are not suited to the prevailing (intra-state/social) crises.

'Classical' diplomacy has diminished in importance as states have disintegrated and state interlocutors and negotiating partners have disappeared.

There is a 'gap' between early warning and early action.

There is a lack of co-ordinated, coherent approaches between state actors and non-state actors and international organizations.

Proposed solutions

Proactive-preventive action is needed.

A conceptual adjustment to civil wars and processes of state disintegration plus humanitarian catastrophes is required.

Crisis-management must be used to respond to the 'privatization' and 'chaoticization' of war.

Network-style civil early-warning capacities involving 'bottom-up' information need to be created.

'Multi-track diplomacy' with major involvement by non-state actors and promotion of 'peace-processes from below' is becoming more and more important.

Mechanisms of communication and consultation must be altered, a form of contingency planning based on prevention must be developed, and obstacles to early action must be removed.

Co-ordination, complementary task-sharing and coherence between various crisis-prevention actors must be improved.

Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance

Problems

The links between development, peace, and military violence have not been sufficiently clarified.

Civil war is the 'greatest enemy' of development co-operation.

Where there are processes of state disintegration, state counterparts disappear.

Projects often turn out not to be 'crisis-proof'.

Development co-operation and humanitarian assistance feel they are being used as 'repair workshops' to deal with a never-ending stream of war-damage.

Abuse and exploitation of humanitarian relief by parties to wars and 'warlords' are on the increase, and this unintentionally helps prolong and intensify violence and suffering ('feeding the war').

Humanitarian aid often functions as a substitute for political action.

Proposed solutions

What is needed is critical (self-)reflection, greater crisis-relevance in planning and action, and the promotion of societal structures that assure peace.

Intra-state conflicts, processes of state disintegration, and civil wars, associated with humanitarian catastrophes ('complex political/humanitarian emergencies'), must be taken into account in development schemes.

Co-operation with societal actors on the ground must be strengthened.

Projects must be more deeply rooted at various social levels.

Crisis prevention, acute emergency aid, and long-term development must be organized on a new basis.

Local capacities for peace, and peace constituencies that work against violence and war, must be fostered, and their capacity for mobilization must be strengthened.

(Political) pre-care to avert catastrophes must have priority over (humanitarian) after-care.

combining acute emergency aid, long-term development co-operation, and the added ingredient of conflict management. Overall, development co-operation and humanitarian assistance have become more prevention-oriented, and thereby also 'more political'.

3. The Problems of Crisis Prevention by State Actors

Despite the obvious advantages of preventive conflict management, the reactive approach to crises and conflicts still predominates in the world of states. What is more, it involves a drastically disproportionate investment of human and financial resources—as has just been vividly demonstrated in the Kosovo/Yugoslavia war. In a study published in mid-April by the University of the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehrhochschule) in Munich, NATO's costs were estimated to be between DM110 million and DM130 million per day. The US share was said to be DM80 million and that of Germany DM5 million. On this basis, the first three weeks of the war cost NATO DM3 billion. After just less than two months of war, a more recent study by the university arrived at even higher costs. One scenario assumed the war would go on until the 1 July. On this basis, NATO alone would spend DM22 billion for military purposes. If one adds to this humanitarian expenditure, the costs of war damage in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavian military expenditure, and 'other economic costs', the cost of the war comes out at DM110 billion (see table 'The Costs of the War in Kosovo/Yugoslavia'). The reconstruction of Kosovo and of the Yugoslavian economy will cost tens or hundreds of billions of DM. Compared with these figures, the sums spent on prevention-efforts are minute.

Despite prompt early warning, appropriate preventive action is rarely taken. In the discussion about crisis prevention, this state of affairs is often referred to as the 'gap' between early warning and early action. The way in which crises and conflicts are dealt with seems not infrequently to be determined by entrenched routines of traditional power-based or interest-led politics, or by internal political considerations. In addition, there are various forms of political, psychological, and bureaucratic resistance. The political obstacles will often include: weak in-

terests in crisis prevention; misjudgement of a situation; poorly co-ordinated approaches; and a reluctance, based on international law, to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. On top of all this, in the run-up to crises, it is not usually possible to arouse much public interest, or, as a consequence, to work up much pressure for influencing developments—given that what is involved is, after all, still a 'non-event' and there is therefore no 'CNN effect'. The psychological obstacles include: repression of early warning signals, and concentration on existing problems. And the bureaucratic obstacles include: everyday routines geared to the status quo; competition between different authorities and services; and the lack of an institutionalized mandate and organizational capacity for early warning and early action.

Recommendation:

In order to eliminate political, psychological, and bureaucratic resistance to effective crisis prevention, we propose a clear-cut change of policy and clear signals that there is to be extensive investment in preventive structures. This means, not least, that politics must get itself involved even where its own national interests in the narrower sense do not appear to be affected. Adequate resources must be made available for planning, political consultation, and the improvement of intra-governmental co-operation. Steps must be taken to strengthen both contingency planning and conflict impact assessment. There ought to be improved co-ordination between national governments, international organizations, NGOs, and academic institutions in assessing information. Early-warning and planning elements ought to be integrated more effectively into the structures and sequence of the processes through which consultation, opinion-forming, and decision-making occur. Experiences from past conflicts should be subjected to independent evaluation at national and multilateral level and be taken into account as 'lessons learned'. Expert reports of this kind ought to be commissioned from a variety of sources—in other words, concentration on one establishment, or a handful of establishments of similar outlook, ought to be avoided.

The Costs of the War in Kosovo/Yugoslavia

(The scenario assumed the war would continue until 1 July 1999.)

NATO military expenditure	22 billion DM
Cost of humanitarian assistance	13 billion DM
Costs of war-damage in Yugoslavia	31 billion DM
Yugoslavian military expenditure	6 billion DM
Other economic costs (e.g. loss of tourist trade, suspension of trade relations)	34 billion DM
Total Costs of War	106 billion DM

Source: Bundeswehrhochschule München, as quoted in *Der Spiegel*, 24 May 1999, p. 20

II. Early Action via Crisis Analysis, Prevention Units, and Dialogue Forums

How does one go about identifying starting-points for preventive endeavours? How does one organize early action during phases of escalation?

1. Crisis Analysis and Crisis-Prevention Units

The extent to which particular countries and regions are at risk of crisis is generally well known. Despite this, important initiators of action in governmental and non-governmental institutions often lack detailed, up-to-date analyses of conflicts giving policy-oriented assessments of actors, of the mechanisms that trigger violence, of escalation scenarios, and of options for action. There are already various schemes a-foot to ensure decision-makers get information about the development of conflicts. In Germany, at the administrative level, one notable enterprise is the research project on 'Crisis Indicators in Development Co-operation' run by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung—BMZ). Church-based development organizations are considering integrating information relevant to conflicts to a greater extent into their work. Research institutes for regional affairs and political advisory bodies are also involved in background analyses and the compilation of lists of indicators within the German and EU framework.

A whole range of multilateral organizations (UN, EU, OECD) make efforts to assimilate information about crises systematically into their work. In addition to these, there are two international networks that are particularly notable for linking up early warning and early action: the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), formed by various international organizations, research institutions, and NGOs in 1997; and the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), which is based at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP—Research Institute for International Affairs) in Ebenhausen, a suburb of Munich, and is designed to provide support to the EU Commission in its decision-making and strategy-development. Both organizations, however, are in need of further development: FEWER's effectiveness is hampered by its meagre resources; and the readiness to work with CPN is adversely affected by the 'one-way system' whereby the views of numerous experts are passed on to the EU but there is no exchange or shared learning-process.

Recommendation:

As a way of improving crisis analysis for decision-makers, and of getting this type of analysis integrated into institutional opinion-forming and decision-making processes, we propose the following steps:

- Practical peace and conflict research and crisis-sensitive regional research should become major targets for support from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung—BMBF) and from independent foundations of various kinds. At the same time, governmental and non-governmental institutions should support the development of international information networks and networks of experts by concluding project agreements and co-operation agreements, with a view to forming strategic task-sharing alliances.

- The members of the Federal German Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat—made up of the ministries of foreign affairs, development, defence, the interior, economics, justice, and finance, together with the Chancellor's office) should create small early-warning and prevention units at planning/general policy level. Their task would be: to request, evaluate, and deliver an opinion on internally and externally relevant information relating to crises; to stimulate the development of options for action; and to facilitate inter-ministerial co-ordination. To ensure that these units are viable and that they carry weight within the ministries, a total of 5 to 10 posts in each ministry (particularly the foreign, development, and defence ministries) would have to be redesignated. Existing bodies closely linked to government (e.g. the Bundessicherheitsakademie) could be adjusted to conform to the requirements of a peaceful policy of prevention.

- The experiences of the war in Kosovo show that parliamentarians have specific needs in terms of information and advice when it comes to shaping opinions and making decisions about crises. The German Bundestag should therefore consider either setting up a small working unit for this purpose or participating directly in the creation of a non-governmental 'Early Warning and Dialogue Unit' (*see below*).

- The larger NGOs should respond to the new demands in regard to the prevention of violence and to intervention in crises by effecting institutional reforms and reallocating resources. In order to ensure that new standards, instruments, and mechanisms are implemented, early-warning and prevention units comprising 3 to 5 staff members will need to be created at the general policy and planning levels.

2. Networking via Dialogue Forums for Crisis Prevention

Circumspect, co-ordinated action in situations of crisis is the result not only of learning processes between actors from different milieus but also of shared interests and the pressure of common problems. Dialogue forums are particularly suitable as a means of improving communication on specific regions or topics. As we understand the term, a dialogue forum is a periodic meeting of experts, decision-makers, and practitioners from academia, national administrations, international organizations, business, NGOs, and the media. All those involved should not just bring their own particular expertise to the meetings; they should also derive some kind of 'added value' from the exchange with the other participants.

One example of such a body at the international level is the 'Great Lakes Policy Forum', meetings of which are organized on a regular basis in New York and Brussels by the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations. A German instance would be the dialogue group 'War in Turkey—The Time is Ripe for a Political Solution'. The Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn—AFB) has amassed a variety of experiences through two expert meetings on Ethiopia and the Caucasus region. The Development and Peace Foundation is currently developing a 'Policy Forum on Regional Conflict Management', for which five international workshops are planned over a period of a year. Meetings in this area have also been held by the German Foundation for Development (Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklung—DSE) and the Research Institute for International Affairs in Ebenhausen. In addition, various church organizations have started up processes of dialogue between local actors and decision-makers in Germany. Political foundations working, *inter alia*, in the Horn of Africa, the Black Sea region, and South Asia, are also of crucial importance here. Last but not least, mention should be made of the expertise of business enterprises and associations, which have considerable potential at their disposal when it comes to assessing, and dealing with, situations of crisis.

Recommendation:

■ NGOs and independent foundations working at the interface between civil society and the state should concentrate their resources more on process-oriented dialogue forums. This could involve, on the one hand, the creation of discussion-groups on particular countries and regions, and, on the other, meetings on particular themes—especially practical fields such as election observation and assistance, fact-finding, monitoring of human rights/the judicial system, and post-conflict peace-building. Resources for these forums should be made available as part of government funding for projects.

■ The findings of the dialogue forums ought to be systematically taken into account in country- and topic-based co-ordination between various ministries

and government institutions. In addition, through active participation in the forums, these latter bodies should ensure that government expertise and concerns make themselves fully felt at this interface with civil society.

■ Talks between the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development and NGOs about specific countries should take account of crisis-related developments and should be further expanded into, or linked up with, dialogue forums.

■ The German Ministry of Defence should be involved to a greater degree than previously in this exchange, and should bring its experience—for example, with peacekeeping operations—to it, so that future operational mandates can be formulated more realistically and be more effectively co-ordinated with the activities of civil society.

3. 'Early-Warning and Dialogue Unit'

Practice shows that, in Germany, systematic early warning and co-ordinated action only works in very few cases. There is clearly an urgent need for a non-governmental contact- and relay-point that functions as a 'service unit' and can systematically promote the processes of dialogue needed here. Such a body should perform six functions:

- First, it should act as a *point of contact* for individuals and organizations in Germany who would like to pass on observations or anxieties and who, within the framework of crisis-related processes, are seeking a practically oriented exchange with other interested parties.
- Secondly, such a body could monitor and support existing *consultation mechanisms* and help bring together academic, political, and practical expertise that is currently dispersed. Close exchange with the human-rights institute envisaged in the coalition agreement from October 1998 would also make sense here.
- Thirdly, the service unit itself should initiate *processes of dialogue*.
- Fourthly, the service unit would gradually build up an *institutional memory* for processes of dialogue.
- Fifthly, the service unit should establish contact with similar initiatives at the *international level*.
- Finally, after a preparatory phase, the service unit could assume *warning or signalling functions*.

Recommendation:

We propose that an 'Early-Warning and Dialogue Unit' be created. It should be independent of government and be active at the interface between state and non-state actors. Initially, it would be advisable for the unit to be located within an existing institution that has relevant expertise and good contacts at the national and international level and enjoys broad acceptance amongst governmental and non-governmental actors. It should not, however, be located within a government-oriented advisory body, because this could jeop-

Development of an Infrastructure for Peaceful Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Germany			
	Early Warning and Dialogue	Peace-building and Networking	Training and Expert Pools
Phase 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Promotion of policy-oriented peace research and regional research ■ Creation of early-warning and prevention units in government administration and in NGOs ■ Linking-up of various actors via dialogue forums and consultation mechanisms on specific topics, countries, and regions ■ Creation of an 'Early Warning and Dialogue Unit' Functions of this service unit: acting as point of contact, supporting and monitoring consultation mechanisms and processes of dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Realigning development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, and peace and human-rights work so that they bolster peace constituencies ■ Establishment of Civil Peace Service under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) ■ Establishment of peace-building programmes in development organizations and institution of budget items for peace-building in BMZ and Foreign Ministry ■ Creation of a 'Peace-building and Networking Unit' Functions of this service unit: directory and survey (esp. identification of needs and resources) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Underpinning existing establishments that provide training ■ Creation and back-up evaluation of Civil Peace Service training-programme (DED, Forum ZFD, AGDF, AGdD) ■ Conduct and evaluation of the Foreign Ministry pilot project 'Preparation for International Peace Missions' (with broad participation by civil-society actors) ■ Guide-lines for training and preparation programmes; multinational participants; independent evaluation; public-private partnership between state and civil society
Phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Further development of service unit Additional functions: initiation of processes of dialogue; creation of institutional memory; international link-up ■ Close exchange with the human-rights institute envisaged in coalition agreement of October 1998 ■ Creation of fund for commissioning studies from existing institutions/networks and for financing dialogue forums (min. DM5 million per year) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Further development of service unit Additional Functions: clearing-house, professionalization, information on funding options ■ Practically oriented link-up of governmental and non-governmental peace-building organizations ■ Creation of fund—DM25-30 million per year—for selected areas of work/crisis regions ■ Build-up of a distinct profile of Civil Peace Service through soundly designed and systematically evaluated operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Significant increase in proportion of foreign participants in all training schemes ■ Creation of a Foreign-Ministry-sponsored 'Academy for International Peace Missions' that is organized in public-private partnership ■ Creation of a 'Training and Expert Pools Unit' Functions of this service unit: co-ordination of training modules; further training; supervision; data bank for experts ■ Institutional expansion of Civil Peace Service training-programmes; co-ordination within Konsortium ZFD
Phase 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Further development of service unit Additional activity: warning and signalling function ■ Co-ordination with a possible 'Federal Foundation for Peace' or a 'Foundation for Peace-building' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Europeanization of concept and organization of Civil Peace Service ■ Further development of service unit into a 'Foundation for Peace-building' with own funding capacities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Incorporation of service unit and Civil Peace Service training-programmes into a newly created 'Training Centre for Peaceful Conflict Management' ■ Further development of Foreign-Ministry-sponsored 'Academy for International Peace Missions' into an 'OSCE Academy'

ardize its 'interface' function. One possible approach would be for two or three of the institutions that have built up relevant experience and are pooling their efforts within the framework of the 'German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management' to form a co-operative association.

So that work can begin as soon as possible, the service unit should initially be financed primarily out of government funds. The funds could also be made directly available by the German parliament, the Bundestag. In the medium term, a broader funding-basis should be aimed at, encompassing all those who use the unit or derive benefit from its activities. This means primarily civil society, business, and independent foundations.

We work on the assumption that the 'Early-Warning and Dialogue Unit' can be developed in three phases (see also table 'Development of an Infrastructure for Peaceful Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Germany'):

■ In the first phase (up to the end of 2000), the prime task should be to create the information basis for the contact and interface function and to improve support for existing early-warning units and processes of dialogue.

■ In the second phase, lasting between three and five years, there should be greater emphasis on the advisory and initiatory functions and on making contacts more international. The role of the service unit as an 'institutional memory' should also be expanded. Where necessary, background analyses should be commissioned and consultation mechanisms put into operation. Some kind of institutionally secured funds for activities in this area would also be desirable. These should amount to a minimum of DM5 million per year.

■ In the third phase, the service unit should go on to assume warning and signalling functions and should be systematically linked into the early-warning structures that will so far have been created within the framework of the EU. At the same time, studies should be carried out to see how co-operation with the other bodies working for the peaceful prevention and management of crisis might be optimized, and what role might be assigned here to a 'Federal Foundation for Peace' or 'Foundation for Peace-building' (see box 'The Concept of 'Service Units' and Its Further Development').

The Concept of 'Service Units' and Its Further Development

We recommend that the infrastructure for crisis prevention and peaceful conflict management be expanded, both in state institutions and in civil society. This must be done with due respect for the criteria of cost effectiveness, subsidiarity, task-sharing, and learning from experience. The new infrastructure therefore needs organizational forms that help ensure these criteria are fulfilled. For reasons of operational efficiency, various services within the three areas of infrastructure named by us should, in each case, be performed by a special unit. These services include: fostering of contacts/networking/exchange; collating learning experiences (institutional memory); quality assurance/training; and various special tasks in the particular area of operation.

We propose the creation of three 'service units' to fulfil these functions. In terms of their organizing bodies, structure, and resourcing, they should be designed in such a way that, from their position at the interface between state and non-state actors, they are able to do justice to the needs of both sectors. Their creation should be gradual, and should be systematically geared to requirements in the three infrastructure areas. The actual form of organization should be worked out jointly by participants and financial providers and should be checked and adjusted in the light of the experiences that are gathered. Initially, four 'starter' forms are possible: first, association with, and second, integration into, an existing body with a similar work-profile; thirdly, the formation of an association of several existing bodies that would provide the relevant services on a task-sharing basis; and fourthly, the creation of a new body.

In the third phase of expansion of the infrastructure, a decision should be taken as to which form of organization will perform the relevant services most effectively and efficiently in the long term. Account must be taken here of the institutionalization that is currently in prospect in neighbouring areas of activity. This mainly concerns the creation, now under discussion within the ambit of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, of a 'Federal Foundation for Peace' (Bundestiftung Frieden) designed to put support for peace and conflict research on a sound material footing. When the foundation is created, care should be taken to ensure that support for early warning, for the evaluation of training projects and conflict intervention, and for applied conflict research are accorded appropriate status. In the area of practical peace-building, the creation of an independent 'Foundation for Peace-building' in the form of a public-private partnership also suggests itself as a possibility, given that this would be the only way of securing the considerable funds needed for setting up lasting peace constituencies. The 'Peace-building and Networking Unit' could be integrated into this foundation.

In all the areas of activity, services should gradually be developed in line with the supply and demand situation at the European and international levels. Thus, it would seem sensible for any foundation for peace-building that is created to be opened up from the outset to applications from peace constituencies in crisis regions. And in the case of the expansion of the public-private 'Academy for International Peace Missions', the obvious course would seem to be to develop it further into an 'OSCE Academy', as a way of underpinning this organization's weak substructures. Finally, it would seem sensible for the joint services in the training sector to be brought together, incorporating also the Civil Peace Service.

Criteria for a Civil Peace Service

For some years, there has been discussion as to how a Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst—ZFD) might aid conflict management in developing countries and countries undergoing transformation. The current deliberations about government support for these kinds of initiatives were prompted by the coalition agreement of October 1998, and the goals set out in this. Since then, there has been an intensive and sometimes factious debate about the form such a service should take. In our view, the following criteria should be taken into consideration in any decision about this:

1. At the core of the deliberations should be efforts to support local pro-peace forces in crisis regions at the grass roots and at middle-ranking social leadership level, through co-operation with trained individuals from abroad. This means sending individuals to work on projects that have been developed in conjunction with partner organizations in these regions.
2. One particularly urgent task is for experienced development personnel with regional knowledge to be provided with skills in crisis analysis and conflict management and to be given ongoing training and back-up in their work. This task can be performed through a co-operative arrangement between the five officially recognized development services (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungshilfe, Dienste in Übersee, Eirene, Weltfriedensdienst, and Christliche Fachkräfte) and the German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst—DED).
3. Beyond this, there is a special contribution that peace work can make—namely, support local forces in their activities, placing a special emphasis on civil-rights and reconciliation work. Most of the organizations working in this area are members of the Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst (Forum ZFD) and the Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden (Action Community Service for Peace—AGDF). The work-profiles of these organizations have a number of points in common with emancipatory styles of development co-operation. However, to seek to integrate the new potential entirely into the development framework would be to misjudge it. Many of the activities concerned must deliberately stay outside the context of state institutions if they are to remain flexible, independent, and credible.
4. Given their many points in common, groups and institutions working in development, peace, and human rights ought to develop their training programmes in close collaboration with one another, so that it is possible to organize such programmes at short notice across the different providers. A special role can be played here by the DED, the Forum ZFD, and the AGDF. These bod-

ies should exercise their responsibilities on a partnership basis, without giving precedence to any one participating organization. The Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst—to which the Forum ZFD, the AGDF, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Dienste (AgdD) belong—offers a basic framework for this process of co-ordination.

5. The Civil Peace Service can only become fully effective if it is multilayered in structure. It derives much of its legitimacy and scope for action from direct contacts between different actors in civil society. For this reason, its organizational management should not be left solely in the hands of a government institution; it should be entrusted to an institution composed of governmental and non-governmental providers, on a public-private partnership basis. Here again, the Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst offers a basic framework.
6. The efforts of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development to integrate crisis prevention and conflict management into its country strategies are innovative and very much to be welcomed. They should be viewed as an important component in the work of the Civil Peace Service. That said, it does not seem sensible to bind all the members of the Civil Peace Service to these country strategies as their sole frame of reference. Co-ordinated action is more likely to be achieved here through intensive dialogue and task-sharing than through subsumption to government objectives.
7. For the pilot phase, it seems advisable initially to focus the format of the Civil Peace Service on a particular geographical locus and/or a particular area of operation. This arrangement would offer the greatest possibility of getting a range of people engaged in model activity in selected areas of conflict.

The Civil Peace Service is a particularly visible instrument that can be used symbolically to demonstrate the importance of peaceful approaches to conflict management. It should therefore be systematically developed in areas of activity that are particularly suited to it. But the complex apparatus of peaceful conflict management must not be reduced to the mere government-funded dispatch of personnel to the regions in question. There are other important schemes besides that of the Civil Peace Service: independent projects run by non-governmental organizations, by church bodies, and by independent foundations working in the field of crisis prevention and conflict transformation at various levels of society in regions of crisis. Because of their different approaches, there are good reasons for according all these initiatives importance and appropriate support.

III. Peace Constituencies and Civil Peace Service

1. The Significance of Internal and External Actors

One fatal consequence of many conflicts that are highly escalated and have either been pursued violently over a lengthy period of time or have become ‘bogged down’, is the formation of internal milieus and structures whose members have an interest in seeing the prevailing state of affairs prolonged. These groups include: first and foremost the direct ‘winners’ of the militarized situation, in the army and the various militias; the ‘security services’ of various stamp; the dealers in, and producers of, arms; the political hard-liners; the beneficiaries of redistributions of land, capital, and political posts. They all profit for at least as long as the advantages they derive do not appear permanently assured. In a broader sense, this category also includes those who profit from the war economy. As a counter to these kinds of ‘war constituencies’, we need to create and support ‘peace constituencies’—in other words, as extensive a network as possible of social and political forces of all kinds that have an interest in crisis prevention and peaceful forms of conflict settlement.

In deeply divided, shattered societies, forces working for peace need encouragement, support, and solidarity from outside to be able to effect any change. To this extent, the term ‘peace constituencies’ also implies networking and co-operation with external actors. These include, for example, all development bodies and humanitarian NGOs that have some influence on how outside resources are distributed within a country. Such organizations should design their operations in a way that bolsters the indigenous peace constituencies. The group of external partners also includes foreign human-rights NGOs, who are able to secure a greater international response to abuses highlighted by indigenous experts. It also includes foreign peace activists who provide protection for, or accompany, persons in danger, and conflict-management NGOs, who strengthen the organizations on the ground through programmes of further training or by channelling resources to them. Lastly, external actors can be asked to promote accords through a whole variety of third-party initiatives. In this context, a Civil Peace Service can make an important contribution to getting development work oriented towards peace; it can also put its own particular slant on the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts (*see box ‘Criteria for a Civil Peace Service’*).

2. Ten Guide-lines for Supporting ‘Peace Constituencies’

Practical experiences in the creation and linking-up of peace-oriented forces operating in internal conflicts can be summed up in ten guide-lines. These guide-lines should be borne in mind in performing the urgently needed task of opening up this area of activity.

1. The creation of peace constituencies should aim to promote models based on constructive conflict management, respect, fairness, balance of interests, and civic culture, rather than encouraging ‘sweetness and light’ solutions or exclusive approaches.

2. Support for peace constituencies should also encompass the establishment of the rule of law and ‘good governance’ at central-government level, and the democratization of municipal and regional administrations.

3. The development and promotion of interest-groups of multi-ethnic or multi-religious composition—be they womens’, young peoples’, or professional associations, trade unions, businesses, or human-rights NGOs—is of crucial importance. Such groups should be supported in their function as bridges—particularly by foreign partners doing the same kind of work.

4. Forums and institutions in which conflicts can be discussed openly and dealt with jointly deserve particular attention. They should do more to incorporate experiences from other crisis regions. Below the party-political/parliamentary level, such bodies include: bi-communal administrative bodies; assemblies of ‘elders’; round tables on contentious topics; ombudspersons/-institutions; peace commissions; and self-help groups and self-government structures.

5. Extensive resources should be fed into educational and cultural projects and into the media sector (this should also be done by development organizations). This area covers: the development of teaching materials for conflict and peace education and the provision of appropriate further training for teachers via bilingual schemes of instruction; the organization of multi-ethnic festivals and forums; intercultural exchange; and, lastly, the decentralization and liberalization of media structures and the training of journalists in ways that sensitize them to conflict-related themes.

6. Specialized NGOs that concentrate on reconciliation, trauma, and rehabilitation and are largely financed from abroad are becoming increasingly active in post-war situations. When resources are allocated and strategic plans are drawn up for reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, greater importance should be attached to the synergetic link-up of these measures and to their permanent integration on the ground.

7. In some post-war societies, the strong involvement of humanitarian organizations, development agencies, and independent foundations has meant that, within a short space of time, a civil-society infrastructure with a considerable weight of its own *vis-à-vis* the state has emerged, along with a new middle class of professional NGO activists. This extremely supply-oriented ‘NGO market’ needs to be transformed by being geared more strongly to needs on the ground.

8. As well as larger, strategically planned projects run by professional NGOs using full-time paid personnel, there should be equal emphasis on a multiplicity of community-oriented grassroots micro-projects, preferably away from urban centres.

9. In the course of their work, humanitarian assistance and development policy ought to favour structures that promote understanding. These include reconstruction projects, educational schemes, and leisure facilities in which members of the opposing faction are accepted as fellow human-beings, which rebuild confidence, and which offer the opportunity of shared experiences across ethnic boundaries.

10. The practice that has prevailed up to now of granting support for projects of two to three years' duration should be replaced by a scheme of more long-term material support lasting from five to ten years. In order, at the same time, to counter the risks stemming from NGO milieus, with their artificial basis and tendency to self-complacency, a culture of regular evaluation, self-reflection, and willingness to learn needs to be developed.

3. 'Peace-building and Networking Unit'

The initiation and promotion of peace constituencies should become a prime task for governmental and non-governmental actors concerned with crisis prevention and constructive conflict management in developing countries and countries undergoing transformation. For Civil Peace Service too, a crucial challenge poses itself here. In order to achieve the objective cited, there needs to be a considerable degree of co-ordination, and a whole variety of resources need to be mobilized. A lot of groundwork has already been done here by the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management. But the process needs to be intensified, and should be monitored and supported by a 'Peace-building and Networking Unit'. Four areas need to be taken into consideration here:

- Steps need to be taken to identify those individuals and organizations who have skills and experience in crisis prevention and conflict management and also to find out what activities they are currently performing in which regions of the world. This information should be made easily and immediately accessible, so that it can be used for early action. It will also help identify and rectify shortcomings on the supply-side (*directory and survey function*).
- So that this information reaches the correct targets, so that queries can be dealt with and passed on, so that proposals can be co-ordinated, and so that the whole working domain of peace constituencies is effectively represented to the outside world, appropriate interface functions have to be performed (*clearing-house function*).
- Material support for peace constituencies should be significantly increased. There ought to be transparent procedures for its allocation and it ought to come from a variety of sources—from development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, project-monies from independent foundations and other funding bodies, and from specially created budget-items in government departments (*financing function*).
- Peace-building is only in its infancy. There needs to be systematic encouragement of studies on 'lessons learned' and 'best practices', and of the development of professional and ethical standards—for example, in the form of 'codes of conduct' (*professionalization function*).

Recommendation:

We recommend that a 'Peace-building and Networking Unit' be created, to work as a 'service unit' on a subsidiarity basis. The unit should be independent of government but established on a public-private partnership basis. In the short term, it could be set up within an existing non-governmental institution that has a similar work-profile and enjoys broad acceptance, and it could later be developed into a separate body. To begin with, the resources for this should come mainly from the federal budget. In the medium term, however, efforts should be made to secure a broader financial basis involving civil society, independent foundations, and business. We propose a three-phase model for the unit's creation:

- In the first phase (up to 2000), the prime tasks will be to process information, set up working contacts, pass on experiences, and link into the international 'state of the art'. By the end of this phase, needs and existing resources in this area should have been identified (*directory and survey function*).
- On the basis of this, work should then begin, in a second phase of 3 to 5 years, on the clearing-house and professionalization functions. In addition, information should be made available about funding options provided by other institutions.
- In the third phase, the aim will be to set the funding for peace constituencies on a sound footing. This will involve, firstly, the creation of funds for selected areas of work and regions of crisis inadequately covered by other bodies, and, secondly, the carefully directed use of resources to marshal forces in acute situations of crisis. These funds should contain a minimum of DM25 million to DM30 million. One form of organization that might be used to fulfil this function is a 'Foundation for Peace-building'.

IV. Training and Expert Pools

Of crucial importance in crisis prevention and peaceful conflict management is the ‘human factor’. We therefore propose the creation of pools of experts and the promotion of training for various tasks such as: international missions (fact-finding, verification of peace-agreements, election observation, etc.); development co-operation and humanitarian assistance; peace work and human-rights work.

1. Training for UN and OSCE Missions, Election Observation, and Human-Rights Monitoring

Over the last few years, it has become clear that there is a great need for qualified personnel for election observation and international peace missions operating under the aegis of the United Nations and the OSCE. In Germany, there is a lack of trained personnel, and preparation for the relevant operations is inadequate. This became particularly clear during the search for suitable members for the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in autumn 1998. As far as German foreign policy is concerned, three areas can be discerned in which action is required:

- First, there must be an improvement both in training for specific operations and in preparation for work in established fields of action. One important area of activity in which assistance is frequently requested is *electoral observation and support*. Up to now, election observers have generally only been provided with the most basic of information—sometimes already out of date—within the framework of very short courses run immediately before their departure. What is more, there is no attempt to convey specific knowledge about what can be done to prevent elections being manipulated. Co-ordination between observers from different countries also urgently needs to be improved. Poor observation and appraisal of elections can play a part in bringing elections in general, and the instrument of international election observation in particular, into disrepute. Against this background, practical experience needs to be constantly reworked through external evaluation and processes of dialogue, and needs to be systematically fed into the preparatory procedures for new missions.
- Secondly, staff must be trained for a host of different tasks associated with conflict management in *multi-dimensional, long-term operations*. As well as general knowledge about the overall remit, rules of conduct, and legal framework for these operations, those involved need specific kinds of knowledge (for example, that required for verifying agreements or for fact-finding). In addition, special communication skills need to be acquired for building bridges both between the various milieus and with local organizations and individuals. This is the only way to get the activities of governmental, multilateral, and non-governmental organizations intermeshed with one another.

- German foreign policy should not just react to immediate demands; it should also identify areas that have been neglected in previous missions and in which it would like to introduce its own emphases. Tasks particularly suited to this are *human-rights monitoring and support for the creation of structures based on the rule of law*.

Recommendation:

Linking in with previous training experiences at national and international level, we suggest three guidelines for training in the fields of election observation, international missions, and human-rights monitoring:

- Courses should have a multinational composition and be conducted in co-operation with foreign training bodies. This would mean that, right from the training stage, intercultural competence would be strengthened and there would be scope for practical application. Training schemes developed in Germany should also involve indigenous specialists from the crisis regions. There should be some tie-in with relevant experiences from the pilot project ‘Training in Peaceful Conflict Management’ begun in 1997 in North Rhine-Westphalia. Also of relevance here is the observation that gender parity in course composition is conducive to successful learning.
- The evaluation of training programmes and the process of testing them out in practice should be conducted by independent institutions that are not also acting as consultative bodies for the training providers.
- The training must satisfy government demand for personnel for international missions, but it should not be in a form too closely linked to government. In order to ensure that the expertise and potential of civil society is not merely used selectively as a resource, but integrated fully into training, the provision and organization of the training should be structured from the outset as a public-private partnership. This also opens up greater possibilities as regards recruitment of participants for these kinds of training courses.

2. Specialist Personnel for Development Co-operation, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peace and Human-Rights Work

Organizations working in the field of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance are increasingly recognizing the need to familiarize their specialist personnel in a more thoroughgoing way with local structures of conflict, to sensitize them to possibilities of conflict transformation, and to encourage them to engage in reflection about the effects of their own actions. In addition, it has become clear that the everyday work of specialist staff in development co-operation and humanitarian assistance

often also involves tasks related to human-rights monitoring, the promotion of democracy, and mediation in situations of conflict. In order to do justice to these complex requirements in the design and conduct of projects, specialist staff need specific preparation of a kind that the providers in this area have so far not made available in sufficient measure.

Moreover, many NGOs from the peace-work domain are now active in regions of conflict. The range of their activities is very broad: dissemination of information and encouragement of a critical public opinion; provision of humanitarian, psycho-social, and medical care to war victims; support for deserters and conscientious objectors; observation and documentation of war crimes and human-rights violations; protection and accompaniment of persons in danger; support for communication and encounter between people from opposing parties of conflicts; training sessions in youth, education, and cultural work, for the purposes of empowerment and political conscientization. Some focus on the role of the 'neutral' or impartial third mediator; others see it as their task to empower disadvantaged parties to identify their interests and develop options for action against exclusion and discrimination. Women regularly number amongst the most disadvantaged persons in crisis regions. In many cases, this is true even within the structures of the local and international organizations working on the ground. Care must therefore be taken to ensure gender training is included in preparatory measures.

In line with the idea of peace constituencies as described above, one of the central tasks of external specialists is to provide comprehensive back-up to local forces in their work. Ways in which this can be done include, for example, supporting the formation of networks on the ground, fostering and supporting processes of self-reflection and strategy development, passing on information about options for further training and options for learning from the experiences gathered in other regions of crisis.

3. 'Training and Expert Pools Unit'

The boundaries between the requirements for multilateral missions, humanitarian assistance, and work on development, peace, and human-rights are fluid. There are therefore good grounds for intermeshing the training programmes of different providers and for training personnel on a cross-provider basis. It makes sense to link into the experiences of existing organizations working at home and abroad. Such organizations include, for example, the International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Training Program (IPT), based in Schläining in Austria, and the Responding to Conflict group in Britain. Examples in Germany include: those member-organizations of the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management who belong to its training discussion-group (Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst, Ökumenischer Dienst, Kurve Wustrow, Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Modellvorhaben NRW, Werkstatt für gewaltfreie Aktion, Deutsche Evangelische Erwachsenenbildung); the members of the Action Community Service for Peace (AGDF); the German Development Service (DED); the Technisches Hilfswerk; the ex-

isting bodies that prepare police and members of the German army for UN and OSCE missions; and the 'Human Rights and Democratization' course at the University of Bochum.

Because of the different training requirements—particularly the difference between short programmes lasting two to three weeks and long programmes lasting three to six months—the way the various programmes are intermeshed should be flexible. A sensible basis for an interchangeable, transparent, multi-provider training set-up is to have clearly defined training modules that are recognized by all parties and can be combined with one another. In the short term, it would seem sensible to distinguish three categories here: introductory courses providing basic knowledge; continuation courses providing knowledge and skills for special requirements; and, finally, preparatory courses tailored to tasks in actual impending missions and regions.

To ensure generally improved and co-ordinated pluralistic training and a systematic professionalization of individuals active in these areas, we believe that, at least in the medium term, a 'Training and Expert Pools Unit' is needed. This would perform four functions:

- Co-ordinating the various modules and curricula of the different training providers, taking special account of international experiences (*co-ordinating function*).
- Identifying and further developing training standards; promoting the evaluation of training programmes; organizing the further training of trainers; providing trainers (*further training function*).
- Supporting trained specialists through supervision programmes (*supervision function*).
- Creating a data bank of qualified persons across the whole spectrum of activities of international missions and of development, peace, human rights, and humanitarian assistance; the data-bank must have clear rules for use that make it readily accessible to bodies that organize training or dispatch staff to other countries (*expert-pool function*).

Recommendation:

As in the other areas of activity, the infrastructure in the area of specialist personnel should be developed along three phases:

■ In the first phase (up to 2000), existing training approaches in peace and human-rights work ought to be consolidated. In the field of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, options for further training in conflict management should be created for experienced specialist personnel. A minimum of DM10 million is required for this. In addition, the German Foreign Ministry should join with experienced civil-society organizations to set up a public-private pilot project for training specialized staff for international missions.

■ In the second phase, lasting three to five years, there should, firstly, be a marked increase in the proportion of foreign participants in the various training courses. Secondly, the work of the various providers should be made mutually transparent and should be co-ordinated. To perform this function, and also to perform the further-training, supervision, and expert-pool functions, we propose the creation of a 'Training and Expert Pools Unit'. This could be attached to an exist-

ing institution that has acquired the relevant expertise, has good contacts with training establishments at home and abroad, and is perceived as an 'honest broker' at the interface between governmental and non-governmental actors. The necessary funds could be provided by state institutions and by the sponsors of the existing training establishments. The training funded by the German Foreign Ministry could, in this phase, be developed into an 'Academy for International Peace Missions', to be set up jointly by governmental and civil-society institutions.

■ In the third phase, an investigation should be carried out to see whether the 'Training and Expert Pools Unit' and the Civil Peace Service training programme should be combined into a new 'Training Centre for Peaceful Conflict Management'. This institute should be a joint project of various governmental and non-governmental institutions and should contain a strong international component. In parallel, the 'Academy for International Peace Missions' supported by the Foreign Ministry could be further developed into an 'OSCE Academy'.

V. The Next Steps

In creating an 'infrastructure for crisis prevention and peaceful conflict management', Germany actors should gear themselves to the standards developed by the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries that have experience in this area. But a German foreign-policy of civil bent must also have its own distinct emphases. To achieve this requires a concerted effort by governmental and non-governmental actors:

- The members of the German Bundestag are called upon to make the necessary funds available and to pass the laws needed to improve the framework conditions for peaceful conflict management. In addition, parliament should play an active role in shaping the new institutional infrastructure and should ensure that its competences in regard to participation and control are preserved.
- The German government is called upon to view crisis prevention and peaceful conflict management as a cross-sectoral task, and to create the political, institutional, and financial preconditions for its effective implementation. A scheme of co-ordination between the ministries dealing with foreign policy and international relations must be set in train. The German government should create a fund to offset the imbalance between current expenditure on military crisis-intervention and peaceful approaches to conflict management. Appropriate draft budgets should be presented to parliament.
- The ministries that deal with crisis prevention and conflict management are called upon to involve civil-society experts and the foreign-policy experts from the German Bundestag (members of parliament and their staff) to a greater extent in the elaboration of their plans. The first steps that have been taken towards a dialogue between the state and civil society are welcome and should now be extended to practical fields of action and work.
- NGOs and academic institutions working in the area of peace policy should mesh together to a greater extent than previously to form practically oriented forums, and should organize more intensive exchanges of experience, in order to plug gaps in information, co-ordinate their strategies for action in particular crisis regions, and be able to enter more effectively into dialogue with government actors.
- The political parties are called upon to supply parliament and government to a greater extent than previously with expertise in the foreign-policy, security, and development domains, and to press for the speedy creation of an effective infrastructure for peaceful conflict management.

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