



Lessons Learnt from the German Anti-Terrorism-Package (ATP)

Possibilities and limits of Development Cooperation for crisis prevention and peace building in the context of countries at risk from terrorism

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Authors:

Dr. Thania Paffenholz holds an M.A. in political science from the University of Munich (1990) and received her Ph.D. in international relations focusing on the theory and practice of mediation and peacebuilding in civil wars from the University of Frankfurt (1996). After working as a research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (1992-1996) she held a position as peacebuilding officer within the Regional Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya (1996-2000). Thania Paffenholz joined swisspeace in Berne, Switzerland from 2000-2003, holding the position of Project Director of the Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) and was also Member of the Executive Board of swisspeace. Since early 2003 she is teaching at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Berne and founded her own consultancy firm "Peacebuilding Research and Advice" also in Berne, Switzerland

Dunja Brede, received a degree in psychology, specialised in Social and Organisational Psychology. She worked for GTZ in Brasil before moving to the sector project of crisis prevention and conflict transformation in GTZ Head Office in 2002. She was in charge for the coordination of the ATP package in Technical Cooperation commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Since 2003 she is Planning Officer in the Unit of International Cooperation in the Context of Crises and Disasters at GTZ Head Office. Within the scope of the present study, she carried out one country study (Philippines) and was responsible for the overall coordination.

Contacts at GTZ:

Dunja Brede

Planning Officer

International Cooperation in the Context of Crises and Disasters

Mail: dunja.brede@gtz.de

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Postfach 5180, 65726 Eschborn, Germany
Internet: <http://www.gtz.de>

Responsible:
Bernd Hoffmann

Authors:
Dr. Thania Paffenholz
Dunja Brede

Editing:
Melanie Seegräf

Layout:
Sabine Eddigehausen, GTZ, Section 6002

Foreword

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the fight against terrorism – and terrorism prevention – have become an international obligation. As a result, in 2002 the German Government made available a total of EUR 1.53 billion in special funds for anti-terror measures within the scope of security, defence and development policy. As its contribution to this Anti-Terror Package (ATP) of the German Government, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH – contracted by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – in 2002 implemented 34 regional and five supra-regional special measures for crisis prevention and peace-building as a contribution to structural terrorism prevention world-wide.

So far, conceptual works and documents on the theme of terrorism prevention within the scope of development cooperation have been few and far between. Even more scarce are works evaluating concrete implementation experiences. Through the present study, GTZ therefore seeks to help actively collate the lessons learned to date in the face of the challenges addressed.

The present study evaluates the lessons learned from the ATP measures implemented through TC. The two authors shed light on the extent to which the theme of terrorism prevention constitutes a new discourse of development cooperation in its own right. Ms. Paffenholz and Ms. Brede provide a well-structured overview of the concrete lessons learned and recommendations formulated for development cooperation in countries at risk of terror. A key finding is that traditional development cooperation programmes are highly capable of integrating crisis prevention and peace-building into their existing work by incorporating new approaches, or by focusing their activities thematically or geographically. No less significant is the finding that, in all the countries studied, youth with no job prospects who are excluded from participation in social and economic development processes are susceptible to radicalisation. These groups should therefore be integrated more intensively into development cooperation programmes. The authors identify key challenges, such as closer engagement by development cooperation in Islamic countries, or the integration of terrorism prevention into the instruments available for conflict and peace analysis, thus adding a further dimension to them. At the same time, the study also identifies the limits of development cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and terrorism prevention.

At this point we would like to thank the authors, as well as all those involved at GTZ and BMZ, for their kind cooperation. Our thanks to the GTZ Offices in-country, the representatives of other development organisations, and our partner organisations for their generous and efficient support of the missions.



Bernd Hoffmann
Director of Division



Dr. Uwe Kievelitz
Crisis Prevention & Conflict Transformation Project

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List of abbreviations

ATP	Anti-Terrorism Package (of the German Federal Government)
BMZ	Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DC	Development Cooperation
DOEA	Development-oriented Emergency Aid
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P+D	Planning and Development (GTZ division)
PB	Peace-Building
TC	Technical Cooperation
DC+p	DC projects with supplementary peace-building elements or processes

Executive Summary

The events witnessed in New York on 11 September 2001 created a global awareness of the challenges engendered by terrorism. The German Government too is committed to the fight against terror. As Germany's Federal Chancellor emphasised in his speech on 19 September 2001, the German Government is working to develop a comprehensive strategy for crisis prevention and management. A strategy of this kind will need to address both the symptoms and the causes of terrorism, and will involve various policy areas. As well as military and police measures to fight terrorism directly, civil anti-terror measures will also have an important preventive role to play. At the operational level, development cooperation is mandated to implement primarily structural terrorism prevention measures. These include civil conflict transformation measures, as well as specific development cooperation measures designed to help eliminate the structural causes of, and frameworks conducive to, terrorism.

For 2002, the German Government approved a total of EUR 1.53 billion in special funds for anti-terror measures within the scope of security, defence and development policy. Of that figure, a total of EUR 152.26 million was made available to the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for structural terrorism prevention, in the form of development cooperation measures for crisis prevention and conflict transformation. Contracted by BMZ, GTZ made its contribution to the German Government's Anti-Terror Package (ATP) in 2002 through a special programme comprising 34 regional and 5 supra-regional crisis prevention and peace-building measures in more than 25 countries.

The present study is an evaluation of the lessons learned from the ATP measures¹ implemented through Technical Cooperation (TC)².

At the **operational level** the study draws key conclusions and formulates corresponding recommendations for development cooperation:

1. Comparative advantage of development cooperation (DC) in peace-building (PB) through DC+PB

One of the key lessons learned from the ATP is that traditional development cooperation programmes are highly capable of integrating peace-building into their existing work by

¹ The present study is based on an evaluation of four in-depth country studies (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Senegal and Tunisia), short studies on the Maghreb and Egypt, and a questionnaire survey of all participating projects.

² The conclusions drawn by the study are based essentially on lessons learned within the scope of Technical Cooperation (TC). Since the majority of results and experiences are also of wider relevance to development cooperation as a whole, the study uses the term development cooperation. Where the statements made relate exclusively to TC, this is explicitly indicated.

incorporating new approaches, or by focusing their activities thematically or geographically. This is a key lesson learned from the ATP because development cooperation had initially approached crisis prevention and peace-building by developing new types of project for direct peace-building. In doing so it found itself in competition with institutions such as peace-oriented or church-based NGOs that had always been involved in peace-building, and with the democratisation work of the political foundations. Due to the large number of measures implemented within the ATP, however, it clearly emerged that the comparative advantage of development cooperation is to be found primarily not in the implementation of new project types, but in the integration of approaches and methods for crisis prevention and peace-building into traditional development cooperation projects (measures of the type DC+PB). These kinds of measures were therefore identified as best practices.

2. Specific development cooperation measures for the professional and social integration of youth

Experiences within the scope of the ATP also demonstrated that, in all the studied countries, adolescents and young adults are highly susceptible to radicalisation. This is driven primarily not by religious or ethnic factors, but by the lack of concrete job prospects and opportunities for economic development that go with them, by the dissatisfaction created through the inability to express criticism and participate actively in political processes, and by the negative influence of radical and violent groups. Large sections of these youths are frustrated by this lack of opportunity to get a job and move on. In this situation, improved training alone is often not enough, as the labour market fails to provide enough jobs. Development measures for the professional and social integration of youth are therefore key. Especially important in this context is the analysis of the labour market and potential career opportunities. Yet unless the global causes of these problems are tackled, the impacts of local and national measures will always be limited.

3. Context-specific analyses of the links between poverty and radicalisation

The study also reveals an ambivalent situation regarding poverty and terrorism. This is because development cooperation measures for poverty reduction do not automatically also help fight and prevent terrorism. It emerges that a precise analysis of the respective context must be the key point of departure for programme planning. It will for instance be necessary to analyse whether and in which regions of a country which type of poverty reduction might help reduce tendencies toward radicalisation, and thus help prevent terrorism.

4. Use of funds as an instrument for peace-building

It is recommended that funds continue to be used as an instrument for peace-building. Here, stronger emphasis should be placed on using funds as pilot measures to test new

instruments and partnerships. The experiences of the ATP have shown that funds used as an emergency measure ("emergency funds") can help stabilise peace processes in the initial phase. Funds should only be used as an instrument for medium to long-term peace-building if and when they are built on a sound context analysis, their strategic orientation is precisely defined, and conceptual guidelines or promotion criteria have been drawn up.

5. Use of special programmes to integrate new themes and test feasibility

Overall, the ATP has acted as a driving and innovative force for the mainstreaming of crisis prevention and peace-building within the scope of development cooperation. In this context, important lessons were learned concerning the implementation of special programmes. Experience with the ATP shows that new themes can be successfully implemented using additional funds. An important lesson learned for special programmes in the future is that the pilot nature of the programme should be strongly emphasised. A short special programme can generate few concrete impacts in countries. But it can test potential impacts, the results of which can then be incorporated into existing or new programmes.

At the **conceptual level** the project identifies the following points:

1. Integration of the analysis of causes and frameworks conducive to terrorism into the instruments for peace and conflict analyses

The discourse on development cooperation in the context of countries at risk of terror does not identify any fundamentally new dimensions that have not yet emerged from the debate on crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace-building. This is certainly the case with respect to regional and national terrorist groups, because development cooperation already possesses an array of measures to address such conflicts, which should continue to be operationalised. Nevertheless, the focus on terrorism does bring fresh aspects to light. It is therefore essential that the analysis of causes and frameworks conducive to terrorism be integrated into country context analyses.

2. Linking the debate on development cooperation and terrorism with the debate on development cooperation with countries facing difficult situations

It has also emerged that major overlaps arise between the approaches for addressing international terrorist groups, and the debate on cooperation with countries facing difficult situations. For instance, the ATP has shown that development cooperation faces the problem of how to deal with systems of authoritarian government. In the context of the fight against terrorism, this situation is ambivalent. Some authoritarian states have succeeded in using their security apparatus to bring radical, religiously motivated groups under control. On the other hand, authoritarian state structures and the lack of democracy

that they entail are also key causes of both international and regional/national terrorism. To help find answers to these dilemmas, it is recommended that these more recent development cooperation discourses be more strongly networked.

3. Strengthening national processes of reform and democracy in Islamic countries – a challenge for development cooperation

The ATP has also shown, however, that development cooperation continues to face significant **challenges**: one of the most major being development cooperation in Islamic countries. Taking the example of the Maghreb countries, the study illustrates how measures to strengthen national processes of reform and democratisation can contribute significantly toward crisis prevention and possibly terrorism prevention. Making use of its comparative advantage, development cooperation possesses scope for action to strengthen intra-Islamic dialogue, especially on technical issues, and to strengthen development cooperation with moderate religious (i.e. Islamic) groups and organisations. This should be explored in more detail and analysed in depth.

At the same time, the ATP also highlights the **limits** of development cooperation for terrorism prevention. A key step would be to draw attention to the need to redress the negative impacts of globalisation by creating greater justice in the international system in general, and world trade in particular. Development cooperation can make only a modest contribution here.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The events of September 11th, 2001 raised global awareness of the challenges posed by terrorism. International interest is focused primarily on international organised terrorism. A holistic, global concept comprising a range of strategies is the only hope for medium- to long-term success in the fight against terrorism. This kind of concept must combat both the symptoms and causes of terrorism and involves various policy areas. Besides military and in particular police action, civil anti-terrorism activities of various kinds are important here. These include not only legal measures and controlling international financial flows,³ but also medium- to long-term measures of conflict transformation and development cooperation aimed at reducing the structural causes of terrorism and conditions that favour it.⁴

The German Federal Government declared its readiness to combat international terrorism directly after the events of 11 September. As the Federal Chancellor emphasised in his speech of September 19th 2001, the German Federal Government aims to develop a comprehensive concept for crisis prevention and management. This implies a more general approach to the challenges of terrorism and is thus not limited to what is referred to as “new” terrorism,⁵ but includes internal armed conflicts or outbreaks of violence. In the 2002 federal budget for security, defence and development, the German Federal Government allocated special funds for combating terrorism totalling EUR 1.53 billion. To make a contribution to structural terror prevention the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was allocated EUR 102 million for measures of crisis prevention and conflict management.

In 2002, as a contribution to the German Federal Government's Anti-Terrorism Package (ATP), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) implemented a special programme for crisis prevention and peace-building within the context of Technical Cooperation under a BMZ commission⁶. The first tranche of the ATP⁷ in April 2002 comprised 23 regional and five supraregional projects; the second tranche in August 2002 topped up 15 projects of the first tranche and added 11 new projects. In all, the GTZ

³ See e.g. the work of the UN Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna at www.unodc.org.

⁴ See the comments on causes and favourable conditions in Sect. 2.4.

⁵ See Sect. 2.

⁶ The German Development Cooperation is divided into Financial, Technical and Personnel Cooperation. The following study refers to the assessment of the ATP-programme implemented in the context of Technical Cooperation. General findings refer to Development Cooperation (DC). Technical Cooperation (TC) is mentioned if findings and/or recommendations are specially addressed to this segment of Development Cooperation.

⁷ The following sections continue to refer to the ATP, but always use this term to refer to the ATP measures implemented by the GTZ within the context of TC.

implemented the ATP in more than 25 countries, with a total commission value of EUR 30.2 million.

The programme was aimed at reducing the possible readiness of poorer population groups in crisis and conflict regions to resort to violence; conceptually speaking, these projects and activities are thus concerned with reducing the conditions that favour terrorism. The overall goal was “to create more sustainable potential for development in developing countries through peace-building”, which is more broadly defined and also includes tackling the structural causes of terrorism. Implementation of the ATP programme was completed on December 31st 2002.

1.2 Objective of the study⁸

The objective of the present study, which was commissioned under the sector advisory project “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation”, is to review the lessons learned from a year of implementation of the ATP, in order to derive recommendations on the possibilities and limits of development cooperation in conflict transformation, particularly in the context of countries at risk from terrorism.

The study investigates the relevance of the ATP programme for conflict transformation in the context of countries at risk from terrorism, assesses its potential impact, analyses its coordination in Germany and implementation in selected countries, identifies lessons and best practices and gives recommendations. The study also seeks to determine whether the debate on terrorism within Development Cooperation represents a new and relevant discourse, or whether it can be integrated into existing debates on Development Cooperation in the context of “poor performing countries” (difficult partnerships)⁹ or the debate on “crisis prevention and peace building”.

1.3 Subject of the study: Development Cooperation in countries at risk from terrorism

For the purposes of the present study, countries defined as being at risk from terrorism are those where acts of terrorism are carried out by individual or several groups with the aim of using violence, fear and terror as a means of warfare. As the study focuses on Development Cooperation, however, only those countries are studied in which Development Cooperation takes place and in which ATP funds have been used.

⁸ See Terms of Reference in Appendix 1.

⁹ Cf. the summary of this debate in the design study for the BMZ “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Förderung von Demokratie und Good Governance in Ländern mit “schwierigen” Rahmenbedingungen” (“Possibilities and limits in promoting democracy and good governance in poor performing countries”), Kurtenbach et al., December 2002.

1.4 Methodology and process

The study mainly used qualitative and participatory methods. Besides analysing research studies,¹⁰ it is based on a results-oriented synthesis of a total of four detailed country studies (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Senegal), four brief studies (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, DC in Islamic countries)¹¹ and an analysis of questionnaires and short reports by the officers responsible for programmes in these countries and of workshops with the GTZ and BMZ sections involved.

Data was collected using a key question matrix for the country studies and was analysed on the basis of the following criteria: relevance, impact, efficiency and effectiveness. The OECD criteria for evaluation were adapted for this purpose. In analysing the criteria “relevance of the ATP”, three areas were distinguished: relevance for crisis prevention and peace-building in the country, relevance for crisis prevention and peace-building in Development Cooperation, and relevance for preventing terrorism. Assessment of the relevance of the ATP for crisis prevention and peace-building in countries suffering from armed conflicts was based on analyses of the conflict and peace context in the countries studied, with the help of a relevance assessment.¹² The criteria “impact” was divided into real impacts and potential impacts: real impacts were studied solely with regard to institutional learning, i.e. the impact of the ATP on the implementation of crisis prevention and peace-building by Development Cooperation organisations. No comprehensive local analysis was conducted of the impact of ATP projects, as the ATP was too short to allow the necessary preliminary studies and impact indicators to be developed for an impact analysis to be carried out. The potential impact was therefore assessed.¹³ However, the potential impact can only be accurately evaluated on the basis of individual projects. This was done in the countries studied more closely (see the relevant studies). For the present overall ATP report, impact hypotheses for the general context and individual relevant elements have thus been extracted. In order to assess the criteria “efficiency and effectiveness”, a brief analysis was made of the strengths and weaknesses of ATP implementation by the BMZ and the GTZ.

The following methods were used:

- literature review,
- analysis of crisis potential and/or conflict dynamics and peace processes in the selected countries,
- field and project visits in the selected countries,¹⁴

¹⁰ For concept papers on terrorism, conflict transformation, DC and terrorism, DC and crisis prevention, DC in the context of poor performing countries (difficult partnership), see references.

¹¹ Several of the individual studies are available from the GTZ sector project “Crisis prevention and conflict management”.

¹² See methodology in Appendix 4.

¹³ See methodology in Appendix 5.

¹⁴ The countries were selected for the individual studies on the basis of the criteria of the mix of terrorism and crisis prevention, various levels of intervention (micro, meso, macro) and innovative approaches (content, choice of partners).

- ❑ semi-structured group and individual interviews, carried out in the countries themselves and in Germany using a key question matrix developed for the overall study,¹⁵
- ❑ preparation and analysis of questionnaires for all officers responsible for commissions in the countries themselves,¹⁶
- ❑ workshops with country officers at GTZ and the BMZ,
- ❑ relevance assessment¹⁷ and analysis of potential impact.¹⁸

The study was carried out in the period from December 2002 to June 2003. Data was collected in the selected countries from the end of February to April 2003. The study was carried out in close cooperation between the assessment team and the sector project "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation". The country studies were also produced in close consultation with the GTZ country offices. Data was collected in Germany and the selected countries, and was supplemented by workshops before and after the missions to the countries. The preliminary results were presented and discussed at a workshop at the BMZ and with the sector project before the final version of the study was produced.

1.5 Constraints

The study was limited from the start to analysing the ATP measures in the implementation range of Technical Cooperation (= EUR 30 million of EUR 152.26 million in ATP funds for development cooperation). The given statements essentially apply to lessons learned in the framework of Technical Cooperation. As the majority of results and experiences are relevant for Development Cooperation in general, henceforth the term Development Cooperation will be used in this study. In case that statements concern only Technical Cooperation, this will be marked.

As the GTZ's ATP consisted of a wealth of individual measures, it was not even possible to visit nearly all the GTZ's ATP measures worldwide. Even in the selected countries, security or other problems made it impossible to study each individual project. Again, the overall short timetable for the field visits (on average 10 days) did not permit any closer consideration of the individual activities.

In general shall be pointed out that the statements given in the framework of this study are to be regarded against the background of the extremely short implementation period of the ATP-measures.¹⁹ The short term of planning phase and operating time of the ATP-measures are opposite to the approach of Development Cooperation, which is geared to

¹⁵ See list of individuals interviewed in Appendix 6 and in the country studies.

¹⁶ 39 questionnaires were sent out, 17 returned, and six more countries sent more detailed internal reports and materials.

¹⁷ See methodology in Appendix 4.

¹⁸ Evaluation of potential impact was not carried out using the same methodology in all countries. Appendix 5 contains an example of a method used in two or three countries.

¹⁹ From April 2002 (first tranche) respectively August 2002 (second tranche) to December 2002.

structural changes and for this reason to long-term effects. This results in a discrepancy, which is to be considered critical, especially in the field of crisis prevention and peace-building (see below “Lessons from the ATP for special programmes in general” in sect. 5.4). It is assumed that measures within middle- and long-term Development Cooperation projects are able to perform a more sustainable contribution to crisis prevention and peace-building. Despite these general conditions uncommon for Development Cooperation the possibilities of the special programme were deployed to realise different innovative approaches. These resulted in interesting lessons for the field of crisis prevention and peace-building in the context of Development Cooperation, which are to be described in the framework of this study.

2. Development Cooperation and terrorism prevention

2.2 The debate

The events of September 11th 2001 raised global awareness of the challenges posed by terrorism. Besides threats from terrorist acts of violence within armed conflicts, e.g. in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Russia or the Basque region, internationally active terrorist networks such as al-Qaida attracted greater attention in view of the potential global threat.

The debate on terrorism is confusing for a number of reasons:

- ❑ Firstly, it has not yet been possible to find a uniform definition of terrorism or terrorist groups that is recognised in international law. The question of who is a “terrorist” is itself a political definition. While some may describe themselves as freedom fighters, nationalists or the like, others regard the same groups as terrorist groups. In addition, use of the term has dramatically increased since September 11th.
- ❑ Since September 11th, there has also been less distinction between various types of terrorist groups (international/national, politically/religiously/economically motivated).
- ❑ In addition, various other debates in Development Cooperation have become entangled with the debate on terrorism: there are overlaps with the debate about Development Cooperation and armed conflicts²⁰ and the debate on how Development Cooperation should deal with “poor performing countries” (difficult partnerships).²¹

2.2 Definition of terrorism and categories of terrorist groups

What is terrorism?

There have been countless attempts to define terrorism. It is no accident that nobody has yet succeeded in finding an officially recognised international definition. This is because every type of definition requires a specific basic understanding, which in turn implies certain political views. The present study thus makes no attempt to present a new definition.

²⁰ For several summaries from the extensive literature on this subject, see: Reyhler, Luc/Paffenholz, Thania, *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, Lynne Rienner Publisher Boulder 2001; the collected essays in the Berghof Online Handbook on conflict transformation at www.Berghof-center.net; and the collected volume (in German) “Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Eine internationale Herausforderung” (“Civil conflict management. An international challenge”, *Studien für Europäische Friedenspolitik* series of the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), vol. 8, agenda Verlag Münster 2001.

²¹ See the various OECD DAC Guidelines and the BMZ's design study on this topic (Kurtenbach et al. 2002) for a summary of the debate (in German).

Instead, we have kept to the lowest common denominator, according to which “terrorist groups” are understood as groups that use terrorist actions in the form of violence, fear and terror as a means of combat.

What kind of terrorist groups exists?

There are various ways of classifying terrorist groups: for example, they can be classified by the scale of their operations (international, regional, local) or their goals and motivations (political, religious, economic/criminal). The following sections use a blend of these two categories. Applying this distinction, the following groups can be identified:

- Group 1: international/global terrorist groups;
- Group 2: regional/national terrorist groups;
- Group 3: local terrorist groups.

All these groups may have different motivations and goals:

- groups with political goals/motivations;
- groups with economic/criminal goals/motivations;
- groups with religious motivations.

Mixed forms of various motivations may also appear, and in this case the primary motivations are taken as a guide. For example, many terrorist groups use economic/criminal means to finance their political or religious struggle. Such groups would nevertheless be described as political groups, as this is their primary goal. There is disagreement in the literature on terrorism about whether groups with purely criminal motivations should be described as terrorist groups. This is no doubt connected with the transformation of terrorist groups. For example, the Abu Sayaf group in the Philippines started out with political goals, but it can now be said to pursue purely criminal goals. This makes classification difficult, as motivations have to be constantly reviewed.

2.3 Terrorist groups: description, causes and motivations

The following section analyses the causes of terrorism by group:

Group 1: Global, international terrorism

These are groups (such as al-Qaida) which seek to overthrow the global political order. They differ from groups which extend their armed struggle to other states (thereby internationalising them), such as the Palestinian groups, particularly in the 1970s (see group 2). To make a clearer distinction here, the terms “transnational terrorism” (Schneckener) or “al-Qaida type” (von Hippel) have recently been used.

However, it should not be forgotten here that the causes of the al-Qaida terrorism were originally not the injustice of the world in general, but rather specific opposition to the rulers in their own authoritarian Arab states (in the case of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi state), which are criticised as being decadent and westernised. The focus is only secondarily on the USA and other Western states on account of their military presence, e.g. in Saudi Arabia, and of Western support for the governments in the region and the position taken on the Israel–Palestine conflict, which is perceived as being ambiguous or one-sided. Nevertheless, a shift has been taking place within al-Qaida since 1996, if not before: the USA and the West are now its primary target, to be eliminated first of all as a basis for the subsequent regional struggle.²² This type of terrorism may have either religious or political motivation.²³

It is still true that the original causes of this form of terrorism are located in the structures of authoritarian states. This is why combating this form of terrorism also involves overlaps with the debate about dealing with “poor performing countries”.²⁴

Group 2: Regional/national terrorist groups with some international range

These are groups operating in regional or national conflicts (e.g. LTTE in Sri Lanka, Hamas in Palestine, ETA in the Basque region and the IRA in Ireland). However, such groups often internationalise their struggle through terrorist acts outside their region (hijackings or bombings). Generally, such groups pursue a political and or sometimes a religious goal, often concerned with installing other political systems, control of the state, separation from a central state, protection of minorities or other demands.

The exact reasons for such conflicts differ and are discussed in the literature on research into the causes of conflict.²⁵ What distinguishes group 2 from other armed groups in internal or regional conflicts is the fact that they use acts of terrorism to reach their goals.²⁶ For this type of terrorist group (group 2), the debate on terrorism overlaps primarily with the debate on armed conflicts.

²² For the global causes, see the text by Tehranian, Majid, University of Hawaii 2001, and Schneckener in the 2002 SWP study.

²³ See the subdivision in Hoffmann, Bruce.

²⁴ On the “homemade” causes, cf. von Hippel, Karin, *The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths*, in: *The Political Quarterly* Publishing 2002, p. 35; see also other texts by von Hippel from the research project of the same name at Kings College, London: www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/andrewstelle/sept11/papers/roots5.html, and Schneckener, Ulrich, SWP study, p. 25 op. cit.

²⁵ On research into the causes of conflict, see the Conflict Dataset Catalogue of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala, Sweden, at www.pcr.uu.se.

²⁶ See Sect. 1.4.

However, this category also includes groups who, for opportunistic reasons, exploit general political and/or religious arguments in their public claims, but who primarily follow economic and/or criminal goals. These groups use terrorist acts such as kidnappings or attacks particularly for financial gain. This category includes groups such as Abu Sayaf in the Philippines, for example.

However, there are also several cases where groups with political goals operating regionally or nationally use criminal means to finance a politically or religiously motivated armed struggle.

Group 3: Locally operating terrorist groups

These are groups that operate exclusively in a limited region; like the other groups, they may also pursue political, religious or criminal goals.

2.4 Conditions favouring terrorism

In addition to the root causes of violent conflicts and terrorism (see above), so-called favourable conditions also play a role. In contrast to the causes, such conditions by themselves cannot give rise to either violent conflicts or terrorism, and are merely supplementary variables which under specific conditions or in combination with each other may contribute to radicalisation and violence.

The problem is that so far there is no agreement among experts as to what exactly favourable conditions are. The debate advances elements such as poverty, religion, lack of education, weak and collapsed states and diaspora communities that support terrorist groups.

The trouble with these factors is that they are variables that do not operate in isolation, do not apply to the same degree for all terrorist groups (groups 1, 2, 3) and are generally ambivalent.

Many development aid organisations regard **poverty**²⁷ as a condition conducive to terrorism. According to this argument, poor population groups represent an easy potential source of recruits for terrorist groups. This does not seem to apply to global terrorism (group 1). For example, most of the terrorists in the attacks of September 11th did not come from poorer population groups or the world's poorest nations. This argument is more likely to apply to recruits (followers) of regional, national and criminal terrorist groups (groups 2 and 3). It must, however, be borne in mind that poverty by itself is not a

²⁷ On the connection between poverty and terror, see Krueger, Alan B., Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? Princeton University and NBER, and Jitka Maleckova, Charles University Working Papers, Research Program in Development Studies, May 2002.

sufficient variable, and only favours terrorism in combination with other trends of radicalisation.

The variable **education** is just as ambivalent:²⁸ On the one hand, a certain level of education is a protection against radicalisation, but on the other hand education leads to an awareness of injustice and as such can even contribute to radicalisation. Thus the leaders of terrorist associations – including those of September 11th – have a higher level of education.

We know from peace and conflict research that **religion**²⁹ on its own is not a cause of conflict. Like other factors (such as ethnicity), however, religion can be politicised. This kind of politicisation and instrumentalisation of religion can lead to radicalisation and thus favour terrorism.

Weak or collapsed states³⁰ are also ambivalent variables: one aspect is that such nations provide refuge for terrorists and training camps, which favours the activities of all kinds of terrorist groups. However, these countries are not always suitable as operational bases for international terrorism (group 1), as the necessary infrastructure is lacking. Much of the planning of the attacks of September 11th was carried out in Western industrialised nations. Weak or fragmented countries also seem to be a relatively rare source of international terrorists – the majority of the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks came from authoritarian states. Favourable conditions thus seem to be more a lack of democracy and rule of law than a lack of nationhood.

Diaspora communities³¹ are considered to be another factor. Diaspora research has shown that these groups are often more radical than groups within the conflict countries themselves. The Tamil diaspora community in Germany and Switzerland has provided massive support to the armed struggle of the LTTE, for example. Diaspora therefore appears to be a neglected dimension in conflict transformation and in combating or the prevention of terrorism. Again, however, this variable is ambivalent, as not all diaspora communities are the same, and sound analysis is always needed to investigate the links between a given diaspora community and terrorist groups in the home country.

²⁸ See von Hippel at <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/andrewsteele/sept11/papers/root5.html>.

²⁹ See Schneckener SWP studies, and DAC Guidelines (OECD/DAC 2001b).

³⁰ See von Hippel at <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/andrewsteele/sept11/papers/root5.html>.

³¹ Loc. cit. and the OECD/DAC (2002b; 2003).

2.5 Options for preventing terrorism

International terrorism (group 1) can only be tackled in the short term through police, military, legal and financial measures. In the medium to long term, structural measures to reduce the causes of and conditions favouring this kind of terrorism can be used (see Sect. 2.6 below). Development Cooperation can play an important role here.

A whole range of military and civilian measures are available for transforming armed conflicts (group 2).³² Short-term success can be achieved using military instruments (in the stage of extreme escalation of violence) and above all political measures such as negotiations and mediation, as well as supplementary measures such as financial or other sanctions. As many of these groups have political goals, they are generally also amenable to dialogue. In the long term, the causes and conditions favouring conflict or promoting terrorism can be addressed, and the consequences for the suffering population can be eased. Development Cooperation has various roles to play here. Information is available in the literature on the subject of Development Cooperation, crisis prevention, peace-building and conflict transformation.³³ However, there is no clear statement to date on whether preventing terrorism in terms of group 2 (regional and national groups) is identical with transforming armed conflicts as such, or whether specific additional activities specifically for terrorism prevention are needed.³⁴

To combat criminal terrorist groups, violence can generally only be contained by military and by police measures. In addition – depending on the context – specific political activities, such as introducing international commodity control regimes on the lines of the Kimberley Process in the diamond trade, can make a contribution. The extent to which these groups can be deprived of their recruiting base by strong economic incentives is something that must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Development Cooperation generally can contribute more at the global level, whereas its contribution at national and local level must be seen as relatively minor. All that can be done here is to deal with the consequences of terrorist acts for the suffering population, or design projects to be conflict sensitive in the sense of the “do no harm” approach.³⁵

³² See the tables of measures (toolboxes) in: Lund, Michael, “A Tool Box for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace”, in: Reyhler/Paffenholz 2001, pp. 16-20.

³³ See the extensive publications of the GTZ's sector project on crisis prevention, particularly the overview in in: Mehler, Andreas/ Ribeaux, Claude 2000: Krisenprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung in der Technischen Zusammenarbeit. Ein Überblick zur nationalen und internationalen Diskussion, Schriftenreihe der GTZ, no. 269, Wiesbaden.

³⁴ See the lessons learned from the ATP in Sect. 5.2 and the recommendations in Sect. 6.2.

³⁵ Anderson, Mary, Do no harm. How Aid can Support Peace – or War. Boulder, Col., London 1999, or the summaries in the Berghof Handbook at www.berghof-center.org or in Reyhler/Paffenholz.

2.6 Role of Development Cooperation in preventing terrorism

Since September, 11th the international community has been seeking effective measures to combat terrorism in various policy areas. Development Cooperation also has a role to play in preventing terrorism. According to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC),³⁶ Development Cooperation can use various measures to prevent terrorism. If these elements are supplemented by the measures listed in Sects. 2.3 and 2.4, as research on terrorism recommends, the following measures appear suitable for combating the causes and conditions favouring terrorism through Development Cooperation:

Combating the causes of terrorism, and the role of DC

<i>Measures</i>	<i>DAC recommendation</i>	<i>General recommendation</i>	<i>Suitability for DC</i>
Settling regional and national armed conflict		x	limited ³⁷
Global level: participatory globalisation	x	x	no
Countering injustice and exclusion from decision-making processes	x	x	x
Supporting human rights (govt. + NGOs)	x		limited ³⁸
Supporting democracy		x	limited ³⁹

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³⁶ OECD/DAC 2002b; 2003

³⁷ See possible TC measures in armed conflicts in Mehler/Ribeaux.

³⁸ There are many other actors specialising in this field (churches, foundations, NGOs), but this does not mean that TC cannot also make a contribution in this area, depending on the context.

³⁹ See previous footnote.

Combating conditions that favour terrorism, and the role of DC

<i>Measures</i>	<i>DAC recommendation</i>	<i>General recommendation</i>	<i>Suitability for DC</i>
More focus on the needs of the young generation in developing countries	x	x	x
Greater cultural and religious sensitivity in DC: working with religious groups should not be ruled out, and intra-cultural and intercultural dialogue should be promoted	x	x	limited ⁴⁰
More participation by and information for the population	x		x
Non-proliferation of weapons		x	x
Understanding diaspora communities better and working with them			in-country work

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⁴⁰ See previous footnote.

3. Description of the ATP programme⁴¹

3.1 Content and target groups

In 2002, under the BMZ's ATP (EUR 102 million) for measures to prevent terrorism, the GTZ implemented a package of projects with a total commission value of EUR 30.2 million. The first tranche in April 2002 comprised 23 regional and five supraregional projects; the second tranche in August 2002 topped up 15 projects in the first tranche and added 11 new projects.

Regional priorities were central Asia, Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and the Maghreb countries, plus selected countries in Africa, South and South-East Asia and Latin America. Projects and activities were thus implemented both in countries with a latent potential for conflict (e.g. Senegal) and in acute conflict countries (Palestine) or post-conflict countries (particularly Africa, Southeastern Europe).

Themes ranged from:

- Conflict transformation, peace-building and reconciliation
 - Establishing and promoting competence for peaceful solutions in intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic, religious and resource distribution conflicts
 - Demobilisation and small arms
 - Education, trauma and reconciliation work
 - Promoting cultural identity, intracultural and intercultural dialogue and social integration and tolerance
- Good governance
 - Direct promotion of democracy
 - Decentralisation
 - Establishing democratic structures
 - Strengthening civil society
 - Promoting human rights work
 - Establishing and promoting constitutional institutions and strengthening public administration, fighting corruption, promoting the rule of law and financial control
 - Strengthening partnerships in the security sector, particularly with respect to its integration into democracy and the rule of law
- Economic and employment promotion and vocational training
- Conservation of natural resources and environmental development (water and land conflicts)

⁴¹ See list of measures in Appendix 2.

- ❑ Emergency and refugee assistance
 - Emergency aid and food security
 - Development or rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure

The target groups of the whole programme were poor and disadvantaged population groups, and the majority of activities focused on young people, ex-combatants and women.

3.2 Origin and implementation of the programme

3.2.1 Start of the ATP and planning periods

The time available for planning the ATP programme was short as a whole. The GTZ received a request from the BMZ in December 2001 to submit a bid as part of the ATP. A concept and criteria were then developed at the GTZ. GTZ offices in the countries concerned therefore generally had little time for the initial planning.⁴²

3.2.2 Selection and planning of projects

The GTZ began by establishing a task force to provide conceptual support for the ATP. Later, a separate ATP coordination office was set up in the sector project on Crisis Prevention. The “formal” selection of project proposals was made by the Head Office (format for applications, collection etc.), while most of the project ideas came from GTZ projects and offices in the countries themselves. In the case of existing priority areas in crisis prevention and peace-building, these were taken as a basis and further elaborated in the countries. In countries where the topic was a new theme, brainstorming sessions were held with other German organisations, Development Cooperation partners and local partners. The task force then selected the project proposals to ensure an appropriate geographic and financial distribution. The collective bid for the first tranche was then forwarded to the BMZ, which made a further selection (in many cases there had been cooperation between the GTZ and BMZ regional groups in the course of preparing the projects).

3.2.3 Role of the coordination office

As this involved additional funds with an annual allocation from the German Ministry of Finance, the BMZ was required to submit quarterly reports to the Budget Committee of the Ministry of Finance. The ATP coordination office was commissioned to carry out

⁴² This ranged from 24 hours to a weekend or up to 10 days. More time was available for planning only in a few exceptional cases.

monitoring and quality assurance for the ATP by the Departmental Director General of GTZ's Planning and Development Department. This included financial monitoring, technical backstopping and impact monitoring.⁴³

3.2.4 Naming of the ATP at national level

Almost no country used the original name for the ATP programme,⁴⁴ as everyone involved felt that, politically speaking, the term "terrorism" in the title was too sensitive. ATP projects were thus given different designations in the different countries, e.g. "Fond Bonne Gouvernance" in the Maghreb countries, "German Emergency Programme" in Nepal, "Poverty Reduction and Conflict Management" in the Philippines, "Conflict reducing measures for young people and adults" in Sri Lanka or "Fond Spécial" in Senegal.

3.2.5 Types of implementation

Three types of projects can be distinguished:

- Type A: supplementing Development Cooperation with conflict transformation and peace-building elements or processes (= **DC+p**);
- Type B: new approaches including peace-building or democratisation within the purpose of the project (= **PB**);
- Type C: "classic" Development Cooperation projects (= **DC**).

The majority of projects were type A (DC+p) or B (PB). Only in a few cases was an attempt made to achieve ATP goals using conventional Development Cooperation projects, e.g. in India or central Asia. In various countries, type B projects were handled through funds and then in cooperation with local NGOs and foundations, e.g. in the Philippines, Senegal, Colombia, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb countries or Rwanda. Type A projects involving supplementary conflict transformation and peace building activities (DC+p) were mostly implemented through existing GTZ projects in the countries, although new methods, approaches or processes were developed and tested (Sri Lanka, Senegal, Indonesia, Congo, Niger, Mali, Rwanda) or Development Cooperation projects were extended to regions at particular risk of crisis (Sri Lanka, Yemen, former Yugoslavia, Uzbekistan). The latter often involved pilot measures ("Development Cooperation tests") in the area between crisis-preventive Development Cooperation (DC+p) and development-oriented emergency aid (Congo, Sri Lanka).⁴⁵

⁴³ A separate reporting format was developed jointly with the BMZ for impact monitoring. This was used to record impact areas (e.g. economic, security policy etc.), and not to measure impacts.

⁴⁴ Algeria was the only country where one measure included the word "terrorism" in the title.

⁴⁵ See GTZ publication on DEA, GTZ division 43 (2001) "Entwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe. Arbeitskonzept." (Development-oriented emergency aid: a working concept).

In addition, a number of supraregional programmes were carried out. These were either implemented within existing sector projects, e.g. “Strengthening women’s rights in Islamic countries” and “Security sector reform”, were newly created, such as the “Fond Bonne Gouvernance” in the Maghreb countries, or were assigned to regional organisations such as the UN agency ESCWA in the Middle East.⁴⁶

3.2.6 Partnerships

New partnerships emerged in project planning and implementation in the majority of reported cases, mostly with local NGOs, local grassroots organisations or traditional actors (Egypt, Rwanda, central Asia, Yemen) or other German actors, especially the political foundations (Maghreb, Philippines) and the churches. Otherwise, however, cooperation continued with existing partners, as in Sri Lanka or Nepal.

3.2.7 Follow up

Interest in continuing the ATP projects has been shown in almost all countries and regions. Many GTZ offices report that experience with the ATP is already being incorporated into the work of the normal programmes and projects, and in other cases new projects or follow-up measures that build on the experience with the ATP are planned. The following options for follow-up are currently apparent:

- ❑ Continuation using special funds: In Sri Lanka, activities are being continued with additional special funds, supplied within the framework of the peace process.
- ❑ Continuation through new projects: In the Maghreb countries, a Good Governance Fund is planned; in Senegal, the programme is partly being continued within the framework of the new GTZ priority area of conflict transformation. At the latest government negotiations, the Philippine partners were promised additional funds by the BMZ for a project to support the peace process in Mindanao, based on experience with the ATP.
- ❑ Continuation within the framework of the normal programme: Indonesia, Congo, Colombia, partly Sri Lanka.
- ❑ Continuation desired, but unclear: Rwanda is interested in including the themes in the next government negotiations. In other countries, continuation of the ATP or similar activities would be regarded as very useful, but financing has yet to be resolved: Egypt, Yemen, Bosnia, women’s rights in central Asia, peace-building measures in Nepal, Chad, Peru.
- ❑ Continuation by partners: in Rwanda and to some extent in Uzbekistan, partners are partly continuing the activities.

⁴⁶ See the short overview of the measures in Appendix 2.

4. Assessment of the ATP programme

4.1 Relevance and potential impact of the ATP on crisis prevention and peace-building in countries with armed conflicts

Based on the definition of relevance given in Appendix 4, the relevance of ATP for crisis prevention and peace-building is generally rated very high. The lines of activity of the ATP are focused strongly on the conflict or potential crisis context of the countries. Many ATP projects can also be rated as having a high potential impact.⁴⁷

More detailed assessment of ATP projects in selected countries has also made it clear that a specific set of factors may enhance or reduce the relevance and potential impact of Development Cooperation measures on crisis prevention and peace-building:

Conditions which enhance peace-building relevance and impact⁴⁸

- if an analysis of the conflict or crisis potential is carried out;
- if ex-ante impact hypotheses are developed for projects and programmes in the peace and conflict or crisis context;
- if “do no harm” checks are carried out;
- if the measures are well timed (directly after a ceasefire or peace agreement, before creation of Development Cooperation priority areas on the theme);
- if the strengths of Development Cooperation are harnessed (“participatory development”, quality control).

Conditions which reduce relevance and impact

- if no conflict analysis, “do no harm” check etc. is carried out (absence of the above points);
- inadequate cooperation by partner countries;
- if the high visibility of the German contribution locally conceals or obscures the link between the corresponding measures and the national or local peace process (Sri Lanka, Senegal).

⁴⁷ See the methodology for estimating potential impact in Appendix 5.

⁴⁸ For more detail, see Sect. 5.1: Lessons learned.

4.2 Relevance and impact of ATP projects on crisis prevention and peace-building in Development Cooperation

The ATP can be seen as being highly relevant and as having had a significant impact in terms of increased work on the theme of crisis prevention and peace-building within the framework of Development Cooperation. Many important lessons have been derived for further work on the theme, and a general boost has been given to peace building in Development Cooperation. This can be regarded as a success in the short term.

However, it must also be said that ultimately the success of the special ATP programme depends on the successful and lasting transfer of lessons learned to the conceptual and operational programme and project level.

The following sections describe the observed impacts.

4.2.1 Creative and innovative ideas generated

As the ATP was a special programme that had to be implemented in the relatively short time span from April (respectively August) to December 2002, many GTZ offices in the field are taking advantage of the opportunity to adopt a more flexible approach to programme and project planning. Many creative and innovative ideas that would have been impossible within the framework of the normal programme were given free rein as a result. This meant that many new activities supplementing Development Cooperation (type A = DC+p and type B = PB) were able to be tested. An analysis of the planned follow-up activities in many countries (see Sect. 3.2.7) shows that many promising activities are being integrated into normal programmes, or are leading to the emergence of new programmes.

4.2.2 Learning through new partnerships

In many places, new partnerships are also being tested. The focus here has been on:

- local NGOs (Egypt, Morocco, Rwanda, Yemen etc.);
- communities and traditional actors (Egypt, Yemen, Rwanda, central Asia);
- other German actors, such as the political foundations (Maghreb, Philippines);
- new actors – city twinning, chambers of commerce and universities.

The lessons thus learned are being integrated into existing or new programmes in many places and have given rise to new partnerships, which have also shown the potential for greater coherence in German Development Cooperation.

4.2.3 Awareness-raising for the theme of crisis prevention and peace building

The special ATP programme has resulted in greater awareness of the theme of crisis prevention and peace-building in Development Cooperation. The following forms of awareness-raising and initial implementation were identified:

- ❑ Efficient preliminary tests for new programmes for crisis prevention and peace-building in countries already familiar with the topic (Sri Lanka, Senegal);
- ❑ “Feasibility tests” in countries with a certain amount of awareness of the theme (Philippines, Rwanda);
- ❑ ATP as a door-opener in countries which have previously paid little or no attention to the theme. A particular instance here is Development Cooperation with the Maghreb states, where awareness of the political dimension of Development Cooperation has been enhanced by the ATP;⁴⁹ other instances include Latin American countries, such as Peru;
- ❑ It should, however, be noted that in countries where the ATP might have led – or was expected to lead – to greater awareness (as in central Asia or Palestine), this has not so far happened.

Overall, however, the many proposals for a follow-up to the ATP or for integrating the theme into normal or new programmes confirm the success of awareness-raising.

4.3 Relevance of the ATP for Development Cooperation in countries at risk from terrorism⁵⁰

The ATP measures were designed to reduce the readiness of poorer population groups in crisis regions to resort to violence, and are thus conceptually speaking essentially concerned with reducing the conditions that favour terrorism.⁵¹

The relevance assessment is concerned with determining whether the ATP activities were geared towards reducing the conditions that favour terrorism, in this case whether they sought to reduce the readiness of the poorer population groups in crisis regions to use violence.

A comparative assessment of the ATP shows an ambivalent picture, leading to the overall conclusion that – with some restrictions – the ATP was relevant for reducing the

⁴⁹ See Sect. 5.3.

⁵⁰ No estimate is made here of the impact of ATP measures on combating terrorism, as a one-year programme cannot make any contribution to the long-term struggle against terrorism. However, general lessons drawn from the ATP for combating terrorism are discussed in the lessons learned and conclusions.

⁵¹ See Sect. 2.4.

conditions that favour terrorism. There are various reasons for this ambivalent assessment:

1. Criticism of the premises of the ATP: uncertain link between terrorism and poverty

The ATP is based on the premise that poverty is a condition that favours terrorism, and that measures seeking to reduce the readiness of poorer population groups to use violence can therefore automatically help to combat terrorism.

There are problems with this premise, because it is ambivalent.⁵² Recent research on terrorism⁵³ shows that poverty alone is not an inherent cause of or condition favouring terrorism, and that it does not apply to all categories of terrorism either.⁵⁴ The majority of research into the causes of armed conflicts also favours the idea that poverty is not intrinsically a cause, but may only lead to radicalisation tendencies as a condition favouring terrorism in combination with other variables.⁵⁵

2. Even if the premise that “poverty leads to terrorism” is valid, ATP activities are still only relevant to a limited extent

Even assuming the validity of this premise, ATP measures were only relevant to a limited extent, as they did not focus exclusively on poorer population groups (see e.g. the work with the courts of audit in the Maghreb countries or Peru's Truth Commission).

3. ATP nevertheless relevant for Development Cooperation in countries at risk from terrorism

In many of the countries studied, however, it emerged that the ATP measures were very relevant for reducing the potential readiness to resort to violence of population groups at particular risk. Measures for the vocational and social integration of young people or other potentially disadvantaged groups geared towards reducing the adverse effects of globalisation, armed conflict, social and political injustice and lack of democratisation are particularly relevant here.

In many countries, activities promoting participation by the population in social and political decision-making processes and the provision of information on these processes,

⁵² See the discussion in Sect. 2.4.

⁵³ See e.g. von Hippel at <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/andrewsteele/sept11/papers/root5.html>.

⁵⁴ See the classification in Sect. 2.2.

⁵⁵ The World Bank research group is alone in seeing a stronger link between poverty and conflict, although it is not researching terrorist groups: “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy”, Oxford University Press, World Bank, 2003.

and activities supporting human rights and conflict transformation, in countries at risk from terrorism proved to be particularly relevant.

In the Maghreb countries, various ATP measures focusing on young people, combating urban poverty and promoting East-West dialogue, and particularly between moderate and more radical Islamic groups (intra-Islamic dialogue) proved to be highly relevant for preventing terrorism.

In summary, overall the ATP has relevance for preventing terrorism, even if this does not relate exclusively to poor population groups.

4.4 Assessment of the ATP implementation process (efficiency and effectiveness)

Cooperation between the GTZ's Head Office and local offices and projects and cooperation with the BMZ was described by all those surveyed as good to very good.

4.4.1 Strengths within the GTZ

In implementing the special programme under time pressure, the GTZ showed a high degree of flexibility, ensuring rapid planning and implementation. Where constraints appeared, the GTZ responded with creative solutions. Overall, cooperation between the various units involved was described as good:

- GTZ regional divisions and in-country structures with the coordination office;
- GTZ Head Office with GTZ offices, projects and Principal Advisers in the countries;
- Regional GTZ divisions with the BMZ;
- Local German actors with each other;
- GTZ with (government and non-governmental) partners.

The creation of a task force and subsequently a coordination office proved to be a particularly effective instrument for implementing special programmes. This significantly contributed towards efficient and effective implementation of the ATP.

The majority of those surveyed were very positive about the possibility of procuring equipment and materials locally and the generally large degree of planning and implementation, as this made it possible to exploit niches and opportunities.

Activities within the framework of existing projects and the creation of funds for new programmes were seen as particularly suitable forms of implementing special programmes.

4.4.2 Strengths within the BMZ

As particular strength of the BMZ in implementing the special ATP programme was seen its high level of flexibility on content in designing the measures and the rapid and unproblematic processing of applications.

Granting of special approvals for financing agreements and local grants was also rated as very flexible and constructive for rapid implementation.

4.4.3 Weaknesses in handling the special programme

All those involved at the GTZ regarded the extremely short planning phase and very short implementation period as being problematic. This was the converse of the high level of flexibility – standard procedures were bypassed in some cases, and a lower standard of quality control had to be accepted; moreover, implementation was not straightforward in all countries.

A further criticism in some cases related to the bureaucratic effort (e.g. in the Contract Management), as this further reduced what was already a short period for planning and implementation.

The lack of clarity in communicating the ATP in the partner countries partly led to delays in the implementation, as it was often left unclear for some time whether or not an exchange of notes was required, for example.

As the biggest weakness of the special ATP programme, a lack of clarity in financial processing is described by all those surveyed.

Further complications resulted from the extremely late disbursement and administrative changes in the context of the second tranche. This all led to extreme time pressure in implementation, increased individual management expenditure and a rollback in Head Office quality assurance, as a result of the abandonment of Head Office contracting responsibility for the overall package. Increased increased effort expended on individual steering tasks and decrease of a central quality assurance were the consequences.

Problems arose not only from the technical financing changes, but also – and primarily – from the deficiencies and often discrepancies in communication about the relevant facts between the agencies involved.

5. Lessons learned and best practices

5.1 Lessons from the ATP for crisis prevention and peace-building in Development Cooperation

Educational work under peace perspectives (DC+p) in Sri Lanka:

“Creative writing competition on the theme Peace and conflict management for student teachers” within the framework of the Vanni Basic Education Rehabilitation Project⁵⁶

Within the framework of the ATP, a creative writing competition was held for Sinhalese and Tamil student teachers on the theme of *peace*. The project is rated as an exemplary best practice, as the potential for long-term peace-building was developed within a relatively brief project through a systematically initiated process. The creative writing competition was organised not as a single event, but was integrated into a series of events and activities, such as the choice of a multi-ethnic jury and the organisation of two peace days at which the entries were presented along with multi-ethnic peace performances involving drama and dance. The media, including TV, were also invited. In parallel, an exchange programme (Peace Link) was initiated between student teachers from the South and from the regions in the North particularly affected by conflict.

The short-term project can achieve a high degree of sustainability through follow-up activities. The project itself ran for only a few weeks, but sustainability can be ensured through an interesting process of feeding results into the GTZ-assisted Basic Education Sector Programme (BESP). The best pieces of writing from the competition were printed in an attractively illustrated book in three languages (English, Sinhala and Tamil).⁵⁷ The book is so far the only teaching material available in three languages, and is now firmly established in pre- and in-service teacher training to prepare peace lessons, which also makes it part of the project's standard monitoring.

Comparative advantages of Development Cooperation in peace-building through project type A = DC+p1:

The ATP has provided further impetus for thinking about peace-building within the framework of Development Cooperation, which is an important requirement for the further integration of the theme into Development Cooperation. There was interesting experience from new programmes (project type B = PB), which were implemented through funds in many places, but above all from project type A (= DC+p): implementation of crisis prevention and peace-building activities within the framework of Development Cooperation projects.¹ This means that within Development Cooperation, type B projects

⁵⁶ Taken from the Sri Lanka country study: GTZ – Paffenholz, Thania (2003). Lernerfahrungen aus dem ATP – Sri Lanka ("Lessons from the ATP – Sri Lanka").

⁵⁷ GTZ, Peace, Creative Writing of Student-Teachers of the National Colleges of Education, Sri Lanka, 2002.

(PB) are well suited to raising awareness of the new theme, while type A projects (DC+p) promise greater longer-term establishment of the theme.

This has made it clear that conventional Development Cooperation programmes are very well able to use new approaches or thematic or geographic focusing of activities to integrate the theme of peace-building into existing work. This is an important and central lesson of the ATP, as Development Cooperation became highly involved in the theme at the start of the debate by developing new project types (project type B = PB).

This put DC in competition with institutions such as those traditionally responsible for peace-building, such as peace NGOs or the churches, and also with the democratisation work of the political foundations. However, the diversity of the activities implemented under the ATP has made it very clear that the comparative advantage of Development Cooperation is not the implementation of new project types, but the integration of approaches and methods for crisis prevention and peace-building into Development Cooperation projects.

This does not preclude Development Cooperation also trying out new partnerships and project types where it has a comparative advantage due to local or national conditions. These kinds of trials also allow them to be subsequently integrated into normal Development Cooperation programmes.

Conditions for an enhanced peace-building impact of Development Cooperation

Several factors were analysed which enhance the crisis prevention and conflict transformation impact of Development Cooperation programmes and projects. These factors are a necessary condition to allow project type A (DC+p) to be implemented.

Factors which enhance peace-building relevance and potential impact

- If an analysis of the conflict or crisis potential is carried out: It has been shown that a sound analysis of the context of a Development Cooperation intervention, in combination with integration of the results of the analysis into subsequent programme and project planning or project progress reviews, significantly enhances the peace-building relevance and potential impacts.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ See also the BMZ design study on dealing with countries with "difficult" conditions (Kurtenbach et al. 2002), p. 37, (3).

- ❑ If ex-ante impact hypotheses are developed for projects and programmes in the peace and conflict or crisis context, central statements can be made on the orientation of programmes and projects, which become an important parameter for success.⁵⁹
- ❑ If “do no harm” checks are carried out, the impact hypotheses can be supplemented by determining whether an intervention has a positive or negative impact on the conflict context.⁶⁰
- ❑ If the timing of the intervention is right, the potential peace-building impact of programmes can be significantly enhanced. In countries where the timing of the ATP was particularly favourable, its potential peace-building impact and relevance was enhanced. Two points in time proved to be particularly favourable:
 - ⇒ *Directly after a ceasefire or peace agreement:*
In countries where a ceasefire or peace agreement had just been negotiated (Sri Lanka, Peru, East Timor, Congo), the ATP was highly relevant. In addition, the German contribution to the peace process through the ATP arrived significantly earlier than the contributions of the other international donors.⁶¹
 - ⇒ *In countries where a new priority area in German Development Cooperation on the theme of peace building⁶² had already been decided at the time that the ATP was initiated*, successful activities were able to be tested with the help of the ATP. The new programmes in Senegal, Colombia and Sri Lanka can now be established in a more focused manner by drawing on lessons from the ATP.
- ❑ If projects are professionally planned, use participatory methods and include ongoing quality control on a routine basis, this is a condition for the integration of peace-building and conflict-sensitive elements into Technical Cooperation. Although these are theoretically standard procedures, there is a danger that they are not adequately applied, particularly in conflict situations.

Funds as an instrument of peace-building

The role of funds as an instrument of peace building has been a matter of intensive debate in recent years. One advantage of funds which has repeatedly been put forward is their possibility for flexible funding and for testing new approaches and partners.

⁵⁹ On the question of impact hypotheses in DC, see Reychler, Luc/Paffenholz, Thania, Conflict Impact Assessment Systems: A Field Guide, Leuven, Field Diplomacy Initiative 2003, in preparation, and also available as a download at www.fielddiplomacy.be, probably from the end of September 2003.

⁶⁰ See the book by Mary B. Anderson and the checklists in the Internet at See the book by Mary B. Anderson and the checklists on the Internet at <http://www.cdainc.com/lcpp-indications.htm>.

⁶¹ In Sri Lanka, for example, the ATP came into force directly after the ceasefire, while the new funding for Sri Lanka under the Oslo peace process is only being provided in the course of the current year, i.e. one year later than the ATP. The ATP also made it possible to test which measures might work particularly well in the post-conflict context.

⁶² Also known as conflict management, conflict transformation or peace promotion.

⁶³ Taken from the Philippine country study: GTZ – Brede, Dunja (2003). Lernerfahrungen aus dem ATP – Philippinen ("Lessons from the ATP – Philippines").

Peace-building (PB) in the Philippines:***The peace advocacy measure at the “Mindanao Women’s Peace Conference”⁶³***

The “Mindanao Women’s Peace Conference” measure supported the organisational and consultation process among Christian, indigenous and Muslim women’s representatives in Mindanao aimed at producing a negotiating paper for the peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The women managed to formulate and agree on a negotiating draft, which was submitted to the Philippine Government in February 2003. The military intervention in February 2003 led to a postponement of the planned start of peace negotiations, but a new start has been indicated and the Government has stated that it is taking the women’s position paper into account. Besides their positive contribution towards strengthening the level of organisation of the various women’s groups by assisting networking, the initiative made a direct contribution towards promoting dialogue between the state and civil society and local/regional links with macropolitical peace initiatives. Although the direct conflict-reducing potential of the initiative is given an ambivalent rating, its sustainable, institutionally embedded peace-promoting potential is considered to be very high.

Given the short-term nature of the ATP programme and the special circumstances in many countries where links to current Development Cooperation projects in the region were not possible, funds were established in many countries. The following lessons can be derived for funds from experience with the ATP.

Overall, the creation of funds to promote single projects or initiatives has proved to be an appropriate and flexible instrument. Such funds allow promotion of a wide range of activities, cooperation with widely differing government and non-governmental partners, and hence also various approaches to the topic, different approaches to intervention from the grassroots to the political decision-making level, and the agreement of specific short-term results.

The specific added value of funds became clear from experience with the ATP in various ways.

1. Pilot nature of activities: testing through funds

Funds have proved to be an excellent instrument for testing new approaches and partners. In the event of successful implementation, these can subsequently be promoted through other Development Cooperation activities. This is the major advantage of funds.

Funds are particularly appropriate if a new Development Cooperation priority area is being established in the field of peace-building. In the case of Sri Lanka and Senegal, the ATP has provided considerable impetus for designing the future priority area. Specific testing of new approaches and feasibility has generated far more learning effects than purely strategic and conceptual planning of the priority area.

2. Immediate funds to stabilise peace processes

Funds as immediate measures (“immediate funds”) are an efficient instrument to help stabilise recently initiated peace processes. In some countries (Sri Lanka, Peru, East Timor, Congo), a ceasefire or peace agreement had just been signed at the start of the ATP. As ATP funds had already been approved, an immediate start could be made on promoting projects to stabilise the newly achieved peace, in most cases well ahead of other donors.

3. Funds as instruments for medium- to long-term peace building

Finally, funds are used for direct peace-building in a conflict or crisis country. The goal is usually to be able to support smaller local initiatives in a flexible manner. It is, however, difficult to assess the impact funds have on the direct crisis, conflict or peace context. Often, the lack of coherence of the individual projects is a problem. This limits their overall impact on the peace process.

Support of individual projects or initiatives within the framework of funds has proved efficient where certain PR effects can be achieved which have a positive impact on the peace process. The advantage of funds here is their flexible financing, which permits activities to be timed correctly.

Overall, it is clear that the use of a fund as an instrument for peace-building needs to be carefully considered in each individual instance. Another criticism is that funds entail the risk of feeding “peace industries” in conflict countries. This is because often a number of donors have peace funds in the same region. This regularly leads to duplication in financing the same local organisations. In many places, only a few of these NGOs have sufficient capacity to absorb certain project volumes.

Successful use of funds therefore heavily depends on a good context analysis, exact definition of the goals and strategic thrust of the fund, and preparation of conceptual guidelines or promotional criteria. Regular meetings of the actors involved in a fund can also lead to new peace-policy partnerships, as can be seen in the Philippines. Here, the monitoring meetings held within the framework of the fund (bringing together all the partners in the individual projects promoted) has had the effect of integrating various partners in the field of peace-building who normally do not work together. The result has been new partnerships and consultation between NGOs and between NGOs and the state.

5.2 Lessons from the ATP for Development Cooperation in countries at risk from terrorism

The comparative assessment of the ATP confirms and refines certain assumptions made after September 11th with regard to the role of Development Cooperation in the context of countries at risk from terrorism.⁶⁴

The ATP confirms that Development Cooperation can help change conditions that favour terrorism and combat the causes of terrorism.⁶⁵ In summary, however, only a combination of different measures at various levels (local, national, global) can lead to success in the long-term struggle against terrorism through Development Cooperation. The limits of Development Cooperation in particular in preventing terrorism must also be recognised. Nevertheless, a number of lessons can be drawn from the ATP for preventing terrorism. The following factors have emerged as particularly important for preventing terrorism within the framework of Development Cooperation:

Youth and young adults harbour the potential for radicalisation

Youth and young adults generally represent potential for change, but also for radicalisation. The question is what makes this potential for change and organisation slide into radicalisation and a readiness to use violence. Experience within the framework of the ATP has shown that in all the countries studied, youth and young adults had a high potential for radicalisation. The key factors here are not religious or ethnic ones, but rather

- ❑ the lack of specific employment prospects and hence opportunities for economic development;
- ❑ opportunities to express dissatisfaction (criticism) and to participate actively in political processes;
- ❑ the presence of radical groups within the youths' environment who are ready to use violence and exploit economic needs or perceived dissatisfaction (feelings of oppression) for their own ends.

⁶⁴ See Sect. 2.

⁶⁵ See the table in Sect. 2.6.

Agricultural consultancy with peace perspectives (DC+p) in Casamance, Senegal:

***Rehabilitation of the Balantacounda banana plantation*⁶⁶**

The Balantacounda banana plantation lies at the heart of the violent conflicts between the army and rebels over control of the fertile land in this region, among other things. When the situation began to show signs of improving in 2002, nine of the village communities operated by the plantation got together under the umbrella of the local federation of banana growers, in order to return to their home villages after almost ten years. They negotiated with the local military, obtained their assistance in clearing the plantation of mines, and began to rebuild houses. The ATP assisted this autonomous initiative by financing a water pump to irrigate the plantation. This measure is integrated into other project activities of the PSPI project supported by the GTZ, which includes technical consultancy to banana producers, organisational development for the federation of banana growers and establishing an appropriate form of consumer cooperative for its members.

This risky investment showed that development-oriented action is feasible even in regions that have suffered major destruction. The return of the refugees and rehabilitation of the Banlantacounda banana plantation had major symbolic importance in the region. In the following six months, returnees recommissioned six more banana plantations in the region. The federation, with its strong entrepreneurial activities, is an important lobby for the population in dealing with armed groups, and offers long-term economic prospects for several hundreds of former refugee families. The symbolic aspect of the plantation is at least as important: Reoccupation by the farmers demonstrates their resistance to the war economy and their desire to overcome the current situation of "neither peace nor war" and to work towards a peaceful solution.

This is because broad groups of young people are frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities. Better qualifications are often not enough, as the labour market does not provide sufficient jobs. They are therefore potential recruits primarily for the category of regional/national terrorist groups (group 2).⁶⁷ For group 1 (international terrorism), young people from an urban environment with an intermediary to high level of education but without any concrete job and development perspectives are more likely to be potential recruits. Development Cooperation activities on professional and social integration of young people are therefore very important here. Analysis of the labour market and potential employment prospects are particularly significant in this context. However, unless the global causes of these problems in the context of the international division of labour are tackled, the struggle against them at local and national level will always be of limited success.

⁶⁶ Taken from the Senegal country study: GTZ – Leonhardt, Manuela (2003). Lernerfahrungen aus dem ATP – Senegal ("Lessons from the ATP – Senegal").

⁶⁷ See the classification in Sect. 2.2.

Link between poverty and terrorism varies from case to case:

Lessons from the ATP on the link between poverty and terrorism confirm that poverty alone is not a sufficient condition for terrorism, and changes as a variable from case to case. The context analysis in the case study of Casamance in Senegal⁶⁸ shows that there is no automatic link between terrorism and poverty.⁶⁹ The situation there is that population groups living in extreme poverty are less at risk as potential recruits for terrorist organisations, as the majority of them are too concerned with ensuring their own survival. In the case of Sri Lanka and to a limited extent Mindanao, poorer population groups are potential recruits for the parties to the conflict.

This ambivalent conclusion on the issue of poverty and terrorism shows that Development Cooperation measures for combating poverty do not automatically help prevent terrorism. Another important question is the type of poverty to be reduced, and the target groups that are important for reducing conditions favouring terrorism and violence. In many Arab countries, for example, urban poverty poses greater risks than rural poverty. By contrast, terrorist groups in Algeria, for example, operate more in rural areas. This shows that thorough analysis of the relevant context must be the central starting point in programme planning.

Participation by the population in political processes is important

Promoting participation by broad sections of the population in decision-making processes has proved to make an important contribution. This became clear from the integration of civil society into the reform of the residential registration system in Indonesia, the dialogue between various political representatives from the Maghreb states on reforming the court of audit, the implementation of small-scale measures in poor urban quarters in Egypt, education in citizenship and electoral law in Mozambique, and approaches to work on strengthening identity and organisation with Muslim and indigenous groups in Mindanao, for example. The use of different information media and projects has also proved important in this context for publicising events important for peace-building (Niger, Philippines, Mozambique).

Major overlap in the debate on Development Cooperation/terrorism and Development Cooperation/peace-building

It also became clear that the debate on Development Cooperation in the context of countries at risk from terrorism does not involve any fundamentally new aspects not already covered by the results of the debate on crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace-building in Development Cooperation. This particularly applies to terrorist groups in group 2 (regional and national groups with political goals).⁷⁰ Here, Development

⁶⁸ See the report on the ATP in Senegal, p. 8ff.

⁶⁹ See Sect. 2.4.

⁷⁰ See the classification in Sect. 2.2.

Cooperation already has measures for tackling such conflicts, which need to be translated into operational measures even further.

Even so, the focus on terrorism has highlighted an additional aspect. What we need to do is therefore to integrate the analysis of causes and conditions that favour terrorism into country context analyses. This type of analysis is best integrated into conflict analyses.

Overlap between the debate on Development Cooperation/terrorism and Development Cooperation in the context of “poor performing countries” (Difficult partnerships)

We have also seen that in dealing with category 1 (international terrorist groups) and – to some extent – category 2, there is considerable overlap with the debate on dealing with poor performers. For example, the ATP has shown that Development Cooperation faces the problem of how to deal with authoritarian systems of government. This has ambivalent significance for preventing terrorism. Many authoritarian states have succeeded in bringing radical, religiously motivated groups under control with the help of their security apparatus. Conversely, authoritarian systems of government and the associated lack of democracy are central causes of international and in some cases regional/national terrorism. In the search for answers, the two debates should therefore be more strongly linked.

Limits of Development Cooperation in preventing terrorism

The assessment of the ATP also reveals the limits of Development Cooperation in the context of countries at risk from terrorism. Firstly, there is the need to compensate for the adverse consequences of globalisation through greater justice in the international system and world trade. Development Cooperation cannot make any contribution to this. The assumption that Development Cooperation alone cannot make any contribution towards combating current terrorist threats in the short term is also confirmed. Other measures are needed here.

5.3 Lessons for Development Cooperation in the context of Islamic countries at risk from terrorism, using the example of the Maghreb states⁷¹

The ATP was implemented in various Islamic countries in Africa and Asia. However, the present study was unable to investigate all these countries in detail. As a result, we can essentially only make statements regarding experience in the Maghreb states and Egypt.

⁷¹ See the ATP short studies on the Maghreb states (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) and Egypt, and the short paper on TC in Islamic countries.

The extent to which these statements also apply to Development Cooperation in other Islamic countries is something that must be studied in more detail elsewhere.

In the Maghreb states, activities to address the frustration of youth and young adults, particularly in urban environments, showed potential for preventing terrorism (or reducing violence) in the long term. Here, Development Cooperation can begin work after a thorough context analysis has been conducted.

Support to marginalized regions has also proved important, because militant groups and groups ready to use violence together with their NGOs find it easy to engender support in these areas, as government structures have only a limited ability to meet the needs of the population. An exact context analysis is needed to identify such regions.

Programmes that promote intra-Islamic dialogue (e.g. between state and religiously oriented groups, between moderate and more radical groups, between western-oriented NGOs and religiously motivated groups etc.) and dialogue between East and West have also proved to be valuable where they are concerned with specific technical discussion or measures (e.g. city twinning). For these measures, cooperation between Development Cooperation and political foundations can be very fruitful, although it needs to be carefully considered what area the political foundations should be responsible for and what contribution Development Cooperation can make. Promoting openness and exchange on technical issues such as criminal code reform or courts of audit seems to be an interesting contribution by Development Cooperation.

Increased cooperation with actors of civil society (including religiously oriented actors) who can counter the influence of radical fundamentalist groups ready to use violence also appears to be promising. The ATP has shown that cooperation with religious groups in Islamic countries is possible and important. This is because they provide social services if the state fails to do so. To prevent this field being increasingly taken over by radical or fundamentalist groups, it is important to strengthen moderate actors. Development Cooperation has so far not devoted sufficient attention to these actors, because of a lack of knowledge about them and a resulting reluctance to contact them. More use should be made of conventional Development Cooperation instruments such as target group and organisational analysis in these cases. To stabilise the internal political situation – which in turn is a prerequisite for opening up the authoritarian states – it is also important to support initiatives to bring together the state and religious groups.

In addition, general democratisation activities seek to transform root causes of terrorism in the Maghreb countries, namely the lack of democratisation of authoritarian government systems. Here again, it is necessary to review which of these activities are relevant for Development Cooperation, and which should be better left to the political foundations or NGOs. However, Development Cooperation has also demonstrated within the framework

of the ATP that it can make effective contributions to democratisation, particularly where these are made through project type A (= DC+p),⁷² i.e. when normal Development Cooperation is supplemented by crisis prevention and conflict transformation elements or processes.

5.4 Lessons from the ATP for special programmes in general

Special programmes on new or specific themes are regularly used in Development Cooperation. The aim is to use these special programmes to help embed the themes in normal work. Many special programmes such as the ATP have a short duration, while others run for several years. The question that repeatedly arises is whether these special programmes deliver the benefits expected of them, or whether there are other ways of integrating new and important themes into development work. The following lessons can be drawn from the ATP for special programmes in general:

In almost all the countries where the ATP was implemented, it functioned as an innovation driver for mainstreaming peace-building, regardless of whether the topic was already familiar in the countries or had not yet been established as either a priority area or a cross-cutting issue. In Islamic countries, the ATP also promoted awareness-raising for the political dimension of Development Cooperation in the Maghreb countries.

Even before the ATP was initiated, innovative ideas on crisis prevention and peace-building existed in many countries. However, it took the additional funds under the ATP to enable some of these ideas to be implemented. This shows that the projects initially have little or no scope to include new themes unless additional funds are available. However, experience with the ATP shows that conflict sensitive and peace-building elements can subsequently be integrated into the normal portfolio with the help of good analysis and creativity.

One of the positive features of many ATP projects is that they are test activities, as we have seen how the introduction of new themes generally focuses heavily on the conceptual level of organisations. This “theoretical bias” often blocks the link between the conceptual and operational level of Development Cooperation. People and institutions learn less from concepts than from concrete experience and feasibility tests. This clearly argues in favour of the introduction of new themes through special programmes, and against integrating new themes immediately into normal programmes. This makes clear that special programmes can’t substitute the continuous work of Development Cooperation, laid out for long-term impact.

⁷² See the classification in Sect. 3.2.4.

It is, however, important for future special programmes that their status as test measures be stressed, because the additional value for a new theme from a special programme with a tight timetable lies in testing feasibilities. This makes it all the more important for it to be clear from the start that a short special programme can achieve little concrete impact in the countries, and that “only” potential impacts can be tested, the results of which can then flow into normal or new programmes.

The ATP example also demonstrates that the integration into an existing sector project on the theme can have a positive effect for special programmes. This meant that in-house expertise was already available in the planning stage. Admittedly, though, more systematic use could have been made of this experience if the planning period had been longer.

To analyse experience from special programmes systematically, it is important to plan from the start for integration of documentation and evaluation into planning for a special programme. This essentially involves evaluation of the benefits of the special programme for work in normal Development Cooperation programmes. In the case of the ATP as a whole, important learning experiences were lost, for example, as the study was restricted to implementation within the framework of Technical Cooperation, and evaluation was not an integral part of programme design from the start.

The ATP also showed that the creation of a task force – and particularly a coordination office supporting the entire implementation phase – is an effective instrument for implementing special programmes.

Based on the weaknesses in implementing the ATP,⁷³ it is also clear that good communication between and information to all actors involved (transparency) on implementation modalities and procedures are of central importance for the success of a special programme.

However, despite the lessons learned, particular criticism of the special ATP programme is warranted in view of the high level of funding combined with an extremely short implementation period. Besides questions of efficiency, this raises the problem of transferring the approaches and experience acquired within the framework of special programmes to the normal programme. For the ATP, this challenge was inadequately prepared conceptually and was not systematically implemented; there were therefore only individual cases where additional funds were provided or ATP approaches were able to be continued within the framework of the normal programme. To avoid unintended negative consequences of an abrupt termination – in the sense of the “do no harm” approach –

⁷³ See Sect. 4.4.

special programmes in the field of crisis prevention and peace building in particular should systematically integrate and communicate the question of integration right from the start.

5.5 Best practices: possible model projects

Projects are categorised as best practices if they demonstrate a combination of the following criteria:

- innovative contribution to crisis prevention and peace-building;
- a high degree of sustainability of the measure;
- either existing partners have enhanced awareness of crisis prevention and peace building or new partners are found for the topic;
- the measures may have a general model function beyond their individual national context.

If this catalogue of criteria is applied to the ATP in the countries studied in more detail, supplemented by an evaluation of the questionnaires, the following project types and approaches emerge as best practices:

1. Innovative approaches within the framework of conventional Development Cooperation (= project type A: DC+p)⁷⁴ created *entry points* for crisis prevention and peace-building. This involves activities within the framework of traditional Development Cooperation projects which can have a constructive impact on peace building as a result of the implementation process selected. Participatory dialogue forums associated with Development Cooperation themes (residential registration systems in Indonesia, regional dialogues on courts of audit in the Maghreb countries) or innovative types of projects, such as emergency education in Sri Lanka,⁷⁵ theatre performances on the emergence and management of conflict in Niger, and NGO networking in Congo, should be mentioned here. Innovative and creative forms of partnerships in crisis-sensitive Development Cooperation, such as the joint venture with the business community in Sri Lanka⁷⁶ or cooperation with Islamic institutions in Morocco and Tunisia, are also involved.
2. New regional focus of Development Cooperation programmes in line with the conflict context: the ATP has clearly shown that Development Cooperation, in the area between development-oriented emergency aid and traditional Development Cooperation, can make a successful contribution towards the direct stabilisation of peace processes in conflict or directly post-conflict areas (Senegal,⁷⁷ Philippines,⁷⁸

⁷⁴ See the classification of DC+p in Sect. 3.2.4.

⁷⁵ See report on Vanni Education and Rehabilitation Project in Sri Lanka, Sect. 6.

⁷⁶ See report on best practices in Sri Lanka, Sect. 5.

⁷⁷ See report on Senegal, Lessons Learned, Sect. 5

⁷⁸ See report on the Philippines, Lessons Learned, Sect. 5

Bosnia/Serbia/Kosovo, Sri Lanka,⁷⁹ Congo, vocational training measures in Palestine) if various measures are combined. The Maghreb countries also showed that support to marginalized regions or urban poverty areas can help to counter the influence of fundamentalist groups.

3. Through creative integration into the normal programme, short-term measures can contribute towards the sustainable integration of peace-building in Development Cooperation (e.g. peace education in Sri Lanka,⁸⁰ NGO promotion in Mauritania,⁸¹ dialogue measures in Senegal and Niger).

⁷⁹ See report on Sri Lanka, Sect. 6.3.

⁸⁰ See report on Sri Lanka, Sect. 5.

⁸¹ See internal report by the GTZ Office in Mauritania.

6. Recommendations

6.1 General recommendations on peace-building and Development Cooperation

Harnessing comparative advantages of Development Cooperation in peace-building through DC+p

The ATP made it clear that traditional Development Cooperation programmes that do not have a specific peace orientation are very well able to use new approaches or thematic or geographic focusing of activities to integrate the topic of peace-building into their existing work. This turns them into conflict- and peace-sensitive projects (DC+p).⁸² We therefore recommend that the results from the ATP should be integrated into the conceptual and operational mainstreaming process to a greater extent.

In this context, we have seen that programmes and projects are particularly relevant for peace-building and may have a high potential impact on the peace context (see Sect. 5.1) if

- an analysis of the conflict or crisis potential is carried out;
- ex-ante impact hypotheses are formulated, and “do no harm” checks are carried out;
- the timing is right;
- professional, participatory planning methods and ongoing quality controls are implemented routinely.

Funds as an instrument of peace-building

We recommend that funds should continue to be used as an instrument of peace-building. Specific recommendations are:

- to utilise the pilot nature of funds for testing new instruments and partnerships to a greater extent;
- to use immediate funds for stabilising recently initiated peace processes as quickly as possible;
- to use funds as instruments of medium- to long-term peace-building only
 - if there is a coherent concept,
 - if individual projects can have an relevant impact on the peace process,
 - if the fund has clear criteria and a context analysis has been carried out,

⁸² See the definition in Sect. 3.2.4.

- if the fund's activities have been coordinated with all the relevant donors in order to avoid duplicating activities and to avoiding nourishing the "peace industry".

6.2 General recommendations for Development Cooperation in countries at risk from terrorism

We recommend that the aspect of preventing terrorism should be integrated more effectively into the analysis and planning of Development Cooperation programmes.⁸³

In addition, we recommend that analysis of the relevant terrorist groups should be included in the analysis of the conflict or peace context in countries particularly at risk from terrorism. Here, Development Cooperation should clearly focus attention on analysing regionally or locally operating terrorist groups (groups 2 and 3, see Sect. 2). Particular attention should be devoted to a detailed analysis of the interaction of causes and conducive conditions and their specific regional impacts.

Participation in political processes by broad sections of the population should be integrated into all levels of programmes and projects.

As frustrated youth and young adults have a particular potential for radicalisation, we recommend that useful measures be taken to support these groups.

At the conceptual level, we also recommend that the debate about Development Cooperation (DC) and terrorism should be more strongly linked to the debate about DC in the context of poor performing countries and the debate about DC and peace-building.

6.3 General recommendations on Development Cooperation in Islamic countries at risk from terrorism in the context of crisis prevention and peace-building⁸⁴

We recommend that in principle more attention should be devoted to this theme and that experience and ideas should be exchanged with other Development Cooperation actors.

Specifically, Development Cooperation needs to be adapted more closely to the context of these nations in order to counter radicalisation trends and authoritarian systems of government. Specific recommendations are:

- ❑ to deprive radical groups of their basis by promoting moderate Islamic forces;

⁸³ See the possibilities for combating terrorism within the framework of DC given in Sect. 2.5.

⁸⁴ The recommendations are based on the analysis in the Maghreb countries and should therefore be reviewed in greater detail for other Islamic countries.

- ❑ to review more closely and make greater use of cooperation with moderate, religiously motivated groups and institutions with a view to shared goals within the framework of Technical Cooperation;
- ❑ to promote dialogue between government institutions and civil society organisations;
- ❑ to support regional exchange and dialogue between the Islamic states;
- ❑ to promote technical discussion on Development Cooperation themes and concrete activities to encourage exchange (e.g. partnerships) between Western countries and Islamic countries.

6.4 Specific recommendations to the BMZ

In addition to the aforementioned general recommendations, we also recommend that the BMZ should:

- ❑ analyse more closely the comparative advantages of the different Development Cooperation actors and integrate their activities more efficiently into a coherent concept;
- ❑ make greater use of funds designed to promote peace as a learning instrument and investigate the impact of funds on peace-building itself more closely;
- ❑ provide special funds for peace-building before creating a Development Cooperation priority area on this theme, in order to be able to test effective instruments and projects in advance;
- ❑ initiate a process of discussion on Development Cooperation in Islamic countries among the relevant actors in Germany;
- ❑ integrate the conflict and peace dimension into BMZ-specific processes, too;
- ❑ integrate evaluation of special programmes into planning in advance;
- ❑ create a coordination office for implementing special programmes;
- ❑ create clarity from the start on the implementation mechanisms and financial procedures when implementing special programmes (this includes clear communication with and information to the actors involved).

6.5 Specific recommendations to the GTZ

In addition to the aforementioned general recommendations, we also recommend that the GTZ should:

- ❑ further translate mainstreaming of peace-building into operational measures;
- ❑ establish a coherent strategy of peace-building in the countries and regions, creating a stronger link between specific peace-building measures and the Development Cooperation projects; make greater use of the comparative strengths of Development Cooperation in peace-building through DC+p;

- ❑ seek cooperation and exchange with other actors to an even greater degree.

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Appendices

- Appendix 1 Terms of Reference
- Appendix 2 An overview of the ATP measures
- Appendix 3 Key question matrix
- Appendix 4 Methodology for relevance assessment
- Appendix 5 Methodology for rapid peace and conflict impact appraisal
- Appendix 6 List of the people interviewed (only total)

1. Evaluation of Experience with the Anti-Terror Package

Terms of Reference

1. Background

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA struck the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre, the centres and worldwide symbols of foreign policy, security policy and economic power, ushering in a new era in international cooperation: the global village is no longer united by communication and economic flows alone, but is also confronted by a new form of global violence on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

The attacks in 2001 and the increasing radicalisation that can be seen in general, especially among certain groups in predominantly Muslim countries of Africa and Southeast Asia, and in the Arab states, have raised questions as to the origins of terrorism and have challenged us to take action.

Chancellor Schröder clearly outlined this challenge in a speech he gave on 19 September 2001: "We Europeans must step up our cooperation in the fight against terrorism... To this end, we aim to offer incentives within the scope of development cooperation for states that are willing to cooperate in combating terrorism. We must develop a comprehensive concept to prevent and manage crises, and we intend to do so. This concept must be based on political, economic, cultural and security cooperation."

Development cooperation is one of the mainstays of a concept of this type. Because structural factors are behind the outbreak of fundamentalism and terrorism, we can and must adopt structural measures to tackle them.

In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, the German Government allocated special funds in the 2002 budget for measures in the fields of security, defence and development policy. In this context, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) received some EUR 100 million in additional funds for measures to prevent terrorism and provide humanitarian aid. Although this money also helps to manage crises in the short term, activities are geared more to establishing or maintaining structures for crisis prevention and peace building. The BMZ's Anti-Terror Package contains the reconstruction measures implemented by various institutions in Afghanistan, as well as bilateral and multilateral approaches to crisis prevention and prevention of terrorism worldwide.

As part of the German Government's Anti-Terror Package, the GTZ implemented a total of 34 regional and five supraregional individual measures⁸⁵ between April and December 2002 with funding totalling EUR 30.2 million. These measures were designed to reduce the readiness of poorer groups in selected crisis regions to resort to violence and to make specific contributions worldwide to the prevention of terrorism.

The measures focus on crisis-ridden states in Central Asia, South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Maghreb and selected states in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. The measures target poor population groups and groups that have been particularly harshly affected by conflicts or that are particularly relevant for building competence in the field of civil conflict transformation, such as youth, women, displaced persons/returnees and demobilised soldiers.

The measures cover a wide spectrum of topics:

- Rule of law, political and institutional reform;
- Democratisation, decentralisation, good governance;
- Development-oriented emergency aid and refugee programmes;
- Security sector reform;
- Strengthening civil society;
- Media and communication;
- Establishment/strengthening of conflict transformation capacities, alliances for peace, reconciliation, inter-ethnic exchange and dialogue;
- Economic and employment promotion, upgrading, vocational training;
- Education and youth promotion;
- Gender-specific approaches.

A superficial glance is enough to show that these measures include a number of **topics that are new to technical cooperation**, such as cultural dialogue (intra-cultural, inter-cultural and inter-religious), human rights and women's rights, media work and peace journalism, competence building for civil conflict transformation, trauma and reconciliation work, etc. In the course of these measures, **new partnerships** have also emerged, both at the programme coordination level (cooperation between German development cooperation organisations) and in direct project implementation (greater cooperation with NGOs, Islamic organisations, etc.). The study is to establish, inter alia, what lessons can be learned from the measures for the GTZ's conceptual work in general and for the sector project in particular, what impact these largely innovative measures have actually had, how the measures can be assessed as part of the international effort to prevent terrorism, prevent crises and transform conflict, how effective coordination within German TC has been, and finally what prospects can be seen for continued work in this field.

⁸⁵ The first tranche of this funding covered 24 regional and supraregional measures. In August 2002, with the second tranche, activities were extended to cover another 11 regional measures.

The GTZ Sector Project Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation (Activity Area 4233) has been commissioned to provide the technical back-up, quality assurance and impact monitoring for the package of measures. To this end, a fixed-term post has been created (special planning officer attached to the sector project). The study is also to look at experience gained in the institutional and administrative coordination and the implementation of the package as a whole. Recommendations on how to handle similar packages in the future are then to be made.

2. Objectives

- Initial processing of experience (lessons learned) after one year of implementation of the measures within the scope of the Anti-Terror Package;
- Identification of promising approaches and topics (best practices);
- Drawing up of guidelines for decision-makers at the GTZ (regional departments, Planning and Development Department, sector project) and the BMZ as regards the design and implementation of crisis prevention and conflict transformation measures in the context of the debate on terrorism.

3. Results

The study is to examine the following aspects and issues:

- Strengths and weaknesses of internal coordination and implementation;
- Strengths and weaknesses of coordination with the BMZ;
- Relevance of the measures in terms of:
 - approaches to conflict transformation,
 - new topics,
 - cooperation with national partners and international donors,
 - cooperation with partner countries,
 - setting priorities, and shifts in technical cooperation;
- Identification of promising approaches and recommendations on future contents and institutional integration at project level;
- Recommendations to the GTZ (Sector Project Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation and regional departments) and to the BMZ on the integration of experience into future activities and country portfolios;
- General recommendations on dealing with the Anti-Terror Package and anti-terrorist measures within the framework of technical cooperation.

The results are to be presented in a summary study. The first part of this study should contain an assessment of the Anti-Terror Package on the basis of the above-mentioned

factors, and should identify, describe and assess promising approaches. The second part should focus on concrete recommendations for the future orientation and integration of measures. Recommendations are to be differentiated in terms of the different recipients (sector project, regional departments of the GTZ and the BMZ).

3. Activities

The party to the contract shall be responsible for the overall coordination of the study, for devising criteria and for preparing the overall report.

The main fields of activity are as follows:

- 1) Preparations and data gathering (Germany/Switzerland)
 - Preparations and data gathering (Germany/Switzerland)
 - devising criteria;
 - desk study: ATP project documentation and special reports, fundamental papers on development cooperation and terrorism (OECD's Development Assistance Committee – DAC, BMZ and GTZ/sector project), and any other relevant literature (research);
 - meetings with relevant individuals involved: ATP coordinator, regional departments, BMZ;
 - developing country analysis grid and questionnaires;

- 2) Country study
 - meetings with the GTZ staff involved (regional sections, director of GTZ office, principal adviser, project staff);
 - meetings with partners and target groups;

- 3) Compiling results (Germany/Switzerland)
 - debriefing;
 - drafting country studies;
 - workshop;

- 4) Overall report
 - preparation of the draft report;
 - consultation with sector project;
 - production of the final report.

4. Implementation

The overall coordination and planning of the study will be performed in close cooperation with the Sector Advisory Project Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation (ATP coordinator and project management).

The first assignment will end with the completion of the study, which is to be submitted in the form of a report in German no more than 60 pages long.

5. Schedule

The study is to be conducted between December 2002 and April 2003. The final report shall be submitted by 30 April 2003. The following schedule has been drawn up:

Activities	Days	Location
Preparation		D/CH
Fine-tuning ToRs and work plan	1	
Joint preliminary talks	1	Eschborn
Devising criteria	3	CH/D
Discussion of criteria, further fine-tuning of ToRs, confirmation of country selection	1	Eschborn
Developing country analysis grid and questionnaires	2	CH
Data gathering in Germany		
Desk studies, programme and project information	5	CH
Meetings at the GTZ and BMZ	3	D
Workshop (half-day), including preparations	2	D
Evaluation of results, data gathering and incorporation into the grid for country analysis and questionnaires	2	CH
	20	
In-country data gathering		
<u>Preparation for country studies:</u>		D/CH
Briefing consultants	1	
Evaluation of questionnaires	1	
Exchange of information with regional divisions	1	
Desk studies	1	
Country 1	5-10*	abroad
	from to 14	
Compiling results:		
Internal debriefing workshop	1	Germany
Draft country studies	4	
Workshop BMZ, GTZ to present results	1	
Elaboration of the overall draft	7	CH
Discussion with sector project	1	Germany
Finalisation	2	CH
Contingency	5	
	31	
Total	65	

2. An overview of the ATP measures

Ser.No.	Country	Title of the Project
01	Uzbekistan	Support to technical colleges
02	Tajikistan	Community based conflict prevention. Reintegration of former combatants and training measures
03	Central Asia & Caucasus	Support to the legal reform process in Central Asia
04	FR Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Hercegovina	Promoting young people to prevent conflict and violence
05	Yemen	Development in the Governorats of Marib and Djauf
06	Palestine	Conflict reduction through informal training and NGO promotion
07	Egypt	Self-empowerment of poor in urban areas
08	North Africa, cross-regional	Regional Watermanagement/ESCWA
09	Cross-regional / Mediterranean	Regional Program "good governance"
11	Mozambique	Civic and Voter Education
12	Mali	Program Mali North
13	Senegal	Strengthening Peace Constituencies
14	Niger	Crisis Prevention Niger North
15	DR Congo	Mitigating Crises by strengthening Civil Society
16	Rwanda	Crisis prevention - promoting political education
17	Horn of Africa IGAD	Peace Fund Horn of Africa
18	Philippines	Poverty Reduction and Conflict Transformation Project, Mindanao/Peace development and conflict transformation in the endangered areas of the Philippines, with a particular focus on Mindanao
19	Indonesia	Support for good Governance. Reform of Citizens administration systems
20	Nepal	German Emergency Fund
21	Sri Lanka	Conflict transformation measures - Program for adolescence/adults, Sri Lanka
22	Columbia	Fondo para pequenos proyectos
23	Peru	Fondo para el fortalecimiento de la democracia y el estado de derecho
24	Nicaragua	Improving the police infrastructure to deal with trafficking in human beings
25	Cross-regional – different cross-regional sectoral issues	
25-1	Marginalised Groups / cross-regional Nigeria	Backup measure on democracy and rule of law/ Enforcing the legal rights of disadvantaged groups
25-2	Islamic countries	Strengthening woman's rights
25-3	Security Sector Reform	Security Sector Reform

Ser.No.	Country	Title of the Project
25-4	Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation	Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation
25-5	Peace Fund	Fund for Peace Initiatives (Peace Fund)
New measures in the second tranche		
26	Tadschikistan	Support to the primary education program
27	Palestine	Promotion of basic health services
28	Palestine	Agriculture program for the poor and refugees
29	Sierra Leone	Anti Terror Program
30	Chad	Crisis Prevention
31	Nigeria	Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation
32	Mozambique	Community Policing
33	East Timor	Promotion of post conflict management and reconciliation processes
34	India	Promotion of Watershed - Maharashtra
35	Yugoslavia	Training measures in crisis regions and infrastructure reconstruction and development (Serbia)
36	Bosnia and Hercegovina	Training measures in crisis regions and infrastructure reconstruction and development (Bosnia and Hercegovina)

3. Assessing the Peacebuilding Relevance of programmes or projects

Thania Paffenholz (2002)

What is the objective of a Peacebuilding Relevance Assessment?

The objective of a peacebuilding relevance assessment is to judge whether the overall direction of a programme or project (objectives and main activities lines) are replying to a countries' peacebuilding needs and reflecting donor's respective peacebuilding strategies.

Degree of Peacebuilding Relevance: General Definition:

The extent to which the programme's or project's objectives and main activity lines/sectors are consistent with

The country's peacebuilding needs as defined in an analysis of the conflict and peace situation in the country;

Donor policies (peacebuilding strategies, respective specific programmes, etc.).

How to assess whether the programme or project is in line with the countries peacebuilding needs?

Step 1:

Identify the main conflicts and peacebuilding opportunities in a country
= conflict and peace context analysis.

This analysis should vary from conflict phase to phase:

- When a country has tensions that might lead to violent conflict, the main factors that have potential to lead the country to violent conflict need to be analysed (escalating factors) as well as the main factors that might reduce the potential for violent conflict (de-escalating factors).
- When a country is already in a situation of violent conflict or war, the main factors (causes of war) that lead to more violence (escalating factors) need to be assessed as well as the main opportunities that can contribute to peacebuilding (de-escalating factors).
- When a country is in a post-war / violent conflict situation, the main factors that could eventually lead to a recourse of violence (escalating factors) and the main opportunities for stabilising peace (de-escalating factors), need to be assessed.

Step 2:

Compare whether the objectives and main activities lines of a programme or a project are responding to the identified conflict escalating or de-escalating (peacebuilding) factors (see point 1 above).

⇒ The programme/project is relevant for peacebuilding, when the main objectives and the majority of activity lines are reflecting the factors that are de-escalating (the potential for) violent conflict and contributing to peacebuilding.

How to assess whether the programme / project is in line with donor policies?

1. Identify the main donor policies that are applicable for the given intervention (for example peacebuilding policy papers, specific programme documents, etc.)
2. Compare the programmes/project objectives with the goals defined in the policy papers.
3. If the programme addresses these goals, it is relevant for the respective donor policy.

An assessment of peacebuilding relevance *must not*?

1. be confused with measuring the impact that a programme or project will have on the conflict and peace situation;
2. aim at judging how an intervention is conducted and whether the way the intervention is conducted is contributing negative or positive to peacebuilding.

Both needs to be done within other type of assessments (for example: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) .

4. Rapid Conflict and Peace Impact Appraisal

(work in progress, thanks for comments!)

Thania Paffenholz, 3/2003

Objective

The objective of a “Rapid Conflict and Peace Impact Appraisal” is to assess the potential of an intervention to impact positively or negatively on a conflict and peace situation.

How to do it?

1. Assess the potential to contribute to conflict de-escalation in the short-run and to peacebuilding in the long-run

Key question: Can the intervention give a contribution to the de-escalation of conflict in the short-run and to peacebuilding in the long-run?

Application:

- identify and analyse the major conflict lines and actors
- identify and analyse the peace process of the country/project area/region
- identify the possible conflict de-escalating factors = opportunities for
- peacebuilding (short and long-term)
- check whether the intervention is responding to these factors

2. Assess the potential to contribute to conflict escalation risk in the short run/long-run

Key question: Has the intervention a potential to do harm = contribute to the escalation of conflict?

Application:

Analyse the conflict context of the country/project area/region:

- identify and analyse of the major conflict lines and actors in the country/project area/region
- identify the main factors that contribute to the escalation of violent conflict (short and long-term)
- check whether intervention has given a contribution to these factors

In rare cases, there is also the possibility that an intervention has no impact on the conflict and peace setting = no escalation or de-escalation factors tackled.