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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CECI	Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation
CEDRES	Centre d'Etudes, de Documentation et de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (research and documentation center for economic and social studies)
CES	Economic and Social Council
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNCS	National Statistics Coordination Council
CMOS	Ministerial Orientation and Monitoring Committee
CMS-CSLP	Ministerial PRSP Oversight Committee
CNLP	National Poverty Reduction Council
COMFIB	National Assembly Finance and Budget Commission
CTIS	Inter-Ministerial Monitoring Committee
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
DCSCRIP	Document on the Strategy Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction
DEP	Directorate of Research and Planning
DGB	Directorate General of Budget
DGCOOP	Directorate General for Cooperation
DGEP	Directorate General for Economy and Planning
DPAM	Directorate of Forecasting and Macroeconomic Analysis (MED)
DRED	Regional Directorate for Economy and Development
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSD	National Statistics and Demography Institute
JSA	Joint Staff Assessment
MATD	Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MED	Ministry of Economy and Development
MFB	Ministry of Finance and Budget
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
OEPF	Observatory for Employment and Professional Development
ONAPAD	National Observatory for Poverty and Sustainable Human Development

PAMS	Poverty Analysis Macroeconomic Simulator
PAP	Priority Action Program
PIP	Public Investment Program
PRGB	Budget Management Improvement Program
PRGE	Support Project for Improved Economic Governance
PRGF	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RPRP	Regional Poverty Reduction Paper
SBC-CSLP	Joint Budgetary Support for Implementing the PRSP
SP-PPF	Permanent Secretariat for the Implementation of Financial Programs and Policies
STC-PDES	Technical Secretariat for Coordination of Development Programs
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

1. Origin and Characteristics of Burkina Faso's Poverty Reduction Strategy

Precarious poverty situation

As one of the poorest countries in the world – according to the Human Development Index 2003, Burkina Faso ranks third last (173) of a total of 175 countries – rapid preparation of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) had absolute priority in the government development strategy, so that the country could benefit as quickly as possible from debt relief. Using the internationally defined absolute poverty line of less than USD 1/day, 90 percent of the population currently lives below the poverty line. And even using as a basis the national poverty line of USD 0.444/day, defined in the last household survey in 2003, over 46 percent of the population still lives under this nationally defined poverty line.

PRSP: from structural adjustment to poverty reduction

The disastrous poverty situation in the country called for rapid government action to bring about comprehensive poverty reduction, also through reorientation of the various sectoral policies. The household surveys of 1994 and 1998 formed the statistical foundation for analysis of the poverty situation in Burkina Faso; they pointed to a worsening trend and called for a reorientation of government activity. The Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the changed policy of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) acted as an additional catalyst. In the framework of the structural adjustment programs, the government had already decided at the end of the 1990s to revise its economic policy, which now, through the preparation of a PRSP, was to be clearly focused on alleviating the grave poverty situation in the country.

Poverty situation worsens despite HIPC and PRSP

The third household survey (2003) demonstrated a further worsening of the poverty figures in Burkina Faso and indicated that previous measures related to implementation of the first PRSP and recent economic growth had not positively affected the poverty situation in the country. On the contrary, the percentage of poor people who live under the poverty line increased again to 46.4 percent. Although poverty continues to be primarily a rural problem and is also very unequally distributed regionally – individual regions have poverty rates of almost 70 percent – it is noteworthy that the urban regions are also increasingly confronted with growing poverty (19.9%). The household survey clearly increased pressure on the government to implement effective measures to alleviate poverty. At the same time, however, monitoring, its instruments and indicators, as well as the issue of feedback to the political decision-making process, became part of the discussion. This discussion continues to be pushed chiefly by the international donor community; however, also within the government, discussions surrounding the implementation of the first PRSP are taking a new direction, and the parliament is seeking to assume a stronger supervisory function in this process. Civil-society forces continue to play a marginal role in implementing and monitoring the first PRSP; however, new negotiation possibilities are opening to them, also in cooperation with the parliament, and these have not been sufficiently utilized to date.

Given the precarious economic and development-policy context – aggravated by the crisis in the Côte d'Ivoire, remigration of over 200,000 migrants, and difficult climatic framework conditions – the World Bank decided that its most recent (July 2003) program to support PRSP implementation, with assistance to the amount of USD 50 million, would be entirely in the form of a grant.

1.1 The PRSP 1

In September 1997, Burkina Faso was one of the first countries to reach the decision point of the HIPC I Initiative and thus belongs to the group of the so-called first generation PRSPs.

First generation PRSP

The PRSP 1 was prepared without the detour of an Interim PRSP. This strategy paper was compiled in an extremely short period of only seven months, from November 1999 to June 2000. In July 2000, the first PRSP was approved by the BWI as a good foundation for development cooperation (DC). Burkina Faso thus met all preconditions for the completion point of the HIPC I Initiative and qualified for initial debt relief of USD 400 million (or USD 229 million in net present value terms). At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided that Burkina Faso, through its previous structural reform policy and its presentation of the first PRSP, also fulfilled the conditions (decision point) for additional debt relief in the framework of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, approved in 1999. The government wanted to obtain the debt relief of the HIPC-II Initiative as quickly as possible and gain access to new funds (Poverty Reduction Growth Facility - PRGF, Poverty Reduction Support Credit - PRSC). The goal was to achieve the completion point of the HIPC II Initiative as early as December 2001. Given the sharp drop in export earnings (chiefly cotton) in 2000 and 2001, the IMF and the World Bank, at the request of the government of Burkina Faso, agreed to postpone the HIPC II completion point to March 2002 in order to take 2001 as the base year for the debt situation. In April 2002, Burkina Faso reached the completion point of the HIPC-II Initiative as the fifth country after Mozambique, Tanzania, Bolivia, and Uganda. This involved nominal debt relief of USD 930 million in total. Although almost 50 percent of the country's debt was thus forgiven, the debt indicator (net present value of debt to export ratio) continues to lie significantly above the target rate of the Enhanced HIPC-II Initiative, because of unfavorable world market conditions, drought, and the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.

The first PRSP defined four priority action areas for the poverty strategy:

Four priority action areas

- a) Acceleration of fairly distributed growth
- b) Ensuring access to basic services for the poor
- c) Expansion of income and employment promotion, particularly in rural regions
- d) Promotion of good governance (basically through four partial segments: strengthening democratic constitutional bodies,

strengthening decentralization, transparent financial management, and fighting corruption).

The first PRSP begins with policy orientation papers on, for example, health and education, but also with earlier policy reform projects, such as deconcentration of the government administration and political decentralization. These policy approaches had already defined pillars of government activity which the first PRSP could draw on or which could be more strongly oriented to poverty reduction.

Time pressure...

The process of preparing the first PRSP began in November 1999. The various planning departments of the most important line ministries (DEP-Directorate of Research and Planning) formed an inter-ministerial coordinating body responsible for preparing the document. This inter-ministerial committee was divided into four different sub-groups, which were responsible for dealing thematically with the primary intervention levels of the first PRSP. Starting in February 2000, other actors outside of the government administration were also informed of the status of the process and were incorporated into it.

...to the detriment of participation...

A total of three consultations were organized in February and March 2000, whereby the first (February 15) provided information on the process of preparing and determining the status of the DCSCR (Document on the Strategy Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction) – in a certain sense an Interim-PRSP, which was however only used for the internal discussion in Burkina Faso and not in talks with the BWI. Ten days after this first informational meeting in Ouagadougou (February 25), the preliminary document was supplemented with additional elements and approved at another consultation meeting in Ouahigouya. Three days later, the donors and also civil-society institutions were informed of the results. During the third consultation meeting at the beginning of March (March 3), the previous recommendations related to the DCSCR were already synthesized into a final document and presented to the parliament and also to the CES (Economic and Social Council) for comment.

This brief chronology of the preparation of the first PRSP document makes clear that the participation of the civil society and the private sector could only have been formal. In this phase, participation was limited at best to **participation** in the consultation meetings. In the short period, it was absolutely impossible for other social actors to really comment on, much less revise, the document. Parliament and civil society were hardly involved in the process of preparing the first PRSP; also the second chamber CES was only informed about the final document. In reality, there was no participation in the sense of **real involvement** in the decision-making process surrounding the first PRSP in Burkina Faso.

Drafting of the first PRSP was done largely by the DGEP (Directorate General for Economy and Planning) in close collaboration with the World Bank; even the Inter-Ministerial PRSP Oversight Committee was included in the process in only a rudimentary way.

...and quality of the strategy paper

The enormous time pressure surrounding preparation of the document detracted from its quality and operationalization and also worked to the

detriment of the participatory element. The function of an effective monitoring system – to accompany the implementation process, provide guidance on the required strategy adjustments in a timely manner, and also contribute to the transparent use of funds – was given little weight. Neglect of this aspect hinders implementation of the first PRSP.

Despite these serious gaps and shortcomings, in mid-2000 the IMF and the World Bank determined that the first PRSP presented by Burkina Faso was an adequate foundation for orienting development cooperation.

Implementation plan lacking

The document itself was rather general in nature: concrete, strategic implementation approaches for the four priority action areas were not mentioned. Rapid debt relief was the real motive of the activity. The first PRSP has serious shortcomings both with respect to the analysis of poverty and its causes and with respect to the strategy that should be employed to overcome it. On these points, the document has nothing substantive to say.

Difficult framework conditions

To date, Burkina Faso has received three Poverty Reduction Support Credits from the World Bank to finance poverty reduction. However, up to now, utilization of the resources released by the HIPC-II Initiative has been rather sluggish. Only 41 percent of the available funds were actually used. This points, above all, to low absorption capacity and little planning capacity on the part of the administration.

JSA: critical conclusion

In October 2001, the first Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the first progress report by the Burkinabe government pointed to several weaknesses of the first PRSP:

- concrete Poverty Reduction measures were implemented only very haltingly
- the goals are too ambitious and require adjustment
- the monitoring system is not functional
- in broad areas of the progress report, no concrete connection is made to indicators and goals of the four priority axes.

This tendency continues in the second progress report. The 2002 JSA also criticizes the gap between the objectives and what is feasible, as well as the lacking pre-requisites for an effective monitoring system that provides sufficient information about the process of implementing the PRSP 1.

1.2 PRSP 2 – round two

From PRSP 1 to PRSP 2

In February 2003 a series of consultations were initiated to revise the PRSP 1. In preparing the PRSP 2, the regional components were given far more weight than in consultations on the first PRSP. This meant that not only was the first PRSP more intensively discussed among all participants at the decentralized level of the provinces, but also that

concrete work was done on regional implementation plans, in a certain sense Regional Poverty Reduction Papers (RPRPs).

Intensified consultations

In all 10 regions, there were consultations organized by the Regional Directorate for Economy and Development (DRED), each of which encompassed up to 250 participants. The government administration never comprised more than 50 percent of the participants at these events. Civil society was appropriately represented.

The topics of the consultations included:

- a) discussion of the Regional Poverty Reduction Papers, which were drafted by the corresponding DRED and
- b) a critical evaluation of the initial PRSP 1 implementation phase.

The 10 regional documents that were intended to provide the basis for the region-specific implementation of the PRSP 2 were jointly revised; however, again there was only a limited period of three days available for this purpose. It must be viewed as positive that the civil society was adequately represented in the consultations. However, the fact that its representatives did not feel capable of making a methodological-instrumental or conceptual contribution to the regional strategy papers or the second PRSP must be seen as negative. In fact, the weak civil-society organization meant that they could not even agree on any kind of concerted approach before passage of the second PRSP in September 2003. Although in comparison to phase 1 there was far more room for participation by social actors in the revision of the first PRSP and the reworked second PRSP, this opportunity was not seized. The civil-society organizations lacked the required technical capacities; the private sector showed no interest in this process.

The second PRSP retains the basic orientation to the four priority axes, but with the range of measures supplemented with previously neglected aspects, such as, e.g., gender, the environment, and the promotion of micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises. Nevertheless, the second PRSP, too, fails to concretize strategy implementation. It is thus incomprehensible why precisely the area of handicrafts is fully excluded from axes 1 and 3, although there is untapped income and employment potential, which the promotion of tradespersons in Burkina Faso could tap. The politically sensitive question of fair income distribution in Burkina Faso – 10 percent of the population earns 46 percent of income, while the poorest 10 percent earns only 1.8 percent of income – is also not touched upon in the second PRSP.

Donors demand operationalization

After the second PRSP was presented, all of the donors pushed the Burkinabe government to draw up an operational plan as quickly as possible and to secure the plan with indicators in a manner that would allow for documentation and analysis of both the progress of implementation and the failure of chosen strategy approaches.

1.3 The Priority Action Program (PAP) – the initial PRSP 2 implementation plan for 2004-2006

PAP without participation and consultation

The operational plan PAP (Priority Action Program) was given to the donor community for comment in mid-January. The operational plan was drawn up almost exclusively by the Directorate General for Economy and Planning (DGEP), which is the planning department of the Ministry of Economy and Development; no other ministries except the Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB) participated. The civil society and the private sector were not even informed about this new implementation document.

Inconsistencies...

The PAP was also prepared quickly; its first draft contained serious inconsistencies and used contradictory figures within a single text. The PAP does not include the effects of the external crisis and completely neglects development strategies for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and for the handicraft sector. Donor criticisms of PAP incoherence were largely taken into account by the Burkinabe side in a new version of the PAP, and in March 2004 the revised PAP was presented to the Round Table for coordination between the donor community and Burkina Faso.¹

... and contradictions

The PAP is a first attempt to operationalize the poverty strategy. However, the relationship between the PAP and the PRSP 2 remains unclear, especially as the text contains some warning signs that the PAP may develop into a parallel document to the PRSP 2, including with parallel monitoring structures. With regard to monitoring, the PAP contributes to a degree of uncertainty, as it does not explicitly refer to the core indicators developed in the second PRSP. Furthermore, the significance of the PAP remains unclear (is it an annex of the PRSP or an independent operational plan).

2. Poverty Monitoring in Burkina Faso

Essentially, poverty monitoring is based on regular household surveys (Living Standards Measurement Surveys 1994, 1998, 2003), which offer an overview of the poverty situation in the country, disaggregated by region. In addition there are two surveys on demographic and health developments from the years 1993 and 1998 and a poverty analysis prepared by the GTZ in 1998. As for the perception of poverty through the eyes of those affected, in April 2003 a qualitative and participatory survey was carried out to target government poverty policy.

¹ The results of the Round Table were not yet available at the time the country report was written.

Data flood, data shortcomings, lack of evaluation

Large amounts of poverty-relevant data are also collected at the level of individual line ministries; however, these data are not consolidated, organized, or entered into a poverty-oriented monitoring system. In addition, the flood of poverty-relevant data from the line ministries is not analyzed or assessed with a view to possible policy approaches. The technical survey process is not evaluated; individual evaluations are not followed by any strategic policy recommendations. Poverty mapping exists only in a very rudimentary form and to date maps only data from the area of primary education. Despite their methodological weaknesses, these maps would be a decisive instrument with which to mobilize the public for poverty-relevant themes, given the prevailing illiteracy rates in Burkina Faso. Furthermore, these maps are increasingly requested by the parliament and the various administrative levels. However, at present, the Cartography Department of the National Statistics and Demography Institute (INSD) does not have the technical, methodological, or human resources to meet to this demand.

Two other results-based analyses were carried out in order to determine how users evaluate the changes in government health and educational services. Unfortunately, both studies - which were intended to be qualitative - collected purely quantitative data about changes in utilization without really capturing the assessment of quality in the eyes of those affected.

3. Monitoring Poverty Reduction Policies

These conceptual weaknesses of the PRSP 1 naturally also extend to **PRSP 1 monitoring**.

The annex of the first PRSP lists indicators for monitoring implementation which were drawn up as the basis for the award of additional financial assistance, with emphasis on budget assistance (see Annex 8.2). They are oriented to the performance indicators developed in the New Conditionality Initiative within the Special Program for Africa (in implementation since 1997) under the leadership of the European Union Commission (EUC). The focus of the indicator list was clearly on the allocation of budget funds and referred, above all, to results-oriented budget management. There was therefore an attempt, particularly in the area of social expenditures, to measure the allocation of budget funds in relation to the stated objectives of the respective ministry and to compare these. The allocation of funds to the deconcentrated administration also played a special role here. Individual surveys attempted to lend transparency to the assessments of the users of government services. Four or five indicator areas for health and education were defined, covering school enrollment and literary rates and differentiated according to gender and regional aspects, vaccination and other similar rates; they also investigated school enrolment costs per pupil and treatment costs at the basic level. Overall, this list of indicators reflects a mixture of sector-specific indicators and criteria for the transparent allocation of budget funds.

Because PRSP 1 implementation was considerably slower in the first year than had originally been expected, the Burkinabe government and the BWI agreed to expand the time for revision and adjustment of the first PRSP from a one-year to a three-year cycle. They wanted to avoid tying up the technical capacities of the administration in a revision of the PRSP 1 without having already gathered adequate implementation experience. The respective annual reports were to be consulted before a revision of the first PRSP was added to the agenda.

Initial evaluation after 2 years reveals weaknesses

An initial evaluation after two years of implementation brought serious shortcomings to light, which are mentioned in the World Bank and IMF Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the progress reports: the iterative approach of the first PRSP had a) resulted in a complete disregard of objectives that could be operationalized and thus had paid too little attention to concrete implementation of the strategy; b) taken overly ambitious objectives as the basis; c) neglected the regional components of poverty reduction; d) disregarded the gender aspect; e) completely ignored the importance of a monitoring system and its institutionalized form; and f) failed to consider other strategic components (such as waste water disposal, the environment and desertification, SME promotion, etc.).

3.1 Institutional implementation and monitoring structure

Three-level model

When the BWI decided to orient development cooperation with Burkina Faso to the first PRSP, a monitoring and evaluation committee was set up, which, however, never became functional. Therefore at the beginning of 2001, there was a decision to create a binding institutional structure that could better meet the demands of adequate PRSP 1 implementation and monitoring. The three-level model was chosen: the highest decision-making body is the Ministerial PRSP Oversight Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister. This steering committee supervises the implementation process and decides on necessary strategy adjustments. On the second level, an Inter-ministerial Monitoring Committee (CTIS) reports to the Oversight Committee; it is not only assisted by a Technical Secretariat for Coordination of Development Programs (STC-PDES), but also has five subordinate sectoral groups on a third level (education, health, budget management, competitiveness, and good governance). The Monitoring Committee has responsibility both for the process of implementing the first PRSP and for monitoring. At the operational level, the sectoral groups are responsible for providing impetus for PRSP 1-related measures and for sector-specific approaches. They prepare the quarterly progress reports for their respective areas of responsibility, which are presented to the PRSP 1 steering committee by way of the CTIS.

Monitoring highly inadequate to date

However, this monitoring system proved to be highly inadequate only two years after the beginning of its halting implementation. The system was incoherent because, on the one hand, the institutional capacities of the Burkinabe administration were not sufficient to meet the demands made upon it, and on the other hand, numerous line ministries – particularly those that had not expressly been given priority in the PRSP 1 – did not at all perceive this policy guidelines document as a reference framework for

their sectoral policy decision-making. In fact, they were not willing to participate in monitoring the first PRSP in retaliation for the forcing through of the first PRSP.

The sectoral groups, which were intended to provide the primary stimulus for implementation of the first PRSP and also included representatives of civil society, the private sector, and the donors, were never really functional. Meetings were held only irregularly or not at all. The structure proved dysfunctional due to the design flaw of combining responsibility for implementation and monitoring. Objective monitoring of PRSP 1 implementation was impossible within the chosen institutional setup.

Failure of the system

In July 2002, the national conference on poverty reduction policies identified the following primary causes for the unsuccessful institutional structure of the first PRSP:

- failure to include the leading representatives of the line ministries, in other words, the ministers themselves
- lack of defined procedures for the sectoral groups, including for the contributions expected from them and their composition
- the isolation of individual sectoral groups and lack of overall cooperation
- lack of work specifications and reporting formats
- failure to incorporate the regional dimension into the monitoring process
- lack of clarity about the role of the various development partners (civil society, the private sector, and the donors) in this process
- insufficient internalization of the PRSP 1 as the development policy framework plan.

INSD – no coordinating function

Currently, there are no functioning institutional mechanisms for information management with regard to the implementation process, data collection, or results-based analysis. Data are compiled at the level of the respective line ministries and are not collated by the National Statistics and Demography Institute INSD. Thus, data sets on a particular sector can be fundamentally disparate, depending on their origin. The INSD does attempt to coordinate the compiling of data.

3.2 Institutional structural reform

New approach

The dysfunctional institutional monitoring structure (see Figure 1 in the annex) was made to give way to a new structure. The weak-point analysis of the 2002 national conference formed the foundation for the proposed new structure. A new organizational structure and operational organization for implementation and monitoring of the PRSP 1 were drafted and approved by presidential decree. However, there still were no

corresponding implementing regulations from the Minister of Economy and Development, who appoints staff to the individual committees (see Figure 2 in the annex).

Even before revision of the PRSP 1, there were efforts to put in place a new structure for the implementation and monitoring process on the basis of the list drawn up by the 2002 national conference that had confirmed the failure of the PRSP 1 institutional structure. On a second level, a Ministerial Orientation and Monitoring Committee (CMOS), which is supposed to deal with concrete problem-solving approaches in the area of PRSP 1 and PRSP 2 implementation in the future, has been assigned to report to a national conference (the National Poverty Reduction Council - CNLP). Subordinated to both of these institutional levels is the Technical Secretariat for Coordination of Development Programs (STC-PDES), which, in addition to its work as a coordinating unit, also supports the work of four sectoral commissions and two thematic groups on the third hierarchical level of the institutional system. The STC-PDES is supported in the area of monitoring by the National Observatory for Poverty and Sustainable Human Development (ONAPAD) and the National Statistics and Demography Institute. The sectoral and thematic groups on the third institutional hierarchical level are supposed to evaluate the implementation of sectoral policies and cross-cutting themes (decentralization and finance) and are responsible for consistency between the sectoral approaches and the objectives of both the first and the second PRSP. The regional dimension of the poverty reduction strategy is taken into account through the establishment of regional and provincial councils, which are responsible for region-specific approaches, information gathering, information flows, and systematization of monitoring at the decentralized level. Close coordination between these regional and provincial councils and the Consultative Council on Regional Development, which reports to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), is therefore planned.

New elements

Besides incorporation of the regional level, the key innovations are related to the thematic and sectoral groups, each of which are now, in the new structure, to be chaired by the responsible line minister. The fact that the minister him/herself has the responsibility for the sectoral and thematic groups is an attempt to ensure the functionality of the institutional structure and to circumvent the problem of inter-ministerial competition, which has so far negatively affected implementation of the first PRSP.

The Consultative Committee of Regional Development Councils and the national assemblies constituted additional monitoring bodies assigned to the CMOS, the committee concerned with implementation and monitoring. The national assemblies are headed by the Prime Minister and examine national and regional progress reports, adjust the poverty reduction strategy as needed, and issue directives for implementation. There is also the Mobilization Committee that meets on an ad hoc basis and brings evaluations and recommendations from the civil society, the private sector, and the donors into the process. Thus, ultimately, the decision was made at the political level to limit the participation of the other actors in

implementation and monitoring of the Poverty Reduction strategy to an advisory role.

Inter-ministerial competition continues to hinder implementation and monitoring

It remains to be seen whether the enormous institutional diversity of monitoring procedures which have not really overcome the design flaw of the old structure can meet the demands of implementing and monitoring the first and second PRSP. The inter-institutional competition between the Ministry of Economy and Development (MED) and the Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB) concerning implementation of the poverty reduction strategy continues to shape the process. This conflict is also found on the technical implementation and monitoring level. Since the institutional separation of the former Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), there has been no functional working relationship between the technical actors, STC-PDES and the Permanent Secretariat for the Implementation of Financial Programs and Policies (SP-PPF). Doubtless, their mutual obstruction will also continue to hinder the process of implementing and monitoring the first PRSP.

New structure, basic problem not recognized

The basic problem of the institutional structure for PRSP 1 implementation and monitoring continues to be obscured in the new organizational chart as well: responsibility for implementation and monitoring in the Ministerial Orientation and Monitoring Committee (CMOS) ipso facto precludes objective monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy. The excessive number of staff members in the institutional structure threatens to produce a tedious, overly bureaucratic monitoring process.

3.3 Monitoring system, indicators, responsibilities

No systematic arrangement

The question of what the monitoring system should provide when and how has not yet been resolved in Burkina Faso:

- There has been no binding agreement on reporting formats.
- Capacity-building measures have not been given priority and are too vague.
- There is no concrete implementation planning; the actual availability of funds for monitoring is unclear.
- Given the context in Burkina Faso, the breakdown of the monitoring mechanism to the regional levels entails considerable risks, because even at the national level it was never possible to guarantee adequate completion of this task.

The basis for monitoring the first PRSP is formed by the 14 indicators drawn up in 1997 in the framework of the new conditionality in the sectors of primary education, health and budget management. The list of the 14 indicators was supposed to be supplemented with additional indicators during the process, but that did not happen in practice.

Only with the creation of the ONAPAD under the direction of the INSD did the debate about the indicators in Burkina Faso intensify. In June 2002, at an ONAPAD seminar, a list of 191 indicators, intended to cover seven sectors, was approved. In April 2003, the STC-PDES summarized the

relevant indicators in a list of 85 indicators that were to be attached to the revised PRSP 2.

From the desire to measure everything ...

Then in June 2003, under the leadership of ONAPAD in Tenkodogo, a joint conference was held of all institutions involved in monitoring and civil-society representatives. It drew up a compressed and manageable list of 33 indicators for a total of 12 sectoral areas on the basis of a joint list of 181 indicators compiled from the ONAPAD and STC-PDES lists.

At the same time, a group of Canadian experts was commissioned to critically reevaluate this list and to develop a draft for the core indicators of the second PRSP, which is now found in the annex of the much criticized PRSP 2. The Canadian mission revised this list again and examined to what extent the indicator list could document the 10 primary dimensions of poverty. It then compiled a list of 28 minimum indicators, of which 13 correspond to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and eight implicitly focus on gender aspects.

... to core indicators

These 28 minimum indicators (see Annex 8.3) are supplemented with 19 additional sector-specific performance indicators, so that the present, though not yet functional, PRSP 2 monitoring system encompasses 47 indicators, which are named in the annex of the draft document, which however has not yet been discussed with the BWI. Currently, this list of indicators forms the common basis for monitoring the second PRSP.

The list of core indicators is differentiated according to place of data collection (rural / urban) and gender aspects. Administrative responsibilities are listed and the date of data availability and frequency of compilation are stipulated.

This is a decisive step in the right direction. Nevertheless, this minimum list has still not been implemented in PRSP 2 monitoring, because the new institutional structure is not yet functional. The indicators have sensibly been limited to a minimum number, but the problem of the “missing middle”, i.e. the timely tracking of implementation measures, remains unresolved.

Minimum list

The minimum list encompasses 28 indicators, which are divided into two categories: a) poverty indicators (23) and b) sector performance indicators (5). The poverty indicators are subdivided into 10 areas: income with a focus on rural households (2); education differentiated according to gender aspects (4); health (3); nutrition (2); water / sewage (2); employment (2); living space / habitat (2); access to means of production (3); market access (1); participation / social inclusion (1). The sector performance indicators are subdivided into three categories: macro-economy and budget (3); private sector and competitiveness (1); and good governance (1).

INSD as the key actor

In Burkina Faso, discussion of the minimum list of indicators included the question of the level at which the statistical data for the 10 poverty dimensions and the three transversal sector indicators should be collected. Given the lack of capacity at all administrative levels, it was felt that data collection should be centralized under the National Statistics and

Demography Institute, since the regional and municipal agencies would be overburdened with this task. The deconcentrated administrative levels alone are likely to support data collection. The Directorates of Research and Planning (DEP) of the individual line ministries thus slid into second place, because the fact that the individual line ministries did not cooperate with each other, hindered the flow of information, and did not provide data in a timely manner in the previous monitoring process proved to be a constant obstacle. The DEPs are now to assume a more important role in data analysis.

**CWIQ as
methodological
approach**

The plan is for regular, generally annual compiling and updating of data, which would fulfill the basic prerequisite for a functioning monitoring system. For at least 19 of the indicators, a household survey based on the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) appears appropriate; though not costly, it provides sufficient indicators on who does or does not benefit from activities to improve the social and economic framework conditions. The CWIQ questionnaire generates data on living conditions in private households and indicators of access to, use of, and user satisfaction with municipal and other basic services.

This instrument is to be used more intensively in Burkina Faso for monitoring the first and second PRSP. Initial results of these surveys are expected in the first quarter of 2004.

The CWIQ methodology is designed to fill existing gaps in the statistical data collection system related to the geographic disaggregation of data and estimates of demographic developments. Furthermore, in contrast to the standardized statistical data collection system, the household surveys permit the introduction of socio-economic variables, which provide particularly useful information for analysis of the causes of poverty. These analyses also allow rapid feedback for selected Poverty Reduction strategies. The simultaneous collection of data and the centralized authority of the INSD for at least 20 of the total of 28 indicators guarantee implementation of a unified concept, binding definitions, and a mandatory methodological approach more effectively than the previous procedures.

**Pilot measures:
participatory
monitoring
system**

This new approach is complemented by a pilot project in the Department of Yako, in which CEDRES (research and documentation center for economic and social studies) of the University of Ouagadougou in conjunction with CECI (Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation) is working to establish a system of participatory monitoring at the municipal level.

To date, the monitoring system remains incomplete, as both intermediate indicators and comprehensive budget tracking are lacking. Only persistent tracking of expenditure flows permits an estimation of the extent to which budget allocations in the framework of the first PRSP are targeted, precisely focused, and efficient.

**Consolidating the
system is of
central
importance**

The monitoring system must be consolidated. With the establishment of the Observatory ONAPAD and the OEFP (Observatory for Employment and Professional Development), the Burkinabe side took steps to strengthen the monitoring system. Nevertheless, the function that the

ONPAD is supposed to assume under the leadership of the CNCS (National Statistics Coordination Council) in the first and second PRSPs and with respect to critical reflection on its implementation remains problematic. Institutional responsibilities within the monitoring process are not sufficiently delineated. Furthermore, it is unclear who has the institutional responsibility for monitoring the MDGs. The fact that the DGEP has taken over leadership of preparation of the MDG progress reports and the operational plans (PAP) of the second PRSP can be taken as a sign that the jurisdictions and areas of responsibility of the DGEP, on the one hand, and of the STC-PDES, on the other, have still not been clarified – not even within the Ministry of Economy and Development (MED). The institutional blockage of implementation and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy caused by the competing interests of the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Economy thus gains another dimension.

This hints at new (in this case, inter-ministerial) regulatory conflicts between the DGEP and the STC-PDES in MED that are, to a great extent, the result of the fact that the STC-PDES cannot manage responsibility for coordinating implementation and monitoring the poverty reduction strategy. The last version of the PAP mentions that the program represents the operational plan for the PRSP 2; however, it continues with the observation that monitoring of the PAP should be implemented in conjunction with the PRSP 2 and that the institutional monitoring structure of the PAP should be based on that of the PRSP 2. Even if another section says that the monitoring structures for the PAP and the PRSP 2 are identical, it does appear that, within the government, there are somewhat different understandings of the function of the coordination committee, which cannot be simply dismissed, given previous experience with the sluggish implementation of the PRSP 1. Although the STC-PDES has a key function with respect to feedback of monitoring results to the political decision-making level, it was never really able to carry out this function.

MDG targets

In addition to the previous PRSP Progress Reports, in December 2003 Burkina Faso presented the first progress report on monitoring the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which covered the period from 1990 to 2003. Burkina Faso is one of the pilot countries, which have prepared an initial MDG Progress Report in close cooperation with the UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework).

The indicators of the Human Development Index demonstrate that, since 1990, the country has even lagged behind the general development of the other LDCs (least developed countries). Even if the natural framework conditions of the country are one of the primary reasons for this, these poor starting conditions do not relieve the government of responsibility for doing everything possible to implement the first PRSP to change the poverty situation. The summary of the progress report self-critically notes that efforts to implement the PRSP 1 in the last four years were inadequate, and the report demands more decisive Poverty Reduction measures on the part of the government. A number of key policy decisions have already been implemented; however, the reforms that have been introduced have not resulted in the reduction of poverty. The poverty indices of the last household survey are disturbing, raising great doubt about achievement of the MDGs. Of a total of 12 MDGs, two are classified as possible, six as likely, and four as unlikely, whereby the goals classified as possible must be scaled back (e.g., halving poverty by 2015). If, for example, the present poverty trend of the country continues, applying illusory (given the real starting conditions in the country) economic growth rates of 8-10 percent – indispensable for a visible reduction of poverty by 2015 – a poverty index of 49 percent could be expected in 2015, which would be 19 percentage points above the national target and 25.8 percentage points above the MDG targets for 2015. For many areas of Burkina Faso, the Millennium Goals remain unrealistic targets.

4. The Role of the Donors in Supporting Monitoring

Similarities and differences

From the beginning, the donors underestimated the problem of monitoring the first PRSP. Only after doubt about the precise targeting of the measures and the exclusive orientation to input and output indicators arose during implementation of the first PRSP did the donors focus more attention on this point.

The donor community stands behind a largely coordinated policy of supporting the PRSP 1 processes and commenting on the PRSP 2; however, positions on monitoring demonstrate a variety of nuances. These nuances cannot be clearly outlined according to the formal division of the donor side into a) member states of the EU, b) the group of countries that provides budget support (the EU and also individual bilateral donors) – the "SBC-CSLP (Joint Budgetary Support for Implementing the PRSP) group", which does not include Germany, for example, and c) the "enlarged group", which includes all multilateral and bilateral donors.

There are regular channels of information between the individual groups and comparisons of different evaluations; however, over the course of implementing the first PRSP, it has become apparent that the SBC-CSLP has developed into the most important committee for discussion and decision-making among the donors and also between the donors and the Burkinabe government. Participation in this coordinating committee is tied to provision of budget assistance. The Federal Republic of Germany, for various and completely comprehensible reasons, decided instead to move from a project to a program approach. However, it thereby loses its direct influence on the discussion and decision-making in this committee and is excluded from the direct dialogue between the SBC group and the Burkinabe government. Thus indications are increasing that Germany, too, is willing to make at least a symbolic contribution to budget assistance, particularly since France, the World Bank, and the ADB have also decided to join the SBC-CSLP. The donors are united in the conviction that both implementation of the PRSP 1 and the monitoring process are in great need of improvement; the nuances that distinguish the various donor positions are related, above all, to the manner and extent of support for this process.

All bilateral and multilateral donors have decided upon a coordinated approach to supporting the PRGB (Budget Management Improvement Program), viewing it as one of the priority areas of the good governance component. In comparison to most other bilateral and multilateral donors, the German contribution to the PGRB involves the continual presence of a German advisor in the field, who now is active advising the two key Ministries: Economy and Development and Finance and Budget.

The key actors

The most important contributions to the monitoring discussion in Burkina Faso are made by the following players:

- The **World Bank** has dedicated itself primarily to methodological questions and has emphasized the distinction between poverty indicators and process indicators. In addition, the World Bank committed itself to numerous training and upgrading measures to increase understanding of the role and function of a monitoring system. In critical self-evaluation, the local World Bank representatives described all previous training and upgrading measures for monitoring as complete failures. The sustainability of the measures was not ensured. Recently, the World Bank decided to work solely on strengthening the institutional capacities for data collection and analysis by way of a credit. In 2003 an initiative was started to strengthen institutional capacities in the area of statistics. A credit of USD 11 million was signed in February 2004 for this purpose, on the basis of a needs analysis prepared in conjunction with the UNDP. The total credit volume is supposed to encompass up to USD 26 million, including contributions by other donors. As for monitoring, the World Bank previously limited its role to financing the 2003 household survey and to methodological and instrumental questions of monitoring. The World Bank has increasingly withdrawn from what they consider to be an “artificially imposed” discussion process of the indicators for a functioning monitoring system. In view of the obvious failure of its efforts in the area of training and upgrading measures, the World Bank concluded that Poverty Reduction measures should be given priority at the present time over further discussion on monitoring instruments. This in no way means that the World Bank neglects monitoring; however, it sees the danger that the intensive debate in Burkina Faso surrounding the choice of core indicators only serves to divert attention from the lacking implementation and concretization of the first PRSP.
- From the beginning, the **UNDP** focused on setting up an Observatory on poverty monitoring. In the framework of the UNDP-supported PRGE program (Support Project for Improved Economic Governance), an informal parallel structure was created as a quasi-autonomous work unit within the National Statistics and Demography Institute INSD. This Observatory (ONAPAD) is currently supported primarily by UNDP program-based funds. Whether the institutional sustainability of the Observatory can be ensured after termination of the current program is presently unclear; however, it must undoubtedly be made a condition for further involvement, also of other donors, in support of the monitoring process.
- **Germany** differs in certain respects from other donors in that an advisor has already been placed in the central Ministries of Economy and Finance over several promotional phases. In past years, the German contribution served above all to strengthen institutional capacities in the areas of national accounting, develop new instruments for macroeconomic simulation models, and strengthen implementation capacities in the now separated key ministries. Among

other things, the following were important for PRSP 1 monitoring: first steps towards drawing up a poverty map as the basis for political decision-making; support of results-oriented budget management; and technical support for the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). On a qualifying note, it should be observed that promotion of the poverty map has more or less halted, because it proved impossible to agree on institutional anchoring or the necessary database. In recent months, the advisory project has particularly concerned itself with the introduction of PAMS (Poverty Analysis Macroeconomic Simulator), a set of macroeconomic simulation instruments, developed by the World Bank, which is being applied at the country level in Burkina Faso as a pilot project. Because the World Bank cannot provide support for this process of introducing the instruments or sustainably back it up through advisory services on site, a new form of cooperation with the German advisory project in the Ministries of Economy and Finance was chosen to accompany and sustainably support this process. With the PAMS instruments, it is possible to evaluate the policy results of different key economic-policy decisions on the poverty situation in the country. PAMS thus represents an important element for implementation of the Poverty Reduction strategy. The German advisory project also made a name for itself through several reports on micro-simulations of the poverty effects of changes in world market prices for cotton, migration problems, and the results of remigration given the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. To date, the project has been able to close the huge gap in poverty analysis in Burkina Faso, at least in part, and has provided the policy level with important foundations for decision making.

- **Denmark**, as a comparatively small bilateral donor, has been active only in the financing of several seminars to discuss the indicators required to implement the first PRSP and has concerned itself primarily with issues of participation in PRSP 1 preparation. There were no substantive inputs to the monitoring system from its side, although Denmark has primary responsibility within the SBC-CSLP for tracking the indicators and the monitoring system.
- **Canada** designed a regional development project to strengthen capacities in the corresponding countries on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the monitoring systems in five West-African countries. A promotional period of four years and an appropriation of CAD 4 million were foreseen for the project – a rather modest amount compared to what is really needed to strengthen the extremely limited capacities of West African countries in this area. Canada is undoubtedly the bilateral donor that has been most involved in the debate surrounding the compilation of a binding list of indicators. It has built up a relationship of close cooperation with the STC-PDES.
- **France** has carried out a number of studies on indicators for a monitoring system; however, it has basically left this activity area to the SBC-CSLP group, to which France did not previously belong.

- **Switzerland** provides budget assistance essentially oriented to two axes: support of the PRSP 1 and promotion of the PRGB. Within this framework, Swiss cooperation primarily supports the incorporation of participatory elements and emphasizes, above all, the strengthening of civil-society capacities, also and particularly in the area of monitoring the PRSP 1.
- The **Netherlands** is heading up coordination of the SBC-CSLP and views the previous, apparent weaknesses of monitoring as a normal process within the implementation of the first PRSP.
- For the most part, the **European Commission** is keeping a low profile with respect to the monitoring system. The EU delegation sees it primarily as a national task and rejects project-oriented approaches to strengthening institutional capacities. The delegation clearly emphasizes support of the PRGB process, since strengthening local capacities in the area of budget planning and control is the focus of cooperation, also in Burkina Faso. According to the EU assessment, Burkina Faso has taken important steps with respect to budget planning, implementation, and transparency since 1998, with the reform of the civil service. The EU delegation believes that its major contribution is to support this process, also in the future. The delegation views Burkina Faso as just beginning to assume ownership of the PRSP 1. According to the EU delegation, the parliament plays a crucial role with respect to this successive process of *appropriation*; at least for monitoring implementation of the PRSP 1, it has a central function to fulfill, one that it has not been taken seriously enough until now.

5. Informational Value of the Monitoring System for the Donors

In their evaluations of the previous progress reports, the World Bank and the IMF have used careful, diplomatic language to refer to the lack of concrete information on progress in implementing the PRSP 1 as the central problem.

Donor demand

In the field, considerably more pressure is applied, as reliable information is the foundation for additional pledges of budget assistance. Particularly the donors providing budget assistance face massive pressure from their countries of origin to provide complete documentation about the use of funds. In general, the informational value of the available data is seen as very poor. Data are continually being revised and adjusted at the request of donor countries. There is no reliable database and there is insufficient compliance with reporting obligations. The donors quite openly state that there is no political will to make the data available. Given the current data situation, it is nearly impossible to provide reliable documentation of the implementation progress of the first PRSP.

Although the government has gone to great lengths to provide input and output data (particularly in the priority areas of education and health), to date the donors have not linked PRSP 1 monitoring, monitoring of sector programs, and monitoring of budget assistance, both because these are not carried out in a timely manner and because each is based on different indicators. Estimates of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) with respect to income and expenditures are based overwhelmingly on raw data with unrealistic growth rates, which must undermine the motivation particularly of those ministries that are preparing program budgets closely tied to goal-achievement indicators, as they are generally forced to make large expenditure cuts in the course of the year. The budget allocations to the line ministries reflect only inadequately the political priorities of the first PRSP, and they continue to be based primarily on estimates from the previous year. Furthermore, budget allocations are not disaggregated according to province and region.

The donors continue to be too strongly oriented to quantitative objectives and indicators and they assign too little weight to process indicators.

6. Evaluation of the Monitoring System in Burkina Faso

Lack of ownership as key problem

At the present time, there is no coherent monitoring system in Burkina Faso. On the contrary, monitoring and evaluation instruments are viewed as part of the policies imposed by the donors, not as a flanking policy planning instrument that, by way of rapid feedback loops, permits flexible adjustment of activities to changed framework conditions and current situations. Monitoring of the PRSP 1 did not function; the necessary data were not generated in the form required and demanded, because there was no frame of reference stipulated for the indicators and, from the beginning, the information was basically limited to input indicators. The strategy paper is not understood and accepted by all line ministries as the frame of reference for policy. Each ministry uses its own monitoring system; there is no linkage to PRSP 1 monitoring. There are serious, above all human resources bottlenecks and capacity problems in data collection and validation. Lack of data is not the problem but rather the political will to make it available and to input it into a coherent system.

In addition, a fundamental misunderstanding of the terms *monitoring and evaluation* can be observed on the Burkinabe side. The monitoring process is viewed as a burdensome, donor-planned measure and is handled as secondary. Progress reports do not reflect the reality of the implementation process. Monitoring is increasingly losing its intended function (means of sanction vs. aid to decision making).

The inter-ministerial competition between the MED and the MFB has hindered not only implementation of the first PRSP, but also development of an adjusted monitoring system. This internal bureaucratic gridlock now also impedes implementation of the new institutional structure that was already drafted at the beginning of 2003 and approved by decree in 2003.

Its implementing regulations, however, continue to await the signature of the MED Minister.

At least there was agreement in the PRSP 2 on a list of indicators for the monitoring system; nevertheless, process monitoring continues to play no role. The progress with respect to core indicators has again been called into question somewhat by the Priority Action Program (PAP). Although the Action Program, as a first attempt to operationalize the PRSP 2, is a step in the right direction, the PAP, in contrast to the strongly criticized first draft of the PRSP 2, arose in the seclusion of the Planning Department of MED and was not coordinated with the most important social actors, including the line ministries. Furthermore, the PAP took no steps to ensure the participation of social actors in the monitoring process.

The planned institutional structure of the PRSP 2 monitoring system demonstrates several differences from the structure of the PRSP 1 – among others, its higher position in the political hierarchy and the creation of a National Council on Poverty. However, this structure is still not operational and the integration of the regional levels into monitoring has not yet been clarified. Furthermore, given the weak institutional capacities of the country, decentralizing monitoring appears to be a dubious undertaking, because neither the human resources nor the technical capacities are sufficient to guarantee national monitoring.

The new organizational chart has changed qualitatively in comparison to the first PRSP in that the sectoral and thematic groups no longer include civil-society and donor representatives, as they previously did, but only representatives of the various line ministries. Except for the thematic and sectoral group for agriculture, which includes at least five representatives of the farmers' association, the donors, the private sector, and the civil society have been banished to a dialogue forum. The forum is only consulted and can comment on activities and measures in the framework of the strategy implementation. Direct incorporation of the civil society or the private sector into the monitoring system is not foreseen. It should be critically noted, however, that the more participatory PRSP 1 thematic groups were never really functional, which can be attributed, in part, to the lack of initiative and lack of technical competence on the part of civil-society organizations.

The role of the observatory ONAPAD in interaction with the statistics institute INSD and the coordinating council STC-PDES remains unclear. Although new networks have developed between the statistics departments of the line ministries and ONAPAD, on the one hand, and ONAPAD and the University of Ouagadougou, on the other, it cannot be denied that there is a degree of duplication of monitoring tasks between ONAPAD and the STC-PDES. In setting up the observatory, the founders failed to make of ONAPAD an observation and monitoring instrument that incorporated civil-society forces and the deconcentrated levels, the DREDs, in order to produce a rapid flow of information about PRSP 1 implementation between the municipal, regional (meso), and policy-formulation (macro) levels. The unclear, vague role of the ONAPAD makes the observatory dependent solely on donor contributions. At the same time, the (loose) tie between ONAPAD and the INSD allows direct

regulation by the leading Ministry of Economy and Development. ONAPAD is thus attempting to expand its own room to maneuver by positioning itself at the forefront of the regionalization of monitoring; it is currently setting up the first branch offices in the provinces. In view of the thin staff layer (four technical staff members), it is impossible to steer the regional structure of the observatory.

Roles, functions, and responsibilities within the monitoring process also remain unclear in the new institutional structure. By itself, the stronger tie of regulatory functions to the individual line ministries does not guarantee better coordination of tasks. Lack of ownership of the PRSP 1 is the actual core problem of poor monitoring; this includes not only the government level but also and particularly civil-society forces. This core problem is accentuated by staff bottlenecks, poor technical equipment, and an insufficient budget for PRSP 1 monitoring. The multiplicity of tasks for the various DEPs (Directorates of Research and Planning) has grown with the PRSP 1, while budgets and staffing levels have not been correspondingly adjusted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no effort among the individual DEPs to systematize and link monitoring at the level of the line ministries or to standardize monitoring implementation. The individual ministries guard their data like sacred relics; the result is confusion about official data.

Objective monitoring not possible

The new structure does not distinguish between responsibility for strategy implementation and the level of monitoring implementation. This mixing of roles, functions, and responsibilities, particularly with respect to the tasks of policy formation and follow-up, means that the orientation committee or even the coordination council STC-PDES cannot guarantee objective monitoring of implementation.

Lack of connection to other instruments

Monitoring the PRSP 1 is not closely tied to the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the Public Investment Program (PIP), or the Public Expenditure Review (PER). The PERs, which were implemented or, more accurately, occasionally implemented, in four sectors between 1999 and 2002 and did not fully incorporate the responsible ministries into the process, were not able to develop into a management instrument for expenditure policy. All these instruments, including results-oriented expenditure management, had in common that they were not integrated into the existing budget management system. Even extensive training and upgrading could not disguise the fact that there was no ownership at the national level and that these instruments were thus viewed as externally imposed alien elements. The donors clearly made the mistake of focusing too narrowly on classic macroeconomic and fiscal management themes (above all, because of the enormous increase in budget assistance) and thus neglecting the entire area of implementation planning, implementation monitoring, and results-based analysis.

Strengthening the audit office and parliament

For further implementation of the PRSP 2, it will be important to establish systematic reporting oriented to performance criteria, strengthen supervision by the audit office, and enable the parliament to actually exercise its control function over Poverty Reduction monitoring.

7. Conclusions for the Country Comparison

New territory	Monitoring the Poverty Reduction strategy is a completely new field for Burkina Faso: the function of a monitoring system and the tasks it should undertake are not really understood.
Process-oriented and strategic	Monitoring is seen as external control. Thus, building up a coherent system is not a real objective of the PRSP 1 but only an obligation vis-à-vis the donors in order to ensure the flow of funds. In the monitoring discussion in Burkina Faso – and particularly the intensive debate about which indicators to select – it becomes apparent that monitoring is viewed, at best, as a technical problem of data collection and not as a political learning process.
missing middle	<p>The “missing middle” remains one of the central problems of monitoring in Burkina Faso.</p> <p>Qualitative instruments have played a negligible role up to now. Despite the fact that participation in discussion of the indicators was designed to be very broad and that, in comparison to the PRSP 1, there was real civil-society participation (even if there is considerable doubt about how representative it was), this cannot be viewed as institutionalized participation in the monitoring process. <i>"Who counts reality and whose reality counts"</i> remains an unsolved problem in the monitoring process, which is focused primarily on the collection of quantitative data. Even the creation of the observatory ONAPAD did not really produce any change with respect to participatory monitoring, because ONAPAD continues to be part of the administrative structure and does not foresee the incorporation of civil-society forces in follow-up and results-based monitoring. The participatory element remains limited to participation in the dialogue forum of the CNLP.</p>
No parliamentary presence up to now	<p>The parliament – particularly the budget committee – continues to play a minor role in monitoring. There is also no pressure from the media.</p> <p>There is no close link between the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and monitoring of the PRSP 1, although the incorporation of the SP-PPF into two sectoral or thematic groups might facilitate greater integration.</p>
No real demand	Additionally, there is the problem of demand: the donors are interested in detailed information. Particularly the donors providing budget assistance are under enormous pressure to provide information about use of funds. The government is also under pressure to provide this data and to guarantee the continual flow of funds. However, on the Burkinabe side, there is no real demand for monitoring results for use in the political planning process and for rapid adjustment of key policy decisions to changed framework conditions. Neither do civil-society organizations ask for this information for the purpose of holding the state accountable, because at the national level, the various civil-society actors have not managed, up to now, to arrive at a common position. A spirit of

competition still reigns, hindering the formation of a social counterweight – in the sense of a watchdog function – in the PRSP 1 implementation. On the other hand, the national government is called upon to make the Poverty Reduction strategy a binding frame of reference for all national development policies and not only for the intended beneficiary ministries.

The basis for an efficient and effective monitoring system must be created by accepting it at the decision-making level as an important set of political decision-making instruments and claiming ownership of it. On the other hand, the donor community is called upon to draw up appropriate measures to support PRSP monitoring which not only meets their short-term information needs in the framework of budget assistance, but also positively unites all those involved in the implementation process in joint efforts.

ANNEX

PRSP 1 indicators

Monitoring indicators 2001 – 2003

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Budget management						
1. Rate of realization of budgets of ministries of social affairs and analysis of implementation in terms of objectives laid down by ministries*						
2. Part of the budget effectively granted to the most deconcentrated structures. Annual study of deconcentrated services regarding realization of the budget allocated	Studies					
3. Six-monthly opinion polls: of users of public services (health / education); of economic actors on the public-sector markets (order-placing, time taken to settle accounts)	Studies					
4. Differences in unit prices between a certain number of products obtained on public-sector markets and those obtained by the private sector	Studies					
Health						
1. Rate of vaccination coverage (%)						
BCG	52	60	70	80	83	85
DTP3	31	42	50	60	65	70
Measles	38	53	55	60	65	70
Yellow fever	33	50	55	60	65	70
2. Number of new contacts per person per year in primary health care structures (CSPS, CMA)	0.21	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.27
CSPS meeting standards in terms of staff			60	65	80	90
3. Rate of break-down of supplies of essential and generic drugs (as a % of age at CAMEG for the basket of 45 priority items)	4.44	2.13	<10	<10	<10	<10

4. Costs of medical consultations (primary health care structures)	Studies					
Education						
1. Gross rate of enrolment for girls	33.4	33.6			44.08	
2. Gross rate of enrolment in the most disadvantaged rural areas				16		
3. Rate of enrolment in grade 1 (CPI)						
Girls*	27.6	30.2				
Rural areas*	40.4	41.8				
20 poorest provinces	34	36.1				48
4. Literacy rate*	26.4				31.11	
Women*						
Proportion of literate women in the 20 poorest provinces*						
5. Average cost of primary education for a child	Studies					

* The objectives for these indicators are under consideration at present.

PRSP 2 indicators

List of the 23 indicators covering the various dimensions of human poverty

Dimension	Indicator	Level of disaggregation	Results 2002	Expected level 2003	Goal 2004	Goal 2005	Goal 2006
Income	Degree of self-sufficiency in cereal crops of farming households	Region, province					
	Cereal production per capita in farming households	Region, province					
Education	Gross rate of enrolment	Region, province, sex, level of education					
	Gross rate of admission to grade 1						
	Rate of completion of primary education						
	Literacy rate among adults						
Health	Rate of vaccination by antigen	Region, health district					
	Rate of babies delivered with medical assistance						
	Rate of infant and child mortality						
Nutrition	Rate of low-weight babies born						
	Prevalence of underweight in under-fives						
Water and sanitation	Rate of those with access to safe drinking water	Region, province					
	Percentage of households with	Region, province					

	access to operational latrines						
Employment / work	Rate of unemployment						
	Percentage of gainfully employed persons employed on a daily basis or for one job only – precarious jobs						
Framework conditions	Rate of electrification	Region, province					
	Percentage of households having access to an improved stove	Region, province					
	Percentage of households using roofing and flooring materials	Region, province					
Access to production inputs	Percentage of households using animal traction	Region, province					
	Rate of agricultural equipment of households	Region, province					
	Rate of access to credit	Region, province, sex					
Access to markets	Time taken to reach closest market structures (in minutes) (food production, public transport)	Region, province					
Peace and social inclusion	Rate of participation by gender	Region, province					

List of 5 sectoral performance indicators

Sector	Indicator	Level of disaggregation	Results 2002	Expected level 2003	Goal 2004	Goal 2005	Goal 2006
Macroeconomics and budget	Rate of growth of real GDP						
	Average annual rate of inflation						
	Budget balance as a percentage of GDP						
Private sector and competitiveness	Percentage of GDP accounted for by exports						
Good governance	Share of state spending accounted for by local authority spending						


List of 19 indicators from the sectoral approach not covering the 10 dimensions of human poverty

Sector	Indicator	Level of disaggregation	Results 2002	Expected level 2003	Goal 2004	Goal 2005	Goal 2006
Health, nutrition, demography	Percentage of CSPA complying with human resources standards	Region, health district					
	Breakdowns in supplies of essential and generic drugs	Region, health district					
	Proportion of	Region, health					

	PLWA receiving anti-retroviral treatment	district					
Employment and vocational training	Number of jobs created by projects funded by the support fund	Region, province					
	Number of beneficiaries of vocational training and apprenticeships including technical education	Region, province					
Agriculture, herding, fisheries	Rate of apparent cereal coverage	Region, province					
	Rate of growth of agricultural production						
	Rate of vaccination coverage against Newcastle disease						
	Rate of coverage against contagious bovine peri-pneumonia						
Environment, drinking water, sanitation and energy	Rate of access to potable water points in rural areas						
	Available stock of forest resources						
Private sector and competitiveness of the economy	Effective marginal tax rate						
	Rate of tax burden						

	Industrial production index						
Macroeconomics, budget, living conditions and sustainable human development	Arrears in internal and external payments						
Good governance (economic, democratic, and local)	Ratio of spending audited by means of subsequent administrative controls						
	Rate of realization of budgets of priority ministries						
	Ratio of participation of women in parliament and in bodies that deliberate important matters						
	Rise in the number of well-founded decisions						

Figure 1



Ministerial PRSP Oversight Committee


Chairman: Prime Minister

Inter-ministerial Technical Monitoring Committee

STC/PDES

Technical Secretariat

Figure 2



1. ONAPAD, INSD (M&E)
2. STC/PDES: Executive Secretariat
3. CNLP (coordination)
4. Ministerial Orientation and Monitoring Committee (CMOS)
5. General assembly (AG)
6. Consultation and coordination framework with partners (OSC and PTF)
7. 6 committees – 4 sectoral committees – 2 thematic committees

8. Rural development
9. Social sectors
10. Economic infrastructure
11. Private sector, competitiveness
12. Governance, decentralization
13. Finance
14. Regional and provincial poverty reduction councils

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